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Generally risk is seen as an abstract concept which is difficult to measure. In this thesis, 
we consider quantification in the broader sense by measuring risk in the context of large projects. 
By improved risk measurement, it may be possible to identify and control risks in such a way that 
the project is completed successfully in spite of the risks.  
This thesis considers the trade-offs that may be made in project risk management, 
specifically time, cost and quality. The main objective is to provide a model which addresses the 
real problems and questions that project managers encounter, such as:   
• If I can afford only minimal resources, how much quality is it possible to achieve? 
• What resources do I need in order to achieve the highest quality possible? 
• If I have limited resources and I want the highest quality, how much functionality do 
I need to lose? 
We propose the use of a causal risk framework that is an improvement on the traditional 
modelling approaches, such as the risk register approach, and therefore contributes to better 
decision making.    
The approach is based on Bayesian Networks (BNs). BNs provide a framework for causal 
modelling and offer a potential solution to some of the classical modelling problems. Researchers 
have recently attempted to build BN models that incorporate relationships between time, cost, 
quality, functionality and various process variables. This thesis analyses such BN models and as 
part of a new validation study identifies their strengths and weaknesses. BNs have shown 
considerable promise in addressing the aforementioned problems, but previous BN models have 
not directly solved the trade-off problem.  Major weaknesses are that they do not allow sensible 
risk event measurement and they do not allow full trade-off analysis. The main hypothesis is that 
it is possible to build BN models that overcome these limitations without compromising their 
basic philosophy.  
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CPD  Conditional Probability Distribution 
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Many large-scale projects are unsuccessful due to insufficient analysis of the risks 
involved which usually results in escalating costs, delay and poor delivery. In particular the 
perception of major project failures is heightened due to the well publicised failures of large 
construction projects such as airports, bridges or public buildings.  Information about the 
overrunning of public projects appears in the media more often, but large overruns also exist in 
private industry. The 2008 Heathrow Terminal 5 fiasco is a classic example of perceived project 
failure. Despite the enormous attention project risk management has received since the 1990s, the 
track record of projects is fundamentally poor, particularly for large projects. 
Project risk management consists of identifying, monitoring, controlling and measuring 
risk. This project focuses on one especially important component of risk management - namely 
the quantitative aspect. Quantification has always been a key component of risk management, but 
until very recently the quantitative aspects focused entirely on insurance type risk. In this thesis, 
we consider quantification in the broader sense of measuring risk in the context of large projects. 
By improved risk measurement it may be possible to identify and control risks in such a way that 
the project is completed successfully in spite of the risks. 
The criteria against which a project’s success or failure can be measured are cost, time 
and quality, often referred to as The Iron Triangle, see Figure 1.1. Ideally, every project manager 
would like their projects to satisfy all three of the above criteria. However, the reality is that due 
to project constraints, trade-offs need to be made which usually result in only two of the three 
criteria being met, as implied by the Iron Triangle. Many factors need to be considered when 
deciding whether to compromise on time, cost and/or quality. The problem is that it is not always 
possible to amend one of these factors without having an impact on one or more of the other 
factors. For example, reducing the time could have a serious impact on cost and/or quality. The 
key point is that it is possible to trade-off quality for lesser time spent, but also less cost. 
              Currently project management literature only covers the theory behind the classic ‘trade-
off’ problem between cost, time and quality but it does not provide a decision-support system for 
trade-off analysis, in such a way that project managers can monitor and see which projects are on 
target in different phases of a project. This thesis is interested in providing a decision-support 
system motivated by the real problems and questions that face real project managers:   
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• If I can afford only minimal resources, how much quality is it possible to achieve? 
• What resources do I need in order to achieve the highest quality possible? 
• If I have limited resources and I want the highest quality, how much functionality do 
I need to lose? 
 
Figure 1.1 The Iron Triangle 
What is needed is a new approach to quantitative risk assessment that satisfies the 
following requirements:  
1. Able to model and measure trade-offs between time, cost and quality; in such a 
way as to be able to answer questions such as those mentioned previously.  
2. Able to produce an overall risk score for the project which: a) takes into account 
the overall success criteria and b) is available at any stage of the project life cycle 
and not just at the end of the project. 
3. Is dynamic, i.e. able to take into account new information in order to revise its 
predictions and assessments for the overall risk score.  
4. Is able to capture notions of cause and effect such as the possibility of avoiding 
risks by using controls and mitigants. Ideally also be able to capture opportunities 
as well as risks since these will have an impact on the overall success of the 
project. 
5. Able to quantify unavoidable uncertainty in all of this.   
6. The approach can be used by practitioners who have no mathematical/statistical 
background. 
The research hypothesis is: We can provide an approach and template model which satisfies all 
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approach is based on Bayesian Networks (BNs). BNs will be used because they provide effective 
decision-support for problems involving uncertainty and probabilistic reasoning, since they are 
able to combine diverse data. 
In addition to satisfying the above requirements the proposed approach has the following benefits 
inherited from the BNs methodology: 
a. Handle and make predictions with incomplete data sets  
b. Combine diverse types of data sets including both subjective beliefs and objective data 
c. Overturn previous beliefs in light of new evidence 
d. Learn and explicitly model causal factors and their relationships 
e. Reason from effect to cause and vice versa 
f. Arrive at decision based on visible auditable reasoning and improve decision making for 
managers 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters as follows. 
Chapter 2 discusses the background and overview of project risk management. Project risk 
management is introduced together with project risk management standards. This is followed by a 
comprehensive list of risk factors for large projects with a discussion of the reasons for project 
failure and project success. The chapter finishes with a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art 
project risk management tools.  
Chapter 3 provides the necessary background on BNs including their theoretical and technical 
framework. This provides sufficient information to discuss the advantages of BNs when applied 
to project risk management modelling.   
Chapter 4 gives a detailed description of existing BN project risk models and their limitations. 
Models that include trade-off analysis as well as models that cover other aspects of project risk 
management are examined.  
Chapter 5 is one of the main new contributions of this thesis and it argues that standard project 
risk quantification framework is inadequate. Overview of the risk definitions and how they have 
evolved to include opportunities are included. We present a new causal risk framework and 
models created to demonstrate it.  
This is the original work and an earlier version of this work has been published: Fineman, 
M. and Fenton N. E., Quantifying Risks Using Bayesian Networks, IASTED Int. Conf. Advances 
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in Management Science and Risk Assessment (MSI 2009), Beijing, China, 2009, IASTED 662-219 
[65]. I discussed the fundamental problems with a classical risk register and proposed a solution 
based on Bayesian Networks that incorporates opportunities into modelling.  
Chapter 6 is one of the main contributions to this thesis and it describes a Causal Risk Register 
Model that implements risk taxonomy presented in chapter 5. The model is validated internally 
and externally. The model addresses key limitations of classical risk register approach. 
Chapter 7 is one of the main contributions to this thesis and it describes Generic Trade-off Model 
that provides trade-offs between time, cost and quality. It includes requirements for the new 
template model and covers structure of this model. The model is an improvement on models 
discussed in chapter 4. The model is validated internally and externally.  
This is the original work and an earlier version of this work has been published: Fineman 
M., Radlinski L. and Fenton N. E., Modelling Project Trade-off Using Bayesian Networks, IEEE 
Int. Conf. Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering. Wuhan, China, 2009, IEEE 
Computer Society [64]. I developed a generic BN model for analysis of trade-offs between time, 
cost and quality in large projects. I also proposed a set of assumed rules that the model had to 
satisfy and demonstrated how the model can be used to support decision making by the managers 
in some typical scenarios. The new research content of the paper is almost entirely my own work, 
with contributions from the co-authors on presentation and accuracy.   
Chapter 8 summarises the main points of the research undertaken for the thesis drawing 
conclusions. 
Appendix A, Risk Factors for Large Projects 
Appendix B, Risk Factors for Large Projects as Attributes 
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2.  Overview of Project Risk Management  
To understand the requirements and research hypothesis it is crucial to review and 
provide the background information on project risk management. In this chapter we discuss 
project risk management standards, since we believe risk definitions from various standards could 
be improved. We discuss the project risk management process and general risk issues for large 
projects. Numerous works have been conducted on how project success can be measured. Project 
success is usually defined as meeting time, cost and quality objectives. Key project factors 
identified will be used in the quantitative models developed and described in the subsequent 
chapters.  
In the second part of this chapter we examine current state-of-the-art models. These vary 
in focus from the ones that concentrate on planning and scheduling to risk register through to 
alternative approaches. We first cover the planning and scheduling group of models including 
critical path method, PERT and Monte Carlo simulation techniques. We then cover classical risk 
register, followed by alternative techniques including fault trees, cognitive mapping methods and 
decision trees. 
The new contribution of this chapter is the analysis of risk factors and improvement on 
how they can be phrased as attributes (Appendix B) and the analysis of the suitability of various 
modelling approaches to risk analysis for large projects.       
2.1 Background of Project Risk Management  
 
The first formalized project risk management approach started in the 1950s. An important 
milestone for indicating the beginning of quantitative project risk management was the 
development of scheduling techniques such as the Critical Path Method (CPM) [96] and the 
Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) [119] which deal with risks implicitly. The 
main focus of those approaches was project scheduling This is a reasonably well researched area 
and it is not a major focus of this thesis, except if scheduling is in the context of quantifying risk 
assessment (tools such as the CPM and PERT, along with other project risk management tools are 
discussed in section 2.7).  
The first article on project risk management was published by the Harvard Business 
Review [68]. In the beginning, the main focus was on planning, procurement and administrative 
functions. By the 1980’s, project risk management had already become a well-recognized area in 
project management literature consisting of: risk identification, estimation, risk response 
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development and risk control. Its applications in industries were mainly time and cost risk 
analysis [78].  
During the 1990’s the focus of project risk management has changed and it began to turn 
from developing the quantitative side into developing and understanding the risk management 
process. New project risk management focus areas were cooperation and networking approaches, 
and managing business processes as projects. The rapid development of technology has enabled 
the application of project risk management in a geographically distributed business environment. 
Furthermore, an increasing number of risk management studies were carried out in the 1990’s 
which report on project failures. Hence, practitioners are paying attention on learning from 
experience and introducing experience-based solutions of how risks could be avoided.  
Companies are developing knowledge bases associated with project risk management 
[123]. The knowledge bases contain the descriptions of risks, but can also offer other valuable 
data such as suggestions for how to respond to risk. These risk knowledge bases can thus be used 
as organizational memory banks where experience about risks and potential risk responses are 
continuously recorded during project execution. It seems likely that changes and developments, 
such as these, in project risk management will continue. 
2.2 Project Risk Management Standards 
 
The first risk related standard ever published was Norsk Standard NS5814:1991: Krav til 
risikoanalyser in 1991 [143]. This standard only addressed risk analysis and it did not cover the 
other parts of risk assessment.  
The first project risk management standard was BS 6079-3:2000: Project Management – 
Part 3: Guide to the Management of Business – related Project Risk by British Standards 
Institution in 2000 [24]. The International Electrotechnical Commission in Switzerland launched 
CEI/IEC 62198:2001: International Standard, Project Risk Management: Application Guidelines 
in 2001 [86]. In its scope section is stated that: “This International Standard is applicable to any 
project with technological content. It may also apply to other projects.” In general it is easy to 
classify the standards according to their scope. The exception to this is the IEEE Standard 1540-
2001: Standard for Software Life Cycle Processes – Risk Management by Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers in USA in 2001 [84], which states in its introduction that: “The risk 
management process defined in this standard can be adapted for use at an organisation level or 
project level.”  
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The Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition by the US Department of Defence 
published in 2002 [182] has a limited scope of application to US defence acquisition projects. 
Two project risk management standards appeared in quick succession in 2004. The 
Association for Project Management in the UK launched the Project Risk Analysis and 
Management Guide [7]; and the Project Management Institute in USA introduced the Guide to 
the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBoK): Chapter 11, Project Risk Management 
[151]. 
The focus on various standards was to create process consistency. All standards identified 
describe the following process steps: planning, identification, analysis, treatment and control. 
Terminology differs between the standards, but the process structure is similar in all of them.  
In the analysis step, there seems to be a dominant distinction between the two following main 
activities: 
1. Risk estimation, which refers to an assessment of the likelihood of occurrence and 
possible consequences of the risks identified in the previous step. 
2. Risk assessment, which refers to an evaluation of the assessed risk by comparison with 
the criteria and thresholds of the decision makers in order to determine the priority for 
treatment.  
The above six standards limit their scope of application, as indicated by their title, to project 
risk management. However, it may be worth looking at other standards, defined in general terms 
since there are no significant differences in terms of the structure of the processes and the 
contents of the various stages. Thus it seems reasonable to also consult the following general 
scope standards, i.e. organisational standards: 
• CAN/CSA-Q850-97: Risk Management: Guideline for Decision-Makers 
launched by Canadian Standards Association in 1997 [27]. 
• JIS Q2001: 2001(E): Guidelines for Development and Implementation of Risk 
Management System launched by Japanese Standards Association in 2001 [88]. 
• Risk Management Standard published by Institute of Risk Management/National 
Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector/Association of Insurance and 
Risk Mangers in UK in 2002 [85]. 
• AS/NZS 4360:2004: Risk Management published by Standards 
Australia/Standards New Zealand in 2004 [9]. 
In subsequent discussions about risk definition and processes the following standards 
have been used: Risk Management Standard published by Institute of Risk Management/National 
Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector/Association of Insurance and Risk Mangers in 
                                                                                                               
20 
 
UK in 2002, AS/NZS 4360:2004: Risk Management published by Standards Australia/Standards 
New Zealand in 2004, the Project Management Institute in USA introduced Guide to the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBoK): Chapter 11, Project Risk Management. 
2.3 Project Risk Management Process 
 
In advocating the use of project risk management, Wideman [189] observed that: 
“Experience on many projects reveals poor performance in terms of reaching scope, quality, time 
and cost objectives. Many of these shortcomings are attributed either to unforeseen events which 
might or might not have been anticipated by more experienced project management, or to 
foreseen events for which the risks were not fully accommodated.”  
Wideman’s observation manages to encapsulate three central ideas in project risk management 
practice:  
1. Identifying events with negative consequences  
2. Estimating their probability and impact  
3. Responding appropriately 
Wideman’s process requires that we first identify ‘risk events’. We then estimate the probability 
that each risk will occur, and the impact on the project if it does occur. Thirdly we determine an 
appropriate response to the risk.  
Research of failed software projects showed that “their problems could have been avoided or 
strongly reduced if there had been an explicit early concern with identifying and resolving their 
high-risk elements” (Boehm [19]). Hence, Boehm [19] suggested a process consisting of two 
main phases:  
1. Risk assessment, which includes identification, analysis and prioritization. 
2. Risk control, which includes risk management planning, risk resolution and risk 
monitoring planning, tracking and corrective action.  
Fairley [53] proposes about seven steps:  
1. Identify the risk factors 
2. Assess risk probabilities and effects   
3. Develop strategies to mitigate the identified risks   
4. Monitor the risk factors 
5. Invoke a contingency plan  
6. Manage the crisis 
7. Recover from the crisis  
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The Software Engineering Institute [168], a leading source of methodologies for managing 
software development projects, looks at project risk management as consisting of five distinct 
phases: identification, analysis, response planning, tracking and control. In its Guide to the 
Project Management Body of Knowledge, the Project Management Institute [151] gives a good 
overview of typical PRM processes consisting of four phases: identification, quantification, 
response development and control.  
Kliem and Ludin [103] present a four phases process: identification, analysis, control and 
reporting. Chapman and Ward [32] outline a generic PRM process consisting of nine phases: 
define the key aspects of the project, focus on a strategic approach to risk management, identify 
where the risks might arise, structure the information about the risk assumptions and 
relationships, assign ownership of the risks and responses, estimate the extent of the uncertainty, 
evaluate the relative magnitude of the various risks, plan the responses and manage by monitoring 
and controlling the execution. From this brief review it is noticeable that there is general 
agreement regarding what is included in the process, with the differences depending on variations 
in the level of detail and on the assignment of activities to steps and phases. 
It is in response to the risk stage that project risk management lays a claim to rationality. The 
expected value of the risk can be calculated as first described by Bernoulli in 1738 [16]: 
“If the utility of each possible profit expectation is multiplied by the number of ways in which can 
it occur, and we then divide the sum of these products by the total number of possible cases, a 
mean utility will be obtained, and the profit which corresponds to this utility will equal the value 
of risk in question.” 
This concept of expected value allows us to evaluate risk responses. Let net response gain 
for a given risk response be defined as the gain in expected value less the cost of applying the risk 
response. The rational risk treatment is then the response among all possible alternatives that has 
the greatest net response gain. 
The risk response planning process prescribed in the PMBOK offers a number of 
categories of risk treatments. If the expected value of the untreated risk is sufficiently high, one 
might decide to accept the risk (pg. 263). Otherwise, one might treat the risk by transferring it, for 
example, by insuring against it. Alternatively, one could avoid the risk by adopting a new course 
of action through which the risk cannot occur, or one could mitigate the risk by taking action to 
reduce its probability or impact (pg. 261-2). Techniques based on the traditional expected utility 
theory do not accurately describe human decision making and techniques based on expected 
monetary value raise even more concerns [101]. Review of multiple criteria decision analysis 
(MCDA) indicates popularity of multiattribute utility theory [50].    
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2.4 General Risk Issues for Major Large Scale Projects 
 Risks differ according to the type of project. For example, oil platforms are technically 
difficult, but they typically face few institutional risks since they are socially desired because of 
the high revenues they bring to communities and countries [94, 174]. Nuclear-power projects also 
pose high technical risks, however, they have higher social and institutional risks.      
 It is often said that the real risks in any project are the ones that you fail to recognise. 
This would imply that when identifying potential sources of risk, a broad scope should be 
adopted, thereby reducing the chances of overlooking important areas of risk. The emphasis 
should therefore be on generating a comprehensive list of risks rather than prematurely 
identifying a limited set of key risks. During the identification of risks there is a natural tendency 
to simply omit recording some risks because their impacts are immediately considered to be of a 
minor nature. This has obvious dangers in that omitting seemingly minor problems can mean that 
the combined effect of large numbers of apparently minor risks may be underestimated. In 
addition, there is also a tendency to omit recording risks where an effective response cannot be 
attributed to it, and this too has an obvious danger since potentially some risks are overlooked. 
 First it is important to be able to identify: 
• new risks 
• risks of which the scale may have changed, for instance, because of a context that has 
developed 
• long known risks that have not been studied in depth 
• risks of which social awareness has grown, for example, it may be that a risk that has 
been dominant in the past has been eliminated or reduced which creates new priorities.  
2.5 What is a successful project? 
Project success is a core concept of project management. Therefore, it is important that 
success objectives are defined and specified [87, 105, 112, 196, 159]. Oisen [144] in the 1970s 
suggested cost, time and quality as the success criteria for project management and the success of 
projects. Since then these criteria are usually included in the description of project management. 
Many other writers Turner [181], Morris and Hough [130], Wateridge [185, 186], deWitt [41, 
42], McCoy [129], Pinto and Slevin [150], Babu and Suresh [9], Saarinen [167], Khang et al. 
[99], Ballantine et al. [12] and Kerzner [97, 98] all agree cost, time and quality should be used as 
success criteria. Some authors suggest that other criteria in addition to cost, time and quality 
could be used to assess projects [169, 175].        
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In the early 1980s more comprehensive definitions were developed. Baker et al. defined 
project success as follows: “If the project meets the technical performance specifications and/or 
mission to be performed and if there is a high level of satisfaction concerning the project outcome 
among: key people in the parent organisation, key people in the client organisation, key people in 
the project team and key users or clientele of the project effort, the project is considered an 
overall success.” [11]  
Freeman and Beale [67] concluded that success means different things to each 
professional. An architect may consider success in terms of aesthetic appearance, an engineer in 
terms of technical competence, an accountant in terms of pounds spent under budget, a human 
resource manager in terms of employee satisfaction, etc. The importance of the concept of project 
success was reflected by the Project Management Institute devoting its 1986 Annual Seminar and 
Symposium to this topic.  
It is important to understand the concept of project success in order to explore it further. 
Time, cost and quality are the basic criteria to project success and they are identified and 
discussed in almost every article on project success [8]. Atkinson [8] called these three criteria the 
“Iron Triangle”. He further suggested that while other definitions on project management success 
have developed, the iron triangle is always included in the alternative definitions. 
The study performed by Crawford et al. [36] during the period of 1994–2003 confirms 
the fact that project management places great emphasis on ensuring conformance to time, budget 
and quality constraints. All projects are, to a certain degree, unique complex undertakings. 
However, there are significant similarities - most projects have restrictions in time and costs as 
well as certain demands for quality. As a result the project manager may find it extremely 
difficult to stay within the Iron Triangle. Kohrs and Welngarten [105] reported trade-offs that 
project manager must make: “Good! Fast! Cheap! Pick any two.” The Iron Triangle is the ‘magic 
combination’ that is continuously pursued by the project manager throughout the life cycle of the 
project [25, 78, 92, 72, 113, 130, 155, 165].  
If the project were to flow smoothly, according to plan, there might not be a need for 
trade-off analysis. Unfortunately, most projects eventually get into crises such that it is no longer 
possible to maintain the delicate balance necessary to attain the desired performance within time 
and cost [101]. The deviations are normally overruns, in the case of time and cost, whereas the 
quality deviation is usually a shortfall. No two projects are ever exactly alike, and trade-off 
analysis would be an ongoing effort throughout the life of the project, continuously influenced by 
both the internal and external environment. Experienced project managers may have planned 
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trade-offs in reserve in the event that anticipated crises arise hence recognising that trade-offs are 
essential in effective project risk management.  
For example, if we can achieve high quality this may compensate for cost and time. Or if 
there is timely delivery which enables a ‘first-to-market’ advantage (Microsoft products for 
example), then we may be willing to compromise with a low quality end-product. In the case of 
software projects we include functionality as part of quality and by doing this we can compare 
success. For example, how many function points [157] you deliver with how many defects at 
what cost and time. This means we can measure functionality objectively.  
There are many reports on project overruns and it would be a conservative estimate to 
state that approximately 50% of construction projects overrun [130] and approximately 63% of all 
information systems projects encounter substantial budget overrun [130], with overrun values 
“typically between 40 and 200 percent” [130]. Project sponsors claim that although, “most 
projects are eventually completed more or less to specification”, they are “seldom on time and 
within budget” [196]. It has even been suggested that a “good rule of thumb is to add a minimum 
of 50% to every time estimate, and 50% to the first estimate of the budget” [196].  
At first glance, a project that does not meet the three success factors of time, cost and 
quality would appear to be a failure, but this is not necessarily so. It is ‘perceived’ success or 
failure that is important and provided a project achieves a satisfactory level of technical 
performance, in retrospect it may be considered a success by the parties involved, despite 
exceeding its cost and time targets. This of course depends on whether cost and time targets were 
fixed or not. In addition, although the project cost more and took longer than the client originally 
perceived, the client may accept that this was unavoidable, was for good reason, that it received 
value for money, and the project was still a commercial success. The criterion of success or 
failure is whether the project sponsor, owner, client and other parties concerned, including the 
project manager’s parent company, are satisfied with the final outcome of the project.  
2.6 Factors affecting success or failure of projects 
 
The identification of project success factors can be used to analyse the reasons for project 
success and failure. Since the 1960s, many theoretical and empirical studies have been completed 
on success factors of a project. 
The success and failure factors were first introduced by Rubin and Seeling [164]. They 
investigated the impact of a project manager’s experience on the project’s success and failure. 
They concluded that the number of projects previously managed by a project manager has 
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minimal impact on the project’s performance, whereas the size of the previously managed 
projects does affect the project’s performance. 
Pinto and Selvin [150] reported that the critical success of a project depends on ten 
factors. These are: project mission, top management support, project schedules, client 
consultation, personnel recruitment, technical tasks, client acceptance, monitoring and feedback, 
communication and trouble-shooting. Anton listed six factors to enhance project success. These 
factors are: planning effort in design and implementation, project manager goal commitment, 
project team motivation, project manager technical capabilities, scope and work definition and 
control system. 
Belassi and Tukel [14] categorised these factors into four main groups. These are factors 
relating to: the project managers, the project, the organisation and the external environment.     
UK experience 
In the UK, two studies identified the factors leading to the failure of projects. Duffy and Thomas 
[49] identified the following reasons for the failure of projects: 
• Project management in the client, consultant, contractor and supplier organisations is 
an important factor in poor project performance. 
• Inappropriate project organisation is usually the key to an unsuccessful project. Here 
the roles and responsibilities in the project parties have not been clearly defined. 
• Lack of direction and control in the project team often results in low productivity and 
a failure to meet delivery dates.  
• On many projects consideration of an appropriate contract strategy is left until late in 
the project, when the full range of options available to the client cannot be 
considered. 
• Often the scope of work is not defined adequately to those participating in the 
project. 
• Frequently the level of planning is inappropriate to the scope of the project. Project 
stages are not clearly identified with agreed deliverables. 
US experience 
The major research work on the subject was carried out in the USA by Baker, Murphy and Fisher 
[11], who studied 650 projects. They identified a large number of factors which affected the 
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success of projects, the failure of projects and those which affected both success and failure, as 
shown in Table 2.1. They also consolidated their findings and identified the following:  
• The prime factors leading to project failure: 
o Poor coordination 
o Human relations 
• The prime factors leading to project success: 
o Adequate and appropriate organisational structures 
o Adequate and appropriate planning and control mechanisms 
We will incorporate their research findings in later chapters of this thesis when we build a 
quantitative model for project risk analysis. 
Factors affecting both success and failure 
Goal commitment of project team 
Accurate initial cost estimates 
Adequate project team capability 
Adequate funding to completion 
Adequate planning and control techniques 
Minimal start-up difficulties 
Task (versus social) orientation 
Absence or bureaucracy 
On-site project manager 
Clearly established success criteria 
Factors affecting… 
Failure Success 
Inadequate project manager: 
• Human skills 
• Technical skills 
• Influence 
• Authority 
Insufficient use of status and progress reports 
Use of superficial status/progress reports 
Insufficient client influence 
Project manager commitment to: 
• Established schedules 
• Established budgets 
• Technical performance goals 
 
Frequent feedback from the parent organisation 
Frequent feedback from the client 
Client commitment to: 
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Poor coordination with the client 
 
Lack of rapport with the client 
Client disinterest in budget criteria 
Lack of project team participation in decision-
making 
Lack of project team participation in problem-
solving 
Excessive structuring within project team  
Job insecurity within project team 
Lack of team spirit and sense of mission within 
project team 
Parent organisation stable, non-dynamic, 
lacking strategic change 
 
Poor coordination with parent organisation 
Lack of rapport with parent organisation 
Poor relations with parent organisation 
Project more complex than the parent has 
completed before 
Inability to freeze design early 
Inability to close out the effort 
Inadequate change procedures 
Unrealistic project schedules 
Initial under-funding 
New ‘type’ of project 
Poor relations with public officials 
Unfavourable public opinion 
• Established schedules 
• Established budgets 
• Technical performance goals 
 
Project team participation in determining 






Parent commitment to: 
• Established schedules 
• Established budgets 
• Technical performance goals 
Parent enthusiasm 
Parent desire to build up internal capabilities  
Adequate control procedures, especially for 
dealing with changes 
 
Judicious use of networking techniques 
Minimal number of public/government 
agencies involved 
Lack of excessive government red tape 
Enthusiastic public support 
Lack of legal encumbrances 
 
Table 2.1 Factors affecting the success or failure of projects [11] 
Very often a project team might use a table (such as the one in Table 2.2) to prompt their thinking 
about risks for their project. The team can decide which factors are relevant at what rating, and 
then proceed to state the specific risks they suspect could affect their project. By doing this they 
would develop a risk register.  
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When the project completes, the team should review its performance against the risk 
management documentation to see if there are factors to add to this table or if there are cues that 
should be changed to help future projects in the organization better identify their risks. 
               Rating (check one)    
Factor 
ID 
Risk Factors Low Risk Cues Medium Risk 
Cues 
High Risk 
Cues L M H NA NI TBD 
Notes 
                                    
Mission and Goals 










impacts one or 









                     










impacts one or 



















project in area 





or services of 
this 
organization 
                     
4 Work Flow little or no 
change to work 
flow 
will change 
some aspect or 
have small 




work flow or 
method of 
organization 
                     
Table 2.2 Sample risk factors for large projects [45] 




For the complete table, please refer to Appendix A. It consists of 14 categories with a total of 77 
risk factors listed. 
As Table 2.1 and 2.2 confirm, major studies carried out do identify separate factors 
affecting large projects i.e. factors affecting project success and factors affecting project failure. 
In fact many researchers do not realise that these factors are symmetrical. To prove this, we have 
created our table covering key project factors based on the studies we have mentioned above. In 
our table, factors are in fact attributes that can be either good or bad, Table 2.3. 
Adequacy of PM Good Bad 
Mission and Goals 
Project Fit to Customer 
Organization 
directly supports customer 
organization mission and/or 
goals 
does not support or relate to 
customer organization mission 
or goals 
Project Fit to Provider 
Organization 
directly supports provider 
organization mission and/or 
goals 
does not support or relate to 
provider organization mission 
or goals 
Customer Perception customer expects this 
organization to provide this 
product 
project is mismatch with prior 
products or services of this 
organization 
Work Flow little or no change to work 
flow 
significantly changes the work 
flow or method of 
organization 
Goal commitment of project 
team 
High goal commitment of 
project team 
Low goal commitment of 
project team 
Table 2.3 Key Project Factors 
For the complete table, please refer to Appendix B. 
2.7 State-of-The-Art on Modelling Project Risk  
2.7.1 Planning and scheduling tools  
Critical Path Method 
 
The Critical Path Method (CPM) is one of the most frequently used project scheduling 
tools. A schedule “network” represents the project strategy [82]. “Network” analysis procedures 
originated from the traditional Gantt chart. When the results of a CPM analysis are fitted to a 
calendar time, the project plan becomes a schedule. The CPM is overwhelmingly the standard 
approach for considering the effects of delays on a project [190].  
The CPM identifies the longest path in the network called the critical path by calculating 
activities time parameters. Any delay in an activity on the critical path will delay the entire 
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project. The paths that are not critical can be delayed, if they have scheduling flexibility, without 
necessarily delaying the project. 
The CPM models the activities and their dependency. Hence, it is not possible to start 
some activities until others are finished. These activities need to be completed in a sequence, with 
each stage being completed before the next stage can begin. Since real projects do not work this 
way, the CPM is just the beginning of project schedule management. Some key reservations 
about the standard CPM: 
• It is based on single-point estimates and therefore gives a false notion that the future can 
be predicted precisely. One common misconception is that since estimates are based on 
most likely estimates, things will even out by the law of averages [90]. In almost all 
cases, the CPM completion date is not the most likely. [82] 
• The activities on the critical path may not be the most likely to delay the project. Tasks 
not on the critical path can, due to deviations from the plan, end up on the critical path. 
The use of the CPM can therefore direct management’s attention to activities not likely 
to delay the project. The duration of each task is an estimate subject to uncertainty [90].  
The critical path may vary and single tasks may or may not be on the critical path when 
randomness is accounted for.  
• Project duration is probabilistic and therefore predictions of completion dates should be 
accompanied by probabilities. The duration calculated by the CPM is simply an addition 
of the most likely estimates, which is only accurate if everything goes according to plan. 
[82] The CPM date is rarely a good approximation of the most likely date. Even with a 
single path project, the CPM date is almost always far too optimistic [71].  
• The CPM does not account for path convergence and therefore tends to underestimate 
the duration of the project. For example, if three parallel activities all have an estimated 
duration of 10 days, the CPM calculated duration will be 10 days. However, if any one 
of the activities is delayed, this estimation will not hold. The likelihood of meeting the 
predicted merge date is the product of the probabilities of each of the joining paths [71].  
• The project duration calculated by the CPM is accurate only if everything goes 
according to plan. This is rare in real projects. 
• In many cases the completion dates the CPM produces are unrealistically optimistic and 
highly likely to be overrun, even if the schedule logic and duration estimates are 
accurately implemented. 
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• The CPM completion date is not even the most likely project completion date, in almost 
all cases. 
• The path identified as the “critical path” using traditional CPM techniques may not be 
the one that will be most likely to delay the project and which may need management 
attention. 
PERT 
The PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Technique) is a variation on Critical Path 
Analysis developed in the 1950’s. It was able to incorporate uncertainty in activity duration by 
making it possible to schedule a project while not knowing precisely the details and durations of 
all the activities [40, 119, 130, 132]. For each activity PERT gives three estimations: optimistic, 
most likely and pessimistic times. Also, it identifies the minimum time needed to complete the 
total project.  
In the 1960s PERT was a great success. However, in the 1970s doubts were raised about 
the theoretical assumptions of PERT and its practicality. The assumption of independence 
between activities and also assumption that all estimates have a Beta distribution are not practical. 
More importantly the PERT assumes that the probability distribution of the project completion 
time is the same as that of the critical path. The possibility that the critical path identified may not 
end up being the critical path is ignored. Hence, the PERT consistently underestimates the 
expected project completion time and produces overly optimistic estimates for the project 
duration.  
Monte Carlo Simulation Tools 
 
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) can be used to overcome some challenges associated with 
CPM and PERT. It was first proposed for project scheduling in the early 1960s. The technique 
became dominant only in 1980s when sufficient computer power became available. Each 
simulation is generated by randomly pulling a sample value for each input variable. These input 
sample values are then used to calculate the results, i.e. total project duration, total project cost, 
project finish time. The duration of each activity is estimated by shortest, most likely and longest 
duration and also the shape of the distribution (Normal, Beta etc.). Then critical path calculation 
is repeated several times. A sufficient number of runs provide a probability distribution for the 
possible results (i.e. time, cost) [91].  
 The following project risk management tools apply Monte Carlo analysis: 
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• Pertmaster Project Risk [149] 
• @Risk [1] 
• Deltek Risk+ [43]  
• Risk+ from S/C Solutions Inc. [161] 
• Crystall Ball [38]  
• Risky Project Professional 2.1[162]  
• PROAct [152]  
• Project Risk Analysis [154]  
Each MCS tool has its own specific functionalities. The following features are common 
to all of them:  
• Assign different statistical distributions including custom distributions to project 
inputs (task duration, cost, etc.) 
• Output results in different formats.  
MCS can also provide a sensitivity analysis by measuring the correlation between the 
project inputs (task duration, finish time etc.) and the project outputs (project duration, cost etc.). 
This gives an indication of how much the duration of each task affects completion of other tasks 
and also the tasks that are most likely to cause delay on the project. 
The classic Monte Carlo simulation method has a number of limitations. The serious flaw 
in traditional MCS is the assumption of statistical independence for individual activities which 
share risk factors in common with other activities [183]. MCS tools assume that the marginal 
distribution of uncertainty for individual activities in the project completely define the 
multivariate distribution for project schedule. Van Dorp and Duffey [183] demonstrated that 
failure to model such dependence during MCS can result in the underestimation of total 
uncertainty in project schedule. Statistical distributions of project inputs such as task durations 
should be obtained based on reliable historical data. In most large, novel projects this information 
is not available and using the MCS may not improve estimations [183]. 
2.7.2 Risk Register Approach 
 
The standard tool for project risk management is the so-called risk register [33, 184, 29, 
37, 191, 193]. Many organisations store their risks in undisclosed forms of registers [146, 34]. A 
risk register is a list of the typical risk factors of project failure compiled based on the experiences 
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from past projects. A risk register usually takes the form of a questionnaire or a risk list. The 
questionnaire consists of a set of questions that ask about the current state of the project. The 
questions directly indicate the existing risk factors and also guide towards some potential risk 
factors. The risk factors are identified usually by negative answers. Research conducted by the 
Design Information Group at Bristol University found that 67% of questionnaire respondents 
documented their risks on either paper or a computer based risk register [37].  
There are various statements in the literature describing the role of a risk register. 
Williams [193] states that a risk register has two main roles:  
1. To serve as a repository of knowledge 
2. To begin analysis and plans that flow from it.  
As such, the risk register should be used to keep log of the risks to a project. Chapman and Ward 
state that, to enable the documentation of the sources of the risk and their responses, as well as 
their classification, “the risk register identify phase involves compiling a list, a log or register” 
[33]. Within this, they identify that the documentation produced through the utilisation of project 
risk management can be regarded as a “by-product…rather than a central concern” [33]. 
Furthermore Ward states that “the purpose of the summary risk register is to help the project team 
review project risks on a regular basis throughout the project” [184]. The risk register is used as a 
formal method of identifying, quantifying and categorising the risks, as well as providing the 
means of developing a cost-effective method of controlling them [71].  
The risk register consists of three entities. A register of the risks itself as suggested by the 
title, which is the main focus of the system, and two supporting documents, to include 
information on the risk owner and risk reduction and mitigation plans. Once the risks have been 
identified, assessed and possibly analysed, they are placed into the risk register. Additional 
information about the risks to the project can be held within the risk owner and risk reduction and 
mitigation plans entities.   
Williams [193], Carter et al. [29] and Ward [184] all give examples of the type of 
information or items which can be stored in the risk register. Their general consensus is that the 
risk register should contain a description of the risk, its impact and probability. Hence, risk is 
decomposed into two components: 
• Probability of the risk 
• Impact the risk can cause. 




Risk is then quantified as the measure: 
risk = probability x impact              
Many additional items that could potentially be included within the risk register.  
A risk register involves a considerable dose of subjectivity especially where the project 
state is being assessed. A common technique to reduce the subjectivity in a risk register is to 
gather the answers from different sources.  
The publicly available risk identification risk registers are particularly useful in practice 
because of their accessibility and comprehensiveness. Some public risk registers currently 
available are: 
• Taxonomy-Based Questionnaire [28] – not very detailed, but wide-ranging questionnaire 
proposed by SEI in 1993. It consists of 194 mostly yes-no questions (some with sub-
questions) arranged in 3 risk taxonomy classes (product engineering, development 
environment and program constraints) divided further into 3 to 5 elements each with 3 to 
8 attributes. 
• Risk Assessment Checklist [179] – general questionnaire proposed by Rob Thomsett in 
1992 to assess risk in the very early stages of a project. It consists of 64 test questions in 
3 risk areas (user environment, team environment, system complexity). Coverage of the 
user environment is quite unique to this risk register. The questionnaire is supplemented 
with a method to assess the overall level of project risk, which evaluates each answer 
with a given number of points. The total number of points is then compared against a 
predefined scale, which assigns a risk level (high, medium or low) to a given range of 
points. 
• Software Development Checklist [127] – very detailed technically oriented questionnaire 
proposed by Steve McConnell in 1993. It consists of 511 yes-no questions in 5 major 
areas (requirements, design, construction, quality assurance, outsourcing). This checklist 
is exceptionally detailed and comprehensive with regard to the implementation practices 
(371 questions).  
• Complete List of Schedule Risks [128] – comprehensive list of risk factors for the 
exceeded schedule risk compiled by Steve McConnell in 1996. It consists of 109 risk 
factors in 12 areas (e.g. requirements, design, customer, end-user, personnel, 
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management). This risk list is also published on the Internet. It is quite well known and 
used in the industry. 
• Capers Jones’ 60 Risk Factors [90] – list of 60 common risk factors for the general risk of 
project failure compiled by Capers Jones in 1994. Each risk factor is extensively 
described in a 20-point text structure including severity and frequency, root causes, 
methods of prevention and control, as well as effectiveness and cost of known therapies. 
Information on known remedies, support, and references for each risk factor makes this 
risk list especially useful. 
2.7.3 Alternative general graphical tools  
 
This thesis proposes the use of graphical methods [113], namely Bayesian Networks 
(BNs), for project risk management. However, there are alternative graphical tools and that is 
what we will review next. 
Fault trees  
 Fault tree analysis was developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1962 for the US Air 
Force for use with the Minuteman system. It was later adopted and extensively applied by the 
Boeing Company [72, 160]. This is a graphical technique that provides a systematic description 
of the combinations of possible occurrences in a system, which can result in a system failure [14]. 
Fault tree analysis is a top-down method of analysing an undesirable event to determine all the 
ways that the event can happen, based on the behaviour of the components, lower-level 
assemblies, and interfaces.  
The most serious outcome is selected as the Top Event. A fault tree is then constructed by 
relating the sequences of events with AND and OR logical gates, which individually or in 
combination, could lead to the Top Event. Probabilities are assigned to each event and at an OR 
gate the probabilities must be added to give the probability of the next event, whereas at an AND 
gate, the probabilities are multiplied. Therefore it is possible to identify the failures that have the 
greatest influence on the End Event.  
Advantages of fault tree analysis are: 
• Provides insight into the system behaviour 
• A graphic aid for management 
• Identifies failures deductively 
• Handles complex systems more easily 
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• Provides options for management and others to perform either qualitative or quantitative 
reliability analysis 
• Allows concentration on one particular failure at a time 
In contrast, some of the disadvantages are as follows: 
• Independence assumption between the causes 
• A time consuming approach 
• A costly method 
• It considers components in either a working or failed state. More specifically, the 
components partial failure states are difficult to handle 
• Difficult to use for large projects 
• The end results are difficult to check. 
Cognitive Mapping Methodologies  
 
Cognitive mapping methods have been applied in research in a project context by Eden et 
al. [50] to study disruption and delays in projects; Williams [194] proposes using causal mapping 
and system dynamics to model complex projects; Williams et al. [194] used causal mapping to 
explore risks in projects; Maytorena et al. [124] employed causal mapping to explore the process 
of risk identification in projects and Klein proposed cognitive mapping to model project trade-
offs [101], to name a few. In a broader management science context cognitive mapping methods 
could be combined with other methodologies such as MCDM [16].  
The cognitive mapping methodology is built on the premise that all individuals gain an 
understanding of the world they inhabit through developing a set of beliefs, assumptions, and a 
knowledge base that is used to make sense of the world around them. The decision makers use 
“personal models” when making decisions and it is through the dissection of their explanations 
using cognitive mapping techniques that researchers are able to gain greater insight into the 
perceived complexities of the issues.  
Cognitive mapping techniques are used to identify an individual’s beliefs about a 
particular domain and to depict these diagrammatically. Swan [175] in her review of cognitive 
mapping as a management research tool highlights that the product of these mapping techniques, 
although typically referred to as cognitive maps, are not cognitive maps in the “psychological 
sense”. It is not “an internal mental representation” but a visual representation of an individual’s 
subjective data which helps in the understanding and analysis of specific elements of an 
individual’s thoughts rather than thinking [175].  
                                                                                                               
37 
 
The maps are a network of nodes and arrows as links where the direction of the arrow 
implies believed causality. Hence, when constructed by group cognitive maps are known as 
‘cause maps’. Cognitive maps are usually derived through interviews and they are intended to 
represent the subjective world of the interviewee. Cognitive mapping is a formal modelling 
technique with rules for its development. Cognitive maps are characterised by an hierarchical 
structure which is most often in the form of a means/ends graph with goal type statements at the 
top of the hierarchy.  
Eden’s causal mapping is an interactive decision-support tool used to capture and analyse 
complex problems and decision making [52]. Eden’s mapping approach is based on Kelly’s 
Personal Construct Theory [95], which provides a sound basis for understanding how individuals 
make sense of their experiences. This focus on problem solving and action makes it appropriate 
for ‘problem structuring’ and uncovering solution options. Kelly’s theory provides the rules for 
mapping.  
For representational purposes a cognitive map is drawn as short pieces of text linked with 
arrows. Generally a statement at the tail of an arrow is taken to cause, or influence, the statement 
at the arrowhead. An important aspect of Kelly’s theory argues that we make sense of situations 
through similarities and differences. Hence, we seek to identify each statement as having two 
contrasting poles. For cognitive maps the causality relates the first phrase of the bi-polar 
statement to the first phrase of the second statement. When an arrow head is shown with a 
negative sign attached then the first pole of the tail statement implies the second pole of the head 
statement. Typically a concept which has no implication is referred as a ‘head’ and a node which 
has no in-arrows is referred to as a ‘tail’.       
It is a well-founded methodology with a limited number of usable analysis software 
packages that allow for a detailed analysis of individual maps. One of the most advanced software 
packages is Decision Explorer™ [13]. In practice, the maps are built out of concepts linked to 
each other by arrows in a hierarchical form that indicate the nature of the linkage. From this the 
structure of the map has the potential of being analysed in a number of ways. Its disadvantage is 
that it does not allow for content analysis to be carried out easily. However, it can be used in 
combination with other specialist software packages for this purpose.  
This technique provides clear procedures for collecting data, and it allows for a 
systematic analysis of that data and is supported by a software package, which increases the 
reliability of the analysis. However, it does not provide the full use of causal modelling i.e. 
building quantitative models. We will provide this with using Bayesian Networks. 





A decision tree is a graphical diagram consisting of nodes and branches used to model 
and evaluate a decision process which consists of an alternating sequence of actions and 
uncertainty consequences [30, 80]. There are two node types: 
• Rectangle represents the decision to be made. The branches from decision nodes are the 
alternative choices. The manager can implement only one alternative.   
• Circle represents chance node. The branches from chance nodes have some element of 
uncertainty as to whether or not they will occur.  
The core of the decision tree is aggregating the payoff values and their associated 
probabilities into a single quantity that can be compared with each other. The aggregation 
procedure is repeated until the decision maker can identify the action to be chosen at the initial 
node and the subsequent decision nodes. The most commonly used method for the decision tree is 
the expected monetary value (EMV), which maximises the expected payoff as the evaluation 
criteria. If the monetary value is replaced with utility, which measures the decision maker’s 
preference in an interval scale, the EMV decision rule would become the maximising expected 
utility (EU). The utility analysis is a powerful framework for decisions involving risk, but it has 
some limitations. As discussed in [20], it cannot include the portfolio effect of the decision 
maker’s attitude, as the decision maker’s attitude changes dynamically. Another limitation is the 
famous Allais paradox [101], where people sometimes violate the basic assumptions on which the 
utility approach is based. So in most cases it is usual to use only the EMV rule. However, this 
might not produce the best result since the EMV rule does not consider the decision maker’s 
attitude. Yager pointed out the shortcomings of the EMV rule [199, 201, 200] such as the use of 
the expected values that associate a neutral attitude to the decision maker.  
For the solutions of constructing decision functions which allow for the inclusion of 
decision attitude and probabilistic information in uncertainty, Yager comprehensively 
investigated this problem in various conditions, and proposed a mechanism for combining 










Every project involves some degree of risk, but that risk can be controlled with careful 
analysis.  One of the key responsibilities of a project manager is to anticipate project risks, and 
then to devise the means for controlling those risks before they can get out of hand.  This is where 
the risk management process comes in. Risk is a complex notion and it is very difficult to capture 
all major aspects of project risk. The fast changing environment and the complexity of projects 
has increased risk exposure. 
Project risk management operates in a complex and dynamic environment that is 
constantly confronted with various risks. It is therefore imperative that project managers should 
consider all possible risk factors affecting a given project. Furthermore, they should take 
corrective actions to control and manage the identified risks. An effective risk management 
approach can provide a framework for project mangers which enables them to identify and assess 
potential risk factors and to then take the necessary actions in order to achieve the desired 
objectives of a given project. 
Risk management can be a challenging process because it requires anticipating future 
events. However, instead of only trying to look into the future, we can manage risk by looking at 
the past. By examining prior project experiences, you can get a better insight into risk 
probabilities and if you can anticipate an event, you should be able to weigh up the consequences, 
and control the outcome. 
All novel projects are risky and once a project has started even experienced project 
managers can make ineffective choices. Hence, we need project risk analysis and project risk 
management tools in order to help us with decision making.  
We have reviewed the techniques currently in use within the area of project risk 
management. Furthermore, we have established the requirements which must be satisfied and, as 
we can see in Table 2.4, there is no current state-of-the-art tool which satisfies all the 
requirements. Even what is considered as standard to project risk management (the risk register) 
does not satisfy two of the criteria. We believe it is possible to develop a tool which satisfies all 
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 Expectations for 
project risk 
analysis tool 
Expectations met by: 













time, cost and 
quality 
No No No No No No No No 
2) Produce overall 
risk score 
No No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
3) Dynamic 
model 





No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5) Model key 
notions of causal 
effect 
No No No No No No Yes No 
6) Quantify 
uncertainty 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Table 2.4 Expectations for project risk analysis tool 
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3. Bayesian Networks  
This chapter introduces the formal technique for quantitative risk assessment called 
Bayesian networks (BNs). The current state of the art of this subject is laid-out in detail. Bayes 
theorem and its uses are described. Recent developments in the area, such as ranked nodes and 
dynamic discretisation, are also covered in detail.  
This chapter also offers basic BNs background knowledge which lays the foundation to 
be able to understand the models reviewed in chapter 4 and the models developed and described 
in chapter 6 and 7. The new contribution of this chapter is a compact introduction to the BNs and 
a detailed review of recent developments used to build BNs. 
3.1 Background 
 
Bayesian networks (BNs) have been established as practical representations of 
knowledge for reasoning under uncertainty. They are based on modelling ideas that have been 
around for some time. The representation was first introduced in 1921 by the statistician Wright 
[197] for the analysis of crop failure. It was reinvented by many forms of research [54, 89, 122, 
137, 135, 172, 147, 74, 92, 118, 204, 138, 155, 177, 195] under various names, such as causal 
networks, causal probabilistic networks, graphical probability networks, belief networks, and 
influence diagrams. Bayesian networks, are also called, generative models, probabilistic cause-
effect models and causal models. 
All inference in BNs is performed using Bayes Theorem. Bayes Theorem is all about how 
to revise our beliefs in the light of new evidence. To illustrate Bayes Theorem, we start with a 
simple two node BN in Figure 3.1. 
 
                                          Figure 3.1 BN of ‘Project Late’ risk 
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In this example we assume for simplicity that both nodes have just two states (true and false). The 
arc from ‘Poor Project Management’ to ‘Project Late’ simply indicates that the former influences 
the latter. To compute Bayes we need the prior probabilities given in Table 3.2.   
H   False True 
E P(E|H) 
False 0.9 0.3 
True 0.1 0.7 
Table 3.1 Probabilities for H and E 
Suppose that H represents the statement ‘Poor Project Management’ and E represents 
‘Project Late’. The probability for H is P(H). Since this node does not have parent nodes the NPT 
(Node Probability Table) for this node is very simple. We only have to assign a probability to 
each of the two possible values ‘True’ and ‘False’. NPT in Table 3.1 tells us that the probability 
of H being ‘False’ is 0.1 and the probability of H being ‘True’ is 0.9. We are interested in 
knowing what the probability is for H given the evidence E. We write this as P (H| E). The 
inference in the model is performed based on Bayes Theorem. Mathematically Bayes theorem is 
expressed as: 
                                                                                   (2-1) 
Where it is possible to update our belief in hypothesis H given E. The left-hand term, 
P(H|E) is known as the posterior probability, or the probability of H after considering E. The term 
P(H) is the prior probability of H. The term P(E|H) is the conditional probability of E given H. 
Finally, the last term P(E) is the prior probability of E. 
We know from the NPTs that P(H) = 0.1 and P(E|H) = 0.7. The NPTs do not provide the 
denominator value directly, but they do provide it indirectly and we can calculate it using the 
following equation: 
P (E) = P(E|H)P(H) + P(E|not H)P(not H)          (2-2) 
         = 0.7(0.1) + 0.1(0.9) 
         = 0.153 
 Therefore, substituting these values in Bayes’ Theorem we get  
P(H|E) = 0.7 * 0.1 / 0.153 = 0.457.             (2-3) 
H P(H) 
 False 0.1 
 True 0.9 
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Thus, the observation that there are profits in the company increases the probability that there is 
follow on work with this client up to 0.457.  
While we can perform the necessary probabilistic reasoning manually when there are just two 
variables, things are more complex as we introduce additional variables and dependencies. This is 
why we need the mechanism and algorithms of BNs.    
3.2 Bayesian Network Definition 
 
In Figure 3.2 we apply this definition to a BN example model. 
 False                      0.6 
True 0.4 
                                                     
W False True 
M False True False True 
False 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 
True 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 
 
Figure 3.2 ‘Project overspend’ risk – BN theory applied 
Each node in a BN model has a specific type. Common types are: 
• Discrete where the states are point real numbers e.g. ‘-2’, ‘0’, ‘1.5’, ’33.4’ etc. 
• Continuous where the states are intervals between real numbers e.g. ‘-20 – -10’,  
‘-10 – 0’, ‘0 – 10’, ’10 – 15’ etc. Or point real numbers. 
• Labelled where the states are expressed as words which cannot be transformed into a 
numerical scale e.g. ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’, ‘yellow’. 
• Boolean where there are two states ‘True’ and ‘False’. 
False 0.7 
True 0.3 
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The conditional probability can be defined in two ways: 
• Conditional probability distributions (CPD) used for continuous variables. 
• Node probability tables (NPT) used for discrete and labelled variables. 
A BN model that contains both discrete and continuous variables is called a hybrid Bayesian 
Network [121, 140]. 
Let us now enter observations into the model. We can assume that the project has 
‘Unfavourable exchange rate’ and ‘Poor project management’. In a scenario like this, the 
probability of ‘Project overspend’ increases to 80% (Figure 3.3 d). As expected this is a higher 
probability than the initial one, since we are now sure that there is ‘Unfavourable exchange rate’ 
and ‘Poor project management’.  
If we assume that there is favourable exchange rate, but ‘Poor project management’ the model 
predicts that the likelihood of ‘Project overspend’ is actually 60% which is still higher than 
initially assumed (Figure 3.3 c). Finally if we assume there is favourable exchange rate and 
project management is not poor the model predicts that the likelihood of ‘Project overspend’ 
drops down to 20% (Figure 3.3 b). 
 
 
a) Nominal b) ‘Unfavourable exchange rate’ and ‘Poor 
project management’ are ‘false’ 
  
c) ‘Unfavourable exchange rate’ is ‘false’ and 
‘Poor project management’ is ‘true’ 
d)’Unfavourable exchange rate’ and ‘Poor 
project management’ are ‘true’ 
Figure 3.3 ‘Project overspend’ – different scenarios 
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In complex real-life BN models that we use, the Bayesian inference calculations are performed 
using various efficient algorithms implemented in BN toolkits. They can be either: 
• Exact e.g. variable elimination, clique tree propagation, recursive conditioning, 
enumeration etc. 
• Approximate e.g. direct sampling, Markov chain sampling, variational methods, 
loopy propagation. 
More theoretical aspects of BNs can be found in [135, 89, 147]. 
3.3 Node Independence Assumptions 
 
The nodes or variables in BNs are usually of three types: 
1. Hypothesis variables – variables of interest. 
2. Information variables – variables whose state can be observed. 
3. Mediating variables – variables introduced for a special purpose, for example, to reflect 
the independence properties in the domain.  
The definition of BNs and the chain rule require that the independence assumptions are respected.  
Two events are independent if the occurrence of one event makes it neither more nor less 
probable that the other event occurs. In probability theory two events A and B are independent if 
P(A∩B)=P(A)P(B). In other words, the probability that both events will occur is equal to the 
product of their separate probabilities. Therefore, independence is equivalent to saying that 
observing B does not have any effect on the probability of A. In graph theory the word 
independent usually means pairwise disjoint or mutually nonadjacent. In this context, 
independence is a form of immediate nonadjacency. An independent set or coclique is a set of 
vertices of which no pair is adjacent. Two sets A and B are independent if their intersection A ∩ B = Ø, 
where Ø is the empty set. One of the methods of checking that these assumptions hold is known as 
d-separation [148].  
The rules of d-separation are based on the three fundamental connections in Bayesian networks 
Figure 3.4: 
1. Serial Connection X->Y->Z: Information may be transmitted through the connection 
unless the state of Y is known. Example: If we observe the ‘Subcontractor fails to deliver 
key component’ (Y), any knowledge that there is a ‘Project dependence on 
subcontractor’(X) is irrelevant to any hypothesis (or belief) that the ‘Project late’ (Z). On 
the other hand, if we do not know whether ‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’ 
or not, observing a ‘Project dependence on subcontractor’ will increase our belief about 
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‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’, which in turn will increase our belief 
about ‘Project late’. 
2. Diverging Connection X<-Y->Z: Information may be transmitted through the connection 
unless the state of Y is known. Example: If we observe the ‘Project dependence on 
subcontractor’ (Y) and then that the ‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’ (X), 
the added knowledge that the ‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’ (X) will tell 
us nothing more about the ‘Internal staff misunderstand true requirements’ (Z) than the 
information gained from observing the ‘Project dependence on subcontractor’ alone. On 
the other hand, if we do not know whether a project is dependent on subcontractor or not, 
an internal staff misunderstand true requirements report will increase our belief in 
‘Project dependence on subcontractor’, which in turn will increase our belief about the 
‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’. 
3. Converging Connection X->Y<-Z: Information may be transmitted through the 
connection only if information about the state of Y or one of its descendants is available. 
For example, if we know that the ‘Project late’ (Y) and that the ‘Subcontractor fails to 
deliver key component’ (X), then this will affect our belief about whether ‘Internal staff 
misunderstand true requirements’ or not (Z), as the ‘Project late’ leads us to believe that 
this was caused by ‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’, rather than the 
‘Internal staff misunderstand true requirements’. On the other hand, if we have no 
knowledge about the state of the ‘Project late’, then observing that ‘Internal staff 
misunderstand true requirements’ will not affect our belief about whether the 
‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’ or not. 
 
Figure 3.4 ‘Project late’ BN 
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Two variables X and Z are d-separated if for all paths between X and Z there is an intermediate 
variable such as Y that either 
• The connection is serial or diverging and Y is instantiated (i.e. its value is known), or 
• The connection is converging and neither Y nor any of its descendants have received 
evidence. 
In the example of Figure 3.4, the set of nodes {Subcontractor fails to deliver key 
component, Internal staff misunderstand true requirements} d-separates {Project dependence on 
subcontractor} and {Project late}, because ‘Subcontractor fails to deliver key component’ blocks 
the path (Project dependence on subcontractor, Subcontractor fails to deliver key component, 
Project late) and ‘Internal staff misunderstand true requirements’ blocks the path (Project 
dependence on subcontractor, Internal staff misunderstand true requirements, Project late). In 
both cases, the blocking node is linear on the path. Furthermore, {Project dependence on 
subcontractor} d-separates {Subcontractor fails to deliver key component} and {Internal staff 
misunderstand true requirements}, where ‘Project dependence on subcontractor’ is diverging on 
the only path between them, (Subcontractor fails to deliver key component, Project dependence 
on subcontractor, Internal staff misunderstand true requirements).  
If X and Z are not d-separated, they are d-connected. Dependence and independence relies 
on what you know (and do not know). In other words, the available evidence plays a significant 
role when determining the dependence and independence relations. 
We can distinguish various patterns of plausible common sense reasoning that are 
supported by BNs. These patterns can be explained using the example network in Figure 3.5; to 
ensure that the example is as simple as possible we assume that all nodes are discrete, having the 
two possible states ‘true’ and ‘false’: 
• Predictive: If we believe that ‘Unfavourable exchange rate’, then it becomes more 
plausible for us that the ‘Project overspend’. If we find out that ‘Unfavourable exchange 
rate’ is true, the ‘Project overspend’ has become more plausible for us. We can also 
observe predictive pattern in the example in Figure 3.4. 
• Diagnostic: Suppose we observe that ‘Project overspend’ is true then both ‘Unfavourable 
exchange rate’ and ‘Poor project management’ become more likely as shown in Figure 
3.6.  
 
• Explaining away:  




Figure 3.5 ‘Project overspend’ BN 
 
Figure 3.6 ‘Project overspend’ is ‘true’ 
If we observe ‘Project overspend’ is true (Figure 3.6) then the most likely explanation is 
‘Unfavourable exchange rate’ while revised probability for ‘Poor project management’ is still 
low. However, if we observe that the ‘Project late’ is also true (Figure 3.7) then we see that 
‘Project overspend’ is most likely caused by ‘Poor project management’ and not ‘Unfavourable 
exchange rate’. Hence, the ‘Project overspend’ is explained away by the observation that the 
project is late. 
 
Figure 3.7 ‘Project overspend’ is ‘true’ and ‘Project late’ is ‘false’  
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3.4 Bayesian Network Modelling Techniques 
 
Usually domain experts can determine the important variables which need to be included 
in the model and the links between them. Specifying unconditional and conditional probabilities 
for each node is not an easy task. In models where there are many states per variable and nodes 
with many parents it is a very complex task to elicit consistent NPTs or CPDs manually. In this 
study we used a BN tool called AgenaRisk which supports defining NPTs and CPDs using 
expressions which often simplify the task of model preparation and reduce the time needed to 
build a model.  
One of the biggest challenges in BNs is completing NPTs [48]. For example, if a node 
with 5 states has two parents each with 5 states then the child node NPT has 125 cells to 
complete. This section introduces different ways of making that task easier. Another challenge is 
continuous nodes. In section 3.5.3 we discuss how to handle continuous nodes.      
3.4.1 Noisy OR 
 
For Boolean Nodes with multiple parents, noisyOR allows us to quickly model a range of 
complex situations that would be far too difficult to do by manually completing an NPT [44, 173, 
203]. Therefore, the NoisyOR operator is one of the most powerful operators. Let us observe an 
example where we are trying to predict whether a project is going to run over schedule. Assume 
the node F is the node ‘Schedule overrun’. Suppose we decide that we identify five factors that 
can influence F, namely:  
• Poor management (A)  
• Requirements creep (B)  
• Process inefficiencies (C)  
• Inadequate business environment (D)  
• Lack of project commitment (E)  
The structure of such a model is shown in Figure 3.8. For simplicity, in this example, let 
us assume that the nodes A to E are independent and they all influence the node F. In this case we 
cannot use a Boolean expression, because there will always be uncertainty about F. For example, 
even if all the parents are ‘True’ we cannot say with certainty that F will be ‘True’. On the other 
hand, if we try to complete the NPT for node F manually we have 64 entries to complete which 
would be extremely tedious and prone to error. Moreover, imagine trying to complete any such 
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entry; for example, the entry for F being ‘True’ when A is ‘True’, B is ‘False’, C is ‘False’, D is 
‘True’, E is ‘False’. This seems unnecessary because the effects of the parent nodes on F are 
essentially independent. We want to somehow quantify the impact of A on F independently of 
considering all of the combinations of states of the other parents. The NoisyOR operator is 
exactly what we need in this case.  
For a node with n parents the noisyOR operator has n+1 parameters. So in our example 
with 5 parents there are 6 parameters that we have to specify. For each parent we specify a 
parameter that is a value between 0 to 1 that captures the probability that F will be ‘True’ if this 
parent is ‘True’. 
If we believe there is a 0.4 probability that poor management will cause a schedule 
overrun then the parameter for the node A will be 0.4. Similarly, if we believe there is a 0.2 
probability that requirements creep will cause a schedule overrun then the noisy-or parameter for 
the node B will be 0.2, etc. That gives us 5 parameters in this case. The final parameter, called the 
leak value, is also a value between 0 and 1, which captures the amount of ‘noise’ in the model.  
The leak parameter can be regarded as the extent to which there are missing factors from the 
model that can contribute to F being ‘True’. If we set node A to be ‘True’ and all other factors to 
be ‘False’ (Figure 3.8) then the probability of a node F is 0.19, which is higher than the value 0.1 
associated with the node A. This is because the leak parameter is above 0. If the leak parameter is 
set to 0 than the probability of a node F would be equal to 0.1. 
 
Figure 3.8 Node A ‘True’ and other factors are ‘Flase’ 
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Suppose we are confident that the five factors here are the only ones that impact on F. Then we 
would set the leak parameter to be 0. In this case, if all of the parents are ‘False’ then F will be 
‘False’ with 100% probability. For example, if the leak parameter is set to 0.1 (as opposed to 0) 
we are saying that there is 10% chance due to other factors missing from the model which can 
cause F to be ‘True’ (Figure 3.9).  
 
Figure 3.9 Leak value set to 0.1 
 
At the other extreme if the leak value is set to 1 then no matter what the values are for 
any of the parent nodes the node F will always be ‘True’. Hence, when the leak value is 1 there is 
‘maximum’ noise and the model tells us nothing at all. 
3.4.2 Ranked Nodes 
 
Many of the BN models, including the ones reviewed in chapter 4 and new ones created 
and discussed in chapter 6 and 7, use ranked nodes. Ranked nodes are used to model real-world 
variables typically measured on a discrete subjective scale. Typically we use either 3, 5 or 7 point 
scales:  
• 3-point – from ‘low to high’ 
• 5-point – from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’ 
• 7-point – from ‘lowest’ to ‘highest’. 
If we consider the simple BN model example in Figure 3.9 where all variables are ranked nodes 
measured on a 5-point scale, we would have to define 125 probability values in the NPT for 
‘Actual staff quality’. It would be possible to elicit this number from experts for a 5-point and a 3-
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point scale, but inconsistencies would arise (for example assigning dissimilar probabilities to 
similar states). For a 7-point scale exhaustive elicitation would become infeasible. In real-world 
models, when the statistical data available is limited, an exhaustive elicitation is not possible [48, 
187]. 
Ranked nodes simplify this problem [56], since in a ranked node the whole range of possible 
values is internally defined as the interval [0, 1]. This range is divided into an appropriate number 
of intervals. Each interval is associated with one label e.g. low, medium, high. In our example 
considering ranked node contains five states from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’, the intervals 
automatically created for each label are: 
• ‘very low’ [0-0.2] 
• ‘low’ [0.2-0.4] 
• ‘medium’ [0.4-0.6] 
• ‘high’ [0.6-0.8] 
• ‘very high’ [0.8-1] 
This underlying numerical scale, invisible to the user, simplifies the task of generating the NPTs, 
because we can use a simple numerical function to generate a good approximate NPT. These kind 
of ranked nodes are widely used and accepted [56]. In addition company studied in chapter 6 used 
these type of ranked nodes. 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Qualitative example using ranked nodes 
For example, in the BN of Figure 3.10, experts agree with the following:  
• When ‘Quality of staff’ and ‘Quality of staff training’ are both very high the distribution 
of ‘Actual staff quality’ is heavily skewed toward very high. 
• When ‘Quality of staff’ is very high and ‘Quality of staff training’ is low ‘Actual staff 
quality’ is still high. 
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• When ‘Quality of staff’ is low and ‘Quality of staff training’ is high ‘Actual staff quality’ 
is skewed toward low. 
•   When ‘Quality of staff’ and ‘Quality of staff training’ are both very low the distribution 
of ‘Actual staff quality’ is heavily skewed toward very low. 
Such relations suggest ‘Actual staff quality’ is a distribution whose mean is a weighted sum 
of the parents. Hence, various weighted expressions significantly simplify the process of defining 
NPTs. In equation (2-4) we have used a weighted expression to define the NPT for ‘Actual staff 
quality’ from Figure 3.12:  
AS = wmean (2, SQ, 1, ST)        (2-4) 
This expression tells us that ‘Actual staff quality’ is a weighted mean of ‘Staff quality’ and ‘Staff 
training quality’, with the former having twice the impact than the latter. 
Ranked nodes very often use Truncated Normal (TNormal) distribution [56]. This is a Gaussian 
distribution that has been truncated at both ends. Considering it is a Gaussian distribution, it has 
to specify the mean (µ) and the standard deviation (σ). The difference between Normal and 
TNormal is that TNormal has finite end points, hence the range (a and b) of the distribution must 
also be specified. This range is always [0, 1] in ranked nodes.  
To demonstrate this we would have to add a variance (σ2) of 0.001 to our earlier example:   
   AS = TNormal (wmean(2, SQ, 1, ST), 0.001, 0, 1)     (2-5) 
When we run this model for the following two scenarios the result achieved is presented in Figure 
3.11 : 
• Scenario 1: ‘Quality of staff’ = ‘very high’ and ‘Quality of staff training’ = ‘very low’  
• Scenario 2: ‘Quality of staff’ = ‘very low’ and ‘Quality of staff training’ = ‘very high’. 
 
Figure 3.11 Predicted ‘Actual staff quality’ 
Figure 3.12 shows the result of defining different variance in a ranked node. 
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Variance 0.0001 Variance 0.1 Variance 1 
   
  Figure 3.12 Ranked node with different variance 
To use these expressions it is sufficient to provide the weights w(i) for each parent variable X(i) 
without the need to manually analyse all combinations of states of the parent variables. The 
following types of weighted expressions can be used in AgenaRisk: 
• Weighted mean function (wmean) calculates an arithmetic average of a set of variables 
adjusted by the weights reflecting the importance of each variable used in the expression. 
• Weighted min function (wmin) assumes that when the values of the variables are 
different, the aggregated value of them is lower than their average. For example, to have 
quality staff it is necessary not just to have good people, but also to provide them with 
good training. If either the people or the training is insufficient then the result will be 
poor. However, really good people can compensate to a small extent for lack of training. 
Therefore, the necessary function for staff quality is wmin with small weighting in favour 
of good people. The variation from the average depends on the weights assigned. When 
all weights are large this function produces a result close to normal MIN function – 
selecting the lowest value from the set provided. When all weights are ‘1’ then the 
weighted min is a simple average.   
• Weighted max function (wmax) works in a similar way as weighted min function, except 
that the higher, not lower, value is selected from the set provided. 
• Min-max mixture function is a weighted mixture of min and max functions where 
weights are not assigned to individual variables, but to the whole min and max functions. 
3.4.3 Continuous Nodes  
In many models we are required to model variables which are continuous for example, 
actual length of project delay or percentage overspend etc. Until recently most BN algorithms 
assumed all variables are discrete. Therefore the associated BN algorithms are tailored to handle 
discrete variables and it is not possible to directly model continuous nodes. The properties of BNs 
make it attractive to look for possibilities of including continuous nodes in the general 
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formulation and analysis. Hence, many BN tools adopt various forms of numerical approximation 
for quantifying continuous nodes. 
In static discretisation it is necessary to predefine intervals and the range of the 
continuous distribution is split into a finite set which does not change regardless of evidence 
entered into the model. Therefore it is necessary to guess the state ranges before running the 
calculation and consequently make assumption that it is possible to know the resulting probability 
distribution of the results beforehand. For example, if we have a model to predict the profit we 
will have at the end of the year and we enter the following observation into a node ‘Profit 
measured in pounds’ = 100.  Because we are using static discretisation, the discretisation for 
‘Profit measured in pounds’ is such that an observation of 100 cannot be distinguished from an 
observation of 1000 since both values fall in the interval 100-1000. Hence, although ‘Profit 
measured in pounds’ was entered as point value, in the model it is still treated as rather wide 
interval. Number of previously build BN models that we will discuss in more detail in chapter 4 
use static discretisation.       
Undesirable effects that can follow from a static discretisation are:  
• The shape of the distribution can be entirely misleading. 
• Summary statistics such as mean, median and variance become inaccurate. 
• Evidence entered into a poor discretisation becomes less precise. 
• Extra care is required when arithmetic functions are involved between variables. 
Pearl [148] was one of the first researchers to devise algorithms for the inclusion of continuous 
variables in a network topology. He suggested an inference scheme in which the leaf nodes 
represented independent Gaussian distributions. The network topology was restricted to singly 
connected graphs (only one directed path between any two nodes) and the child nodes were 
deterministic, linear functions of their parents. When using Gaussian distribution specific 
assumptions had to be made and that was the only time it was possible to get analytical solution. 
Therefore this approach is unrealistic. Hence, the most viable solution is to apply various forms of 
discretisation to approximate continuous nodes by a BN model.  
Discretisation is traditionally known as a subdivision of a continuous range into a set of 
subranges or intervals [107]. Discretisation may also be understood as a categorisation or 
classification of a given dataset. If the variables of the domain are discretised one by one, a 
discretisation is univariate. A discretisation divides the state space into subspace, or 
hyperintervals, with the same dimensionality as the original state space.  
The problem facing modellers is that it is not always clear in advance where the main 
body of the probability mass will reside. This can be particularly problematic for dynamic BNs. 
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In this case, the probability mass will often move across timeslices, so that a discretisation which 
is appropriate for one timeslice turns out to be inappropriate for another. 
A solution, involving dynamic discretisation, has been proposed by Neil, Tailor and 
Marquez [141]. The dynamic discretisation algorithm outline is as follows: 
1. Calculate the current marginal probability distribution for a node given its current 
discretisation. 
2. Split the discrete state with the highest entropy error into two equally sized states. 
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 until converged to an acceptable level of accuracy. 
4. Repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 for all nodes in the BN. 
This algorithm has been implemented into the AgenaRisk toolset. Hence, we can simply set a 
numeric node as a simulation node without having to worry about pre-defined intervals. It is 
sufficient to define a single interval [x, y] for any variable that is bounded below by x and above 
by y, while for infinite bounds we only need introduce one extra interval. This is the approach 
that has been adopted in the subsequent models.   
 
3.4.4 Object Oriented Bayesian Networks 
 
Object Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBN) were introduced to help model large and 
complex systems [106]. The idea of OOBNs was based on the object-oriented programming 
languages and they provide a robust, flexible and efficient framework. It is possible to build 
complex models by using OOBNs. With objects we can modularise the model into chunks 
representing logical groupings of risks or time dependencies between objects. In an OOBN we are 
essentially modelling sequential time series processes where each ‘time-slice’ in the time series is 
modelled as BN. OOBNs are used in some example models discussed in the next chapter as well 
as the model developed in this thesis. 
The basic element in an OOBN is an object. For multiple objects we can define classes. 
Classes of objects provide the ability to describe a general and reusable network that can be used 
in many different contexts. Figure 3.13 shows a model composed of two risk objects. Each object 
is linked to the network with reference link that connects an output node in one object to an input 
node in other object (dashed link in Figure 3.13).  




Figure 3.13 OOBN – structural representation 
Figure 3.14 shows how objects are linked in AgenaRisk to build a large BN. 
 
Figure 3.14 OOBN in AgenaRisk 
Important advantages of OOBN are [106]: 
• Natural representation of objects that are composed of lower level objects. 
• Classes of objects explicitly represented which allows the incorporation of inheritance. 
• Natural model fragment reuse. 
• Ability to speed up the inference process by encapsulation of objects within other objects 
and the code reuse.  
• Ability to support a natural framework for abstraction and refinement. 
3.5 Strengths and Limitations of Bayesian Networks 
 The strengths of BNs over alternative techniques are:  
• Explicit incorporation of uncertainty 
• BNs, in contrast to classical statistics, can model causal factors explicitly. This makes 
them an ideal tool for predicting the future. 
• The graphical nature of a BN makes it a powerful communication tool. Causal 
relationships among the variables or nodes can be seen easily without the need to 
compute probabilities. 
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• BNs are intuitive, conceptual and easily understandable. This helps at the development 
stage when the model is being discussed between the project manager and the various 
parties.  
• Ability to combine subjective data (expert knowledge) and objective data. This is a great 
advantage especially when objective data is scarce or when there is the need to 
incorporate expert opinion in the model. 
• A BN will update the probability distribution for every unknown variable whenever an 
observation is entered into any node i.e. reason from effect to cause and vice versa. 
• The model can be easily updated or previous beliefs modified in light of new evidence, 
for example the notion of explaining away evidence. 
• BNs can be used to perform sensitivity or "what-if" analyses to examine the sensitivity of 
predictions, or conclusions against initial assumptions. 
• BNs can make predictions with incomplete data. If no observation is entered then the 
model assumes prior distribution. 
•  BNs are capable of modelling highly complex systems. The areas of application 
mentioned earlier demonstrate this. 
Bayesian networks do have some limitations. Originally BNs were constructed based on 
human heuristics and thus have been subject to human biases. The fact is that a BN model is only 
as good as the modeller and experts who produced it, since it is a representation of the modeller 
and the experts' perceptions of reality. Therefore best fit is chosen given the modeller and experts. 
Another limitation centres on the extent of the quality of the prior beliefs used in Bayesian 
inference processing. The usefulness of a BN is based on the reliability of its prior knowledge. An 
excessively optimistic or pessimistic expectation of the quality of these prior beliefs will either 
distort the entire network or invalidate the results. Hence, it is difficult to empirically validate 
model estimates in models built only on expert knowledge.  
3.6 Application of Bayesian Networks 
 
Bayesian networks have had considerable applications in many fields both in academia 
and industry. Hundreds of publications have described BNs application in various fields [61]. In 
the academic field, Nikovski [142] applied BNs to problems in medical diagnosis, Hansson and 
Mayer [77], Ames et al. [5] in heuristic search, Marcot et al. [120] in ecology, Heckermann [75] 
in data mining and Breese and Heckerman [22] in intelligent trouble shooting systems, Xenos 
[197] to predict and assess students’ behavior, Rodin et al. [163] in biology, Andradottir [6] in 
simulation. 
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The industrial application of Bayesian technology spans several fields: Fenton et al. [61, 
57, 55, 58] applied BNs to software quality measurement, Neil et al. [136, 137] in financial 
operational risk scenarios, Langseth and Lindqvist  [110] in software maintenance modeling, 
Bobbio et al. [18]; Langseth [111]; Ingleby and West [83] in general software reliability 
modeling, Lucas et al. [116] in biomedicine and health-care, Hackerman et al. [76] in medical 
diagnosis, Borsuk et al. [21] in environmental science. 
3.7 Summary 
 
In this chapter we have reviewed Bayes Theorem and how it is used when building BNs. 
Also we have looked at the advantages and the disadvantages of BNs. This chapter has provided 
an introduction to BNs and the different types of BN structure in order to enable the reader to 
understand the models developed later in the thesis.  
In the next chapter, we will look at BN models which address project trade-off analysis; 
as well as BN models that address and support different features of project risk management 
(SIMP, MODIST and Productivity model). Later in the chapter, we will look at construction 
projects BNs, Khodakarami’s model and operational risk models.   
 




4. Existing BN Project Risk Management Models 
This chapter focuses on the review of existing BN models. The models to which the 
author had access have been extensively tested. BN models that address trade-offs are reviewed 
as well as a group of other BN models related to project risk management and relevant to this 
thesis. It is demonstrated how such models can be used to provide useful information for decision 
makers, and the advantages and disadvantages of these models are discussed. The new 
contribution of this chapter is a thorough analysis, some of it (SIMP model) which was not 
displayed before in public domain, of selected existing BN models for project risk management.   
4.1 Introduction to Bayesian Net Modelling 
 
We will specifically look at BN models which address project trade-off analysis. These 
models are:  SIMP [3], MODIST [4, 63] and Productivity model [157]. SIMP and MODIST 
attempted for the first time ever to look at project risk management trade-off issues, and are of 
particular interest in this thesis, since the author has drawn motivation for analysing trade-offs 
from these models. In the second part of this chapter, we will look at construction projects BNs, 
Khodakarami’s model and operational risk models. These models address and support different 
features of project risk management. All of the models were used to provide improved methods of 
risk analysis and assessment for project managers in different areas and are discussed in more 
detail in the sections that follow.  
4.2 BN models addressing trade-off analysis 
4.2.1 SIMP – Major Projects BN    
Model background 
The SIMP project was based on the practices of a major international defence company 
for risk and risk criteria. SIMP project objective was to determine whether BNs can model 
defence system engineering processes and derive predictions about risk and uncertainty for 
decision support. The project aimed to develop methods and tools for quantitative risk assessment 
and requirements analysis in complex systems engineering domains. The motivation for this 
research lay in systems cost over-runs, delayed delivery and inadequate performance of complex 
systems in the military and civil sectors. Trade-offs addressed between these variables served as 
inspiration for the author’s focus on modelling trade-offs in large projects. These problems were 
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caused by poor organisation of the systems engineering process, weak risk assessment, inability 
to manage risk and poor requirements analysis. Since this is a commercial model it provides the 
basis for commercial application of trade-off analysis and models that implement it. The SIMP 
project focused on improving the systems engineering process and the quality of the system’s 
products, in particular to enhance the requirements capture to make systems fit for purpose.       
Model structure   
The aim of the SIMP model was to predict and assess overall risk status of large and 
complex systems engineering projects. The SIMP model is aimed at project managers. There are 
six sub-nets in the model: 
• Resource performance – variables capturing the quality of the contribution that the 
resources make to the project (e.g. subcontract management, procurement, information, 
planning, organisation effectiveness, motivation, staff, facilities) 
• Technical quality – variables capturing the quality of the contribution that the technical 
parts make to the project (e.g. interfacing, design solution, key subsystems, obsolescence, 
technical facilities) 
• Schedule – variables capturing the ‘real’ schedule that is suggested by the project risk 
attributes (e.g. budget constraints, process efficiency, requirements, business 
environment) and variables capturing current schedule of the project (e.g. actual schedule 
differential above agreed) The schedule is expressed as the deviation from that of the 
nominal project.  
• Cost – variables capturing the ‘real’ cost that is suggested by the project risk attributes 
(e.g. process efficiency, requirements, business environment) and variables capturing the 
current cost of the project (e.g. actual cost differential above agreed). The cost is 
expressed as the deviation from that of the nominal project.  
• Performance – represents the overall performance of the system being built. It is directly 
influenced by two variables: actual schedule differential and actual cost differential. 
• Reputation – variables capture the reputation in the commercial environment (e.g. actual 
schedule differential above agreed, actual cost differential above agreed) 
Figure 4.1 shows the key part of the model that enables managers to perform trade-off 
analysis between:   
• Time – represented by schedule differential implied by project attributes and  
actual schedule differential 
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• Cost – represented by cost differential implied by project attributes and actual 
cost differential  
• Performance – represented by actual schedule differential and actual cost 
differential 
All the nodes in the model are labelled nodes and their NPTs are defined manually. 
 
Figure 4.1 SIMP model – trade-off part [3]  
Prediction and trade-off analysis using SIMP model  
The relationship between the nodes described in the previous section is fairly complex. In 
order to clarify this relationship we will consider what kind of cost, schedule and performance 
trade-off reasoning the model supports. 
Suppose we know something went wrong and all nodes affecting three indicators 
(resources, management and technical quality) are ‘very low’. In addition suppose that the 
‘Actual cost above agreed cost’ should be as ‘expected’ meaning effectively that this is a fixed 
price contract and it is not allowed to go over budget. The first simple use of the model is as a 
scorecard type assessment by observing how the model evaluates the overall technical quality and 
performance quality (Figure 4.2).  




Figure 4.2 SIMP model – predicted distributions for ‘Technical Quality’ and ‘Resource 
Performance’ 
The distributions are centred around ‘low’ for ‘Technical Quality’ and ‘very low’ for 
‘Resource Performance’ (although there is still small probability that it could be higher for 
‘Technical Quality’). However, much more interesting than these predictions are predictions for 
the output nodes. For example, we can observe ‘Cost Diff Implied by Proj Qualities’ and 
‘Performance’ (Figure 4.3). 
  
Figure 4.3 SIMP model – predicted distributions for ‘Cost Diff Implied by Proj Qualities’ and 
‘Performance’  
So the model predicts rather bad consequences. The cost differential says that, based on 
the project properties the cost overrun is likely to be ‘worse than terrible’. However, we know the 
actual cost is fixed. Hence, the performance prediction is likely to be disastrous. If we change 
actual cost constraint for ‘Actual cost diff above agreed cost’ to ‘worse than terrible’ (in other 
words we increase budget over the original agreed budget) the performance prediction improves 
(Figure 4.4). 




Figure 4.4 SIMP model – predicted distribution for ‘Performance’ when budget has been increased   
However, it is still significantly below average. There are two reasons for this, both of 
which model shows clearly: 
1. We still have poor technical quality and resource performance and these are not fully 
compensated by the increase in the budget. 
2. If we check the prediction for ‘Schedule Diff implied by Project Attributes’ we find 
that the schedule differential is predicted to be ‘worse than terrible’, meaning that we 
really need to increase the schedule time. 
Therefore if ‘Actual schedule diff above agreed schedule’ is increased to ‘worse than terrible’ the 
prediction for performance improves significantly and it now looks good (Figure 4.5). Hence, 
given the poor quality attributes we can still deliver a good system, but only by significant cost 
and schedule overruns.   
 
Figure 4.5 SIMP model – predicted distribution for ‘Performance’ when budget and schedule has 
been increased   
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 Suppose now we replace values entered for ‘Actual schedule diff above agreed schedule’ 
and ‘Actual cost diff above agreed cost’ with ’expected’. In other words the project cannot go 
over budget or schedule. In addition suppose that we have a requirement for the performance to 
be sensational. What happens now is that both overall resource performance and technical quality 
increase significantly despite the evidence that these are poor (Figure 4.6).   
  
Figure 4.6 SIMP model – predicted distributions for ‘Technical Quality’ and ‘Resource 
Performance’ when budget and schedule are fixed and performance sensational 
4.2.2 MODIST project risk– Software projects BN 
Model structure  
The aim of MODIST project risk was to predict and assess the overall risk and quality 
status of large software projects. The model is aimed at project managers. Figure 4.7 illustrates 
the schematic view of the model.  
The six subnets in the model are: 
• Distributed communication and management – variables capturing the nature and scale of 
the distributed aspects of the project management and the extent to which these are well 
managed (e.g. communications management adequacy, subcontract management 
adequacy, interaction management adequacy, overall management quality). This is 
shown in Figure 4.8. 
• Requirements and specification – variables relating to the extent to which the project is 
likely to produce accurate and clear requirements and specifications (e.g. requirements 
difficulty, requirements stability, specification accuracy) 
 




Figure 4.7 MODIST – Schematic view [4] 
• Process quality – variables relating to the quality of the development processes used in 
the project (e.g. specification process quality, specification clarity, development and 
testing quality, overall process quality) 
• People quality – variables relating to the quality of people working on the project (e.g. 
staff motivation, staff turnover, general level of staff experience, overall staff quality, 
overall people quality) 
• Functionality delivered – variables relating to the amount of the new functionality 
delivered on the project, including the resources assigned to the project (e.g. total number 
of inputs and outputs, KLOC (thousands of lines of code) delivered, language, new 
functionality delivered) 
• Quality delivered – variables relating to both the final quality of the system delivered and 
the extent to which it provides user satisfaction (e.g. level of problem reports, quality 
delivered, user satisfaction) 
The key part of the model enables managers to perform trade-off analysis between:   
• Quality – represented by both user satisfaction and quality delivered 
• Effort – represented by the average number of people full time working on the project 
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• Time – represented by the project duration 
• Functionality – meaning functionality delivered 
One of the main limitations of MODIST trade-off analysis is the fact that it applies only to 
software engineering projects. Functionality in the MODIST model is based on function points 
which are a well known measure of software output. This is built into NPTs for functionality and 
therefore it is specific to software engineering projects and not easily extendable.     
Management and Communication Subnet 
 We will show this subnet (Figure 4.8) in more detail in order to examine some of the 
techniques used. This subnet models the size of a project team, its geographical diversity, the 
amount of work that has been subcontracted and the quality of the subcontracted work.  
 Ranked nodes discussed in section 3.4.2 are used extensively in this subnet and 
throughout the entire model. In Figure 4.7 nodes with  symbol are ranked nodes and 10 out of 
12 nodes in this subnet are ranked nodes. The dominance of the ranked nodes indicates the scale 
of expert judgement required in this subnet and indeed the model. This model focuses on 
quantifying aspects of software projects which are often omitted due to the lack of data.        
 This subnet also makes extensive use of the TNormal expression discussed in section 
3.5.2. All the nodes in Figure 4.8 with  symbol have their NPTs defined using TNormal 
expression. For example, NPT for Communications management adequacy node is: 
Communications management adequacy = TNormal (wmax(2.0, sdc, 5.0, cmq), 0.005, 0.0, 1.0) 
i.e. it is  a TNormal whose mean is a weighted maximum of its two parent nodes and whose 
variance is 0.005. 





Figure 4.8 Management and communication subnet [3] 
Prediction and trade-off analysis using MODIST model 
Suppose our project requirement is to deliver the system assessed as being of size 5000 
function points. Hence, the only observation we enter is the one for New functionality delivered. 
The model will give predicted distributions for the effort and time necessary to develop the 
system (Figure 4.9 a) and b) – ‘nominal’ scenario). The distributions have relatively high 
variances due to the minimal data entered. Model predicts, based on the median values, that we 
will need an average of 31 people full time for 35 months to deliver a system with required 
functionality. If, for example, we add a requirement for perfect quality and enter this observation 
into the node Quality delivered; then we can observe that we will need more people full time to 
deliver a system (Figure 4.9 a) and b) – ‘fixed time’ scenario). Model predicts that we will need 
an average of 35 people full time for 39 months to deliver a system with required functionality. 
The model also predicts that we can probably only achieve the target if we have high process and 
people quality (Figure 4.9 c)). The distribution for this node before and after entering the quality 
requirements is quite different.    
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a) Average number of people full-time      b) Project duration 
 
   c) Process and people quality 
Figure 4.9 MODIST model – predicted distributions for fixed quality 
 Suppose now that we do not have the amount of time for system development that the 
model predicts since we have a fixed price contract and we can afford just 15 full-time people for 
18 months. Still assuming that we must deliver 5000 function points and perfect quality then the 
model predicts the distribution for process and people quality as shown in Figure 4.10. It is clear 
that process and people quality almost certainly has to be ‘very high’. 




Figure 4.10 MODIST model – prediction distribution for fixed quality, schedule and effort 
If for example, we know that process and people quality is only average then we can look 
at possible trade-offs between functionality and quality. If we still insist on 5000 function points 
and remove the quality requirement the model predicts the quality very likely to be abysmal. If 
we keep the perfect quality requirement, but remove the functionality delivered requirement, the 
model predicts a vastly reduced number of function points with the median of 566 compared to 
the original 5000.  
4.2.3 Radlinski’s “Productivity” Model 
 
The MODIST project risk model discussed in the previous section is one part of the 
MODIST toolset. Another part is the MODIST phase model. The Phase Model enables detailed 
defect prediction to be performed at a lower level i.e. not for the whole project but for individual 
teams. A single-phase model enables predictions for a single software development phase. It is 
possible to join together copies of the phase-based model to form complex multi-phase models 
that reflect any particular lifecycle used. Radlinski’s model is an extension to the MODIST phase 
model and an attempt to have a unified model. A high level overview of Radlinski’s Productivity 
Model [157] is shown in Figure 4.11. Its aim is to model software risk assessment at the project 
level. The model is too large to be considered all at once. Therefore it is natural to breakdown the 




















Figure 4.11 Main subnets of Productivity model [157] 
The key part of the model is the trade-off part which is influenced by: 
• uncontrollable project factors 
• process and people quality 
• effort allocation 
• development activities (specification, coding and testing). 
The structure of the Productivity Model (Figure 4.11) consists of subnets for: 
1. Prior defect and productivity rates and prior effort 
These are the values, taken from a typical past project, for the prior defect rate, the prior 
productivity rate, and the prior effort. It is possible for users’ to provide them as 
observations from the past project database.  
2. Uncontrollable project factors 
These are the external factors which are not under control of the software development 
company. In this model they include: project complexity, project novelty, project scale, 
quality of input documentation, positive customer involvement, negative customer 
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3. Development activities: 
a. Specification and documentation 
This subnet contains variables related to requirements quality, specification process 
and people quality and change of effort on specification which altogether influence the 
specification and documentation process effectiveness. 
b. Coding 
This subnet contains variables related to coding process and people quality, change of 
effort on coding and the influence on coding effectiveness caused by the 
documentation quality. 
c. Testing 
This subnet contains variables related to testing process and people quality, change of 
effort on testing and the influence on testing effectiveness caused by the documentation 
quality and coding effectiveness. 
4. Revised defect and productivity rates 
These are the rates adjusted by: uncontrollable project factors, documentation quality,       
coding effectiveness and testing effectiveness. The adjusted rates influence the 
relationships between variables in the trade-off component. 
5. Trade-off component 
Software functionality is calculated as the product of revised effort and revised 
productivity rate. Similarly, the number of defects is calculated as the product of 
delivered number of units and revised defect rate. 
The Productivity Model provides the following distinctive features which were not available in 
previous models: 
1. Allows the user to enter custom prior productivity rate and prior defect rate. 
Companies normally keep records and analyse data from their past projects. Productivity and 
defect rates are among the easiest to be extracted from such databases. Even if a company does 
not collect effort data [158], they are often easy to estimate post hoc.  
2. Enables the user to perform trade-off analysis with variables expressed on a numeric scale.  
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3. Enables the user to apply different units of measurement up to the extent where the users 
    perform the analysis using their custom units. 
4. The impact of qualitative factors can be easily changed by changing the weights in the node 
expressions. A questionnaire is provided which can help determine users’ opinions on   the 
relationships between various model variables. 
5. Allows target values for numeric variables to be defined as intervals, not just as point values. 
For example, this model can answer questions such as: how can we achieve a defect rate 
between 0.04 and 0.07 defects/function points for a project of a specific size with other 
possible constraints. 
Other features of the Productivity Model, which were partially available in the past models, 
include: 
1. The model can be easily extended by adding other qualitative factors. 
2. Numeric variables in this model are dynamically discretised. 
However, there are also several places where enhancements could be made for Productivity 
Model: 
1. Causal framework for risk compatibility  
The structure of the Productivity Model can be improved. The model should be 
compatible with the causal framework for risk. Uncontrollable project factors directly 
influence revised productivity and defect rates; and not any of the development 
activities.  Hence, the Productivity Model is not causal model. 
2. Incorporating code reuse 
The Productivity Model assumes that there is no code reused from past projects. To make 
the model more realistic, code reuse may be incorporated into the model. To model this 
properly more details are required about the reused code; for example whether the reused 
code is a complete module or rather smaller pieces of code from various modules, how 
good was the development process when the reused code was originally written and 
tested and what is the typical proportion of reused code out of the total code delivered. 
3. Integrating detailed defect prediction with trade-off analysis 
The Productivity Model is an integrated model in the sense that it can predict both effort 
and quality (revised defect rate, number of defects). However, the prediction for the 
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number of defects is less detailed i.e. detailed data on the potential number of defects 
depending on project size, potential number of defects adjusted by specification and 
documentation adequacy, number of defects inserted as a result of imperfect coding 
process, number of defects found, number of defects fixed, number of defects in the 
reused code (Revised Defect Prediction Model only). 
4. User satisfaction 
The Productivity Model captures software quality as the number of defects, which can be 
objectively counted by testers or managers. It does not refer in any way to how future 
users will perceive software quality. User satisfaction could for example capture 
adequacy of the software to meet user needs, appearance of the interface, software 
performance and level of training and quality of documentation. 
4.3 Other BN PRM models  
4.3.1 BN models in construction projects 
One of the early efforts of applying BNs to project performance were carried out by 
McCabe et al. in 1998 [126, 125]. They developed a BN to improve an approach for modelling of 
construction performance (Figure 4.12). The BN is used to evaluate the performance at each 
resource interaction/queuing location based on performance indices. Five performance indices 
have been developed: queue length index, queue wait time index, customer delay index, server 
utilisation index and server quantity index. The indices are effect variables in the BN model and 
they are evaluated at each queuing location. If the value of any of the performance indices does 
not fall between the lower and upper bounds for that index then a remedial action needs to be 
performed. The cost and duration nodes were added to allow the improvement process to take 
different approaches to diagnosing the performance. For example, if performance indices provide 
evidence that the queue wait time is too long; depending on where the focus has been placed there 
can be two outcomes: 
• If the focus is placed on a shortened duration, then the action would be to increase the 
number of servers. 










Figure 4.12 Conditional Relationships BN model [125] 
Resource variables are causal nodes that represent changes to the construction project that 
are within the control of the project manager. The causal variables in their model are the 
following Boolean nodes: too many servers, too few servers, too many customers, too few 
customers, server too big, server too small, customer too big and customer too small. If 
conflicting causes for poor performance are suggested, the evaluation will be considered 
inconclusive and neither cause will be forwarded to the final evaluation.  
Nasir et al. in 2003 [134] applied BNs for the first time in construction project’s 
scheduling. Their model provides suggestions for the upper and lower activity duration limits 
based on the project’s characteristics. Based on literature and expert opinion they identified 10 
specific categories for building construction schedules. The categories are as follows: 
environment, geotechnical, labour, owner, design, area conditions, political, contractor, contractor 
nonlabour resources and material. Within each category they identified detailed risk variables (in 
total 69 risks). All the risk variables are divided into two types: 
• The schedule risk variables 
• The activity variables. 
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The first type of variables are input nodes where the evidence may describe the project condition. 
The second type of variables are output nodes.   
     Activity variables were divided into 8 groups that represent all the types of activities 
in a construction schedule. The groups were as follows: mobilization/demobilization, 
foundation/piling, labour intensive, equipment intensive, mechanical/electrical, roof/external, 
demolition and commissioning. Each group was modelled with two nodes where one node 
represented the pessimistic value and the other node represented the optimistic value.    
Both BN models reviewed in this section provided a flexible modelling environment. 
However, the models have the following limitations: 
• They are specific to building construction projects. Therefore the models cannot be 
applied to other industries and different type of projects. 
• They make an assumption about the input data i.e. the models assume that most likely 
duration is already known and takes it as an input to the model. 
• The output of the model needs another approach to calculate results such as the expected 
project duration, the probability of delay/completion etc. 
• Pre-defined values for the upper and lower bounds of activity duration i.e. the pessimistic 
side for the percent increase of activity duration is limited to 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. 
• All the risk variables were binary nodes; therefore many variables with more than two 
states were not modelled properly. 
• Overly complex and unstructured models that are difficult to follow and understand. 
• Diagnostic analysis (i.e. reasoning from effect to cause) which is a very powerful BN 
feature not used in the models. 
Luu et al. in 2009 [117] continued Nasir et al. work of applying BNs to quantifying the 
schedule risk in construction projects. They adopted and adjusted McCabe et al.’s BN model to 
construction projects in Vietnam. The sixteen most significant causes of schedule delay in 
construction projects in Vietnam were identified. Following this, based on expert survey, 18 
cause and effect relationships were established. The BN model developed was applied to two case 
studies. The model performed well in predicting the probability of the construction schedule 
delay in both studies.      
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4.3.2 Khodakarami’s model  
Khodakarami’s model [100] is an extension to Nasir et al.’s work on applying BNs to 
project scheduling. He presents a general framework for applying BNs to project scheduling 
incorporating critical path methods (CPM) calculations as discussed in chapter 2. The following 
standard acronyms are used throughout his model: 
• D: duration 
• LS: latest start time 
• LF: latest finish time 
• EF: earliest finish time 
• ES: earliest start time 
• TF: The amount of time that a task can be delayed or extended without affecting project 
end date. 
The schematic model of the BN fragment connected with an activity is shown in Figure 4.13. 
Each activity in a CPM network is mapped to a set of five nodes in the BN as follows: 
• Central component is the ‘Duration’ node which models uncertainty associated with the 
activity’s duration. In a simple case, NPT for this node can be any arbitrary probability 
distribution (e.g. Normal, Beta etc). 
• The LS node models the latest time that an activity should start. Parent nodes are LF and 
duration. The NPT is an arithmetic expression of the parent nodes. 
• The latest time that an activity should finish is modelled with the LF node. The parent of 
this node is LS. The NPT is an arithmetic expression based on the parent node. 
• The LS node models the latest time that an activity should start. Parent nodes are LF and 
duration. The NPT is an arithmetic expression of the parent nodes. 
• The earliest time that an activity may finish is modelled with EF node. Parents of this 
node are ES and ‘Duration’. The NPT is an arithmetic expression of the parent nodes. 
• The ES is the earliest time that all the predecessor activities are finished. Hence, the ES 
node is the earliest time that an activity can start. The NPT is an arithmetic expression 
that takes the maximum value of EF from all the immediate predecessor activities.  




Figure 4.13 Schematic BN for an activity [100] 
The model provides a new interpretation of activity criticality under uncertainty.  
Comparable to standard CPM, the criticality of an activity can be measured by its total float (i.e. 
the difference between the Latest Finish and the Earliest Finish). If TF is zero (or even worse, 
negative) the activity is critical as it must be completed (otherwise it causes delay to the project) 
by a date that is earlier than the current plan shows is possible (i.e. EF). In other words, the 
criticality of each activity can be estimated by comparing the probability distribution of the LF 
with the probability distribution of the EF of the activity. This is modelled by introducing the 
‘Criticality’ node in the model for each activity. ‘Criticality’ is a Boolean node that is ‘true’ when 
LF≤EF. 
To demonstrate how different types of uncertainty can be modelled in a project 
Khodakarami proposed a BN model for the duration of a prototype activity. Activity duration 
depends directly on how much money is spent and/or what level of quality is achieved. Hence, 
there is a trade-off between the uncertainty associated with the duration and the uncertainty 
associated with the cost. For example, if asked to estimate the probability of delay in a particular 
activity of a project, a manager may respond by contending that such probability can be reduced 
to virtually zero if there is no limitation on spending money on the activity.  
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The limitations of the Khodakarami’s model are: 
• The model is far more complex than Monte Carlo based techniques. 
• Efficient application of the model requires a well-established risk management process 
especially in identifying different sources of uncertainty and also in the data acquisition 
process. 
• For large size BNs that contain continuous nodes exact inference is infeasible. Therefore, 
the model is not applicable for large-scale projects.  
4.3.3 BN models in Operational Risk 
  
Risk in large-scale projects is very similar to operational risk in finance, particularly the 
way the risk events are represented. In addition even some of the risk factors are same. Neil, 
Fenton et al. [137] have shown how Bayesian models can be used to improve operational risk 
modelling. These authors first explored the use of BNs to model statistical loss distributions in 
financial operational risk scenarios focusing on modelling ‘long’ tail or unexpected loss events. 
One of the first models they developed was risk control self assessment model. This model was 
able to do the following: 
• Quantified and rated qualitative and quantitative risks 
• Used Risk Maps to rate the risk contribution of each element in a COSO complaint risk 
structure (Business/ Process/ Activity/ Risk Control) 
• Mixed loss distribution derived from internal and external loss databases and embeds 
these in a Risk Map. 
• Forecasted the capital charge in a form of value at risk (VaR) or any other statistic. 
• Coped with missing audit/assessment data and accommodates differences in expert 
opinions. 
The model uses issues and action plans to predict the reliability of the controls being 
modelled. The reliability of these processes is then combined to predict the reliability of the 
overall task and ultimately the information predicts process reliability and the loss distribution 
[3]. We are in particular interested in the structure of this model and how risk events are 
represented. We will use and develop this structure further in chapter 5. 
 





Figure 4.14 Risk Control Self Assessment Model [3]  
 
Figure 4.14 shows risk control self assessment BN that models operational risk in banks. In 
September 1998, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in reaction to a number of well-
publicised financial disasters, initiated work related to operational risk. The operational risk is 
modelled in terms of a variety of loss event types. We know that loss is clearly dependent on the 
number of risks. Risk occurs if control fails. Control fails if control effectiveness fails. Control 
effectiveness fails if there are issues with control and if action plans put in place to deal with 
issues fail. 
The nodes represent variables which may or may not be observable. Each node has a set of states 
(e.g. ‘green (no issues)’, ‘amber (minor issue)’ and ‘red (major issue)’ for ‘Issues with control 
1?’). For each variable with parents, the probability table has conditional probabilities for each 
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Prediction and analysis using Risk Control Self Assessment Model 
 
In Figure 4.15 we can observe that the nominal probability for the ‘Risk B Occurs’ is 
0.46. Suppose we know that the ‘Control 3 Fails’ has not worked. In fact it has failed and we have 
‘True’ entered as the observation. In this scenario the probability updates to 1. 
  
Figure 4.15 Probability of the ‘Risk B Occurs’ – nominal and one control fails  
 
 On the other hand, suppose that ‘Control 3 Fails’ has been successful. In this case our 
observation would be ‘False’. In Figure 4.16 we can see that the probability of ‘Risk B Occurs’ 
has reduced to 0.27. This shows how having a control in place that works can significantly reduce 
risk. In fact we can observe that if both controls work and the observation entered for ‘Control 3 
Fails’ and ‘Control 4 Fails’ is ‘False’, the risk will not occur i.e. probability for ‘Risk B Occurs’ 
is 0.   
 
 
Figure 4.16 Probability of ‘Risk B Occurs’ – one control successful and both controls successful 




Figure 4.17 Probability of ‘Risk B Occurs’ – one action plan in place and both action plans in place 
 Suppose we are at the stage where we do not know if the controls will work or not. 
However, we do know that we have an action plan in place. In Figure 4.17 we can observe that 
even having only one action plan in place still reduces the probability (in comparison to the 
nominal) of ‘Risk B Occurs’ to 0.28. If at this stage we know we have both action plans in place 
this will reduce the probability of ‘Risk B Occurs’ even further to 0.03.   
They subsequently developed the following models: 
• Predicting total losses from event frequency and severity 
• Modelling dependence between event frequency and severity. 
These models were simple and they were mainly used as examples of the potential of BNs in this 
area. 
In their later work they have shown how to use BNs to model the operational risk in 
information technology infrastructure in financial and other institutions. The model was based on 
IT management processes as defined by ITIL [139]: 
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• IT infrastructure management 
• IT architecture and design 
• Business risk analysis 
• Business continuity management. 
The aim of the model was to unify each of these different perspectives and to be used by each of 
these activities to deal with risk and uncertainty. In order to achieve this, various asset classes in 
the IT architecture were modelled as well as business processes that rely on architecture to deliver 
business services. The model is organised in layers and shows clear dependencies between 
services, their constituent business processes and the IT applications that help support or deliver 
those processes. The model can be used to predict the reliability of the service from its constituent 
inputs and answer questions like ‘if application X and application Y fails, does the service fail?’ 
Furthermore it is possible to use the model to make decisions (based on) the basis of clear 
financial criteria, such as VaR. 
Their latest model is a hybrid dynamic BN for operational risk faced by financial 
institutions in terms of economic capital [135]. The model has three layers: 
• Loss event model (Figure 4.18) which models how the potential loss events, Et 
dynamically evolve over time being influenced by controls, Ct. Each control is modelled 
as a function of a set of operational failure modes, Oj. Failure modes are influenced by a 
set of causal factors which initiate the operational failure, Fi.  
• Loss severity model (Figure 4.19) uses probabilities generated by the loss event model to 
predict total losses by severity class. Total losses are modelled using a conditional 
dependency model represented as a DBN.  
• Aggregated loss model calculates the sum of total losses associated with each event in 
each time period. 
 




Figure 4.18 Loss event model [135] 
 
 
Figure 4.19 Loss severity model [135] 
The authors have shown how their generalized HDBN approach can successfully model 
dependencies between events and processes in complex environments evolving over time. This 
has been illustrated by applying this approach to the financial trading process.     
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4.4 Integration of models 
 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the BN models 





Expectations met by: 










time, cost and 
quality 




No No No No No Yes 




No No No No No Yes 
4) Dynamic 
model 
No No No No Yes Yes 
5) Model key 
notions of 
causal effect 















No No Yes No Yes Yes 
Table 4.1 Expectations for project risk analysis tools met by existing BN models 
For complete project management we need an integrated model. Such an integrated model 
would generally be based on the SIMP and MODIST model philosophy which enables various 
types of trade-off analysis. In addition an integrated model would incorporate risk event 
measurement/representation from Risk Control Self Assessment Model. The integrated model 
would focus on: 
• Trade-off analysis between key project factors (time, cost and quality) 
• Sensible risk event measurement. 
Developing such an integrated model for large projects is the main challenge of this thesis. This is 
covered in chapter 6. 
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4.5 Summary  
 
We have seen that it is possible to use BNs to build models that are proved to be 
successful in both research and industry. However, the existing models have some limitations 
discussed in this chapter. These limitations raise the number of well defined research challenges. 
Some of these challenges are addressed using relatively simple solutions. However, the most 
important challenges cannot be solved by extending existing models and they require building 
new models. These new BN models are discussed in the chapters that follow.   
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5. New structured approach for BN risk models 
 
A major objective in the field of risk analysis is the development of a uniform definition 
of risk. In this chapter we briefly review and compare the most common risk definitions. Risk has 
different meanings to different people. Risks are not always associated with negative outcomes 
and they may represent opportunities as well. Taking big risks can be beneficial to a party that is 
able to accept them because it enables opportunity. 
Generally risk is seen as an abstract concept whose measurement is very difficult. Based 
on current risk definitions we propose the causal risk framework for risk quantification, which we 
see as an improvement of the standard risk measure: Risk = Probability x Impact. By using the 
causal risk framework we improve the modelling approach in order to help develop better 
decision support systems. Improvement of the causal risk framework and its application are some 




It is clear that if/when risk strikes, it can have a range of effects on the achievement of 
project objectives, from total failure to a surprisingly good/better than expected outcome. The 
inability of project managers to deal with competing views can affect the quality and acceptability 
of their projects. The confusions and delays in developing, for example, product strategies and 
information systems to support projects can mean that opportunities can be lost.  
Despite this, the traditional project risk management process as practised by the majority 
of project managers tends to concentrate almost exclusively on the potential negative effects of 
risks. As a result of this focus, considerable effort is spent on identifying and managing risks, 
while opportunities tend to be overlooked. We argue that if the synergy between risks and 
opportunities is recognised and properly managed, it can ensure that unwelcome negative effects 
are minimised while at the same time maximising the chances of exploiting unexpected positive 
effects.  
Entrepreneurs, for example, perceive risk differently from project managers. Shane and 
Venkatraman [168] suggest that entrepreneurs who identify an opportunity sooner appear to 
accept greater amounts of risk because others lack the knowledge to properly understand (and 
assess) the opportunity. Therefore, asymmetry in knowledge will lead to differing perceptions of 
risk regarding a given decision. 
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5.2 Identification of Risks  
 
There are many techniques for risk identification, such as brainstorming and workshops, 
questionnaires and interviews. The appropriate combination of techniques should be used, since 
there isn’t a single best method. Each of the commonly used risk identification techniques listed 
could be used equally effectively to identify opportunities as well as risks. To demonstrate this we 
will first list illustrative examples of common risks in large projects [60]. In the next section we 
will use the same technique to list potential opportunities in large projects. 
Typical risks 
• ‘Insufficient use of status and progress reports’ 
• ‘Insufficient client influence’ 
• ‘Poor rapport/coordination with the client’ 
• ‘Lack of project team participation in decision-making/problem-solving’ 
• ‘Job insecurity within the project team’ 
• ‘Lack of team spirit and sense of mission within project team’ 
• ‘Parent organization stable, non-dynamic, lacking strategic change’ 
• ‘Poor rapport/coordination with the parent organization’ 
• ‘Poor relations with the parent organization’ 
• ‘Project more complex than the parent has completed before’ 
• ‘Inability to freeze design early 
• ‘Inability to close out the effort’ 
• ‘Unrealistic project schedules’ 
• ‘Initial under-funding’ 
• ‘New ‘type’ of project’ 
• ‘Poor relations with public officials’ 
• ‘Unfavourable public opinion’ 
• ‘The company’s reputation is damaged’ 
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• ‘Poor staff performance’ 
• ‘Poor quality of the delivered system’ 
5.3 Identification of Opportunities 
 
If risk is defined as entirely negative and opportunity as entirely positive then naturally we would 
need to look at project risk management and project opportunity management. Risk practitioners 
often find it easier to identify potential problems than to look for hidden advantages and upsides. 
Here indeed we list illustrative examples of common opportunities in large projects [60].  
Typical opportunities 
• ‘There is commitment of the project team to a goal’ 
• ‘The initial cost estimates are accurate’ 
• ‘Project team has exceptional capability’ 
• ‘There is exceptional funding to completion’ 
• ‘There are exceptional planning and control techniques’ 
• ‘There are minimal start-up difficulties’ 
• ‘Absence of bureaucracy’ 
• ‘There is an on-site project manager’ 
• ‘There are clearly established success criteria’ 
• ‘There is project manager commitment to: established schedules, budgets and technical 
performance goals’ 
• ‘There is frequent feedback from the parent organization’ 
• ‘There is frequent feedback from the client’ 
• ‘There is client and parent commitment to: established schedules, budgets and technical 
performance goals’ 
• ‘There is project team participation in determining schedules and budgets’ 
• ‘There is slack in the schedule’ 
• ‘There is slack in the budget’ 
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• ‘There is company enthusiasm’ 
• ‘There are exceptional control procedures, especially for dealing with changes’ 
• ‘Judicious use of networking techniques’ 
• ‘Lack of excessive government red tape’ 
5.4 Definition of Risk includes Opportunities 
 
Issues involving risk are often difficult to distinguish and misunderstood by those making 
vital decisions for projects. Risk is not tangible or visible, therefore, a manager’s risk perceptions 
in a particular project vary by risk characteristics and the project’s internal and external 
environment [47]. Are people more risk taking for risks or for opportunities? Indeed, what makes 
a risk risky is the possibility of loss, whether it be loss of current assets or loss of opportunity for 
more assets. However, few people could be expected to take risks if they did not perceive some 
element of opportunity associated with risk-taking behaviour. Thus, it seems clear that the degree 
to which people will engage in risk-taking behaviour is related to the degree to which they 
perceive risk taking as an opportunity for something. Therefore, it is important to first define risk.  
The word risk generally has implications of negative or adverse results from an event [66, 
174, 188, 25]. Therefore, there is no doubt that common usage of the word risk sees only the 
downside. Asking a man in the street if he would be willing to take a risk, will almost always 
result in a negative response. This is reflected in the traditional definitions of the word, both in 
standard dictionaries and some technical definitions. One dictionary defines ‘risk’ as: “a situation 
involving exposure to danger, the possibility that something unpleasant will happen, loss, 
exposure to chance of injury or loss. ” [145]. 
However, some professional bodies and standards organisations have gradually 
developed their definitions of risk to include both the upside and the downside. COSO [34] 
defines a risk as an event that can have negative impact. Equally an event that can have a positive 
impact is an opportunity. A guide published by the UK Association for Project Management has 
adopted a broad view of risk. Their definition of risk is: “Risk – an uncertain event or set of 
circumstances that, should it occur, will have an effect on the achievement of the project’s 
objectives. “ [7] In this definition, the nature of the effect is undefined and could therefore 
implicitly include both positive and negative effects. The Australian/New Zealand Standard has a 
similar risk definition where once again the nature of the effect is undefined and hence could 
implicitly include both positive and negative effects.  Others, for example, a guide published by 
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the US Project Management Institute, are explicit naming both positive and negative effects on 
the project objectives within their definition of risk. The PMBOK definition states: “Project risk 
is an uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or a negative effect on a project 
objective … Project risk includes both risks to the project’s objectives and opportunities to 
improve on those objectives.”[151]  
In traditional behavioural decision theory, the term risk is used interchangeably with the 
term uncertainty [115, 23, 46]. Decision makers are said to be risk-averse if they prefer a sure 
thing to an option whose outcome is uncertain (i.e. a risky option). Yates and Stone’s [202] 
review of risk definitions in various arenas reveals that definitions of risk range from emphasis on 
risk of personal harm, found in medical and hazard research, to emphasis on possible 
opportunities, found in economic and business literature. A common theme in most definitions of 
risk is still the possibility of loss. However, each conceptualisation of risk also contains some 
component of opportunity, even if it is only the opportunity to avoid loss.   
The fact that recent documentation now incorporates both opportunities and risks within 
their definition for risk, it is a clear recognition that both are equally important influences over 
project success [81].  
5.5 Problems with the standard measure of risk  
  
As discussed in 2.7.2 in organisations where risk is treated seriously, it is a standard that 
at the start of every project, managers discuss and list risks. Project managers are often expecting 
a number of risks to occur, which will be similar from project to project. Project managers can 
employ experiences gained through the course of one project to the next one.  
When managers think about the risks that might cause the next project to fail, such as the 
risks listed in section 5.2; whether deliberately or not, they will have measured such risks. A 
liquidity crisis that destroys their company and forces it into administration would probably not 
appear on their list. Although its impact is more devastating than any of the others, the chances of 
it actually happening are so low that a project manager would probably have discounted it. 
As discussed in 2.7.2 the probability x impact measure of risk is quite useful for 
prioritising risks (the bigger the number the ‘greater’ the risk). The problem is that, it is normally 
not possible to get the numbers needed to calculate it [59, 192, 31]:  
• We cannot get the Probability number. It is only natural to be worried if, for example,   
we know there have been bad investments in mortgage back securities. This increases the 
risk of ‘Liquidity crisis’ and could result in the company going into administration. Does 
this make the probability of the liquidity crisis equal to one? Clearly not, because if it was 
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one then there would have been no point in trying to properly evaluate assets. The 
probability of the liquidity crisis is conditional on a number of other control events (like 
practising proper asset valuation to avoid the liquidity crisis) and trigger events (like bad 
investments in mortgage back securities). It makes no sense to assign a direct probability 
without considering the events it is conditional on. In general, it makes no sense (and 
would in any case be too difficult) for a risk manager to give the unconditional 
probability of every ‘risk’ irrespective of relevant controls, triggers and mitigants. This is 
especially significant when there are, for example, controls that are not used very often 
(like implementing proper asset valuation globally).  
• We cannot get the Impact number. Just as it makes little sense to attempt to assign an 
(unconditional) probability to the event ‘Liquidity crisis’, so it makes little sense to assign 
an (unconditional) number to the impact of company goes into administration. This can 
literally mean anything from, for example, no job losses to 100% job losses. Apart from 
the obvious question “impact on what”, we cannot say what the impact is without 
considering the possible mitigating events such as company searching for bailout. Hence, 
we simply discard having 1 – 10 point scale for impact. Mitigants can not only avoid the 
worst case scenario, but can even avoid administration altogether.  
• Risk score is meaningless. Even if we could get round the two problems above what 
exactly does the resulting number mean? Suppose the (conditional) probability of the 
liquidity risk is 0.95 and, on a scale of 1 to 10, the impact of the crisis is 10 (even 
accounting for mitigants). The liquidity crisis ‘risk’ is 9.5, which is a number close to the 
highest possible 10. But it does not measure anything in a meaningful sense.  
• It does not tell us what we really need to know. What we really need to know is the 
probability, given our current state of knowledge that the company will go into 
administration.  
Shortcomings of probability x impact measure are discussed further in section 6.9. 
5.6 Getting sensible risk measures with causal models (risk maps)  
 
The rational way to think of risks is in terms of causal models (BNs) with trigger events, 
control events, risk events, mitigant events and consequence events.  In the next section we will 
explain this in more detail. For the liquidity crisis risk, the relevant causal model is shown in 
Figure 5.1.  
A risk is therefore characterised by a set of uncertain events. Each of these events has a 
set of outcomes. For simplicity here we will assume that these events have two outcomes — true 
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and false (in practice we can extend the outcomes to incorporate more states). For example, the 
criteria for consequence event are defined such that if ‘Company goes into administration’ is 
‘true’, it means a probability of at least 80% that the company will not be rescued.  
The ‘uncertainty’ associated with a risk is not a separate notion (as assumed in the classic 
approach). Every event (and hence every object associated with risk) has uncertainty that is 
characterised by the event’s probability distribution.  
 
Figure 5.1 Causal model for ‘Liquidity crisis’ 
 
The sensible risk measures that we are proposing are simply the probabilities you get 
from running a BN. Of course, before you can run a BN, you still have to provide some 
probability values. But, in contrast to the classic approach, the probability values you need to 
supply are relatively simple and they make sense and you never have to define vague numbers for 
‘impact’.  
To give you a feel of what you would need to do, in the risk map of Figure 5.1 the 
uncertain event ‘Liquidity crisis’ still requires us to assign a conditional probability distribution. 
But instead of second guessing what this event actually means in terms of other conditional 
events, the model now makes it explicit and it becomes much easier to define the necessary 
conditional probability. What we need to do is define the probability of the liquidity crisis given 









Bad investment in mortgage back securities False True 
Proper asset valuation False True False True 
False 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.8 
True 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
Table 5.1 Conditional probability table for ‘Liquidity crisis’ 
 
For example, if there are bad investments in mortgage back securities then the probability 
of liquidity crisis is 1, if there was no proper asset valuation, and 0.2, if there was proper asset 
valuation. In filling in such a table, we no longer have to try to ‘factor in’ any implicit 
conditioning events like investment type.  
There are some events in the BN for which we do need to assign unconditional 
probability values. These are the nodes that have no parents; it makes sense to get unconditional 
probabilities for these because, by definition, they are not restricted by any conditions. Such 
nodes can generally be only triggers, controls or mitigants. An example is shown in Table 5.2. 
False 0.05 
True 0.95 
 Table 5.2 Probability table for ‘Bad investment in mortgage back securities’  
As discussed in chapter 3, we are not suggesting that assigning the probability tables in a 
BN is always easy. You will generally require expert judgement or data to do it properly. What is 
important is that it is easier than the classic alternative. At worse, when you have no data, purely 
subjective values can be supplied.  
Once you have supplied the prior probability values a BN tool will run the model and 
generate all the measures of risk that you need. For example, when you run the model using only 
the prior probabilities i.e. no observations entered, the model computes the probability of the 
liquidity crises as just under 0.8 and the probability of company going into administration 
(meaning at least 80% chance that the company will not be rescued) is about 0.75 (Figure 5.2).  




Figure 5.2 Liquidity crises - marginal state 
In terms of the difference that proper asset valuation could make we can run two 
scenarios: One where there is proper asset valuation and one where there is not (Figure 5.3). The 
probability of ‘Company goes into administration’ being ‘false’ jumps from 0.09 (when there is 
no proper asset valuation) to 0.82 (proper asset valuation). This near tenfold increase in the 
probability of avoiding the liquidity crisis clearly explains why it is important to have a control.  
 
Figure 5.3 Company goes into administration – different scenarios 
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5.7 Causal Framework for Risk  
To develop responses to identified risks which are appropriate, achievable and affordable; we 
propose use of a causal framework for risk [60]. A risk is characterized by the following set of 
events (Figure 5.4): 
• Trigger event - a negative event that may or may not occur. If it occurs it may cause a 
risk event. Project manager has no impact on this node. There may be numerous trigger 
events for one risk event. 
• Control event - a positive event that may stop trigger event or reduce the size of its 
impact on the risk event in order to make it more acceptable to the project. There may be 
numerous control events for one risk event. 
• Risk event – a negative event that in turn may cause a negative consequence. This is the 
key node observed in the model. 
• Mitigant event – a positive event that may reduce the impact of risk event on further 
consequence event. There may be numerous mitigant events. 
• Consequence event – a negative event which is the result of a risk event occurring. There 
may be numerous consequence events caused by one risk event.  
All the types of events in the model are completely interchangeable depending on the perspective. 
Hence, risk event in one model can be trigger event in another model or control event in one 
model can be trigger event in another model etc. This interchangeability stresses symmetry and 
simplicity of the causal approach. In addition, it is possible to extend the types of nodes when 
necessary. This might be especially useful for a consequence event node. Hence, we may define 
more than one level of consequence events in a model. We will demonstrate this in our model in 
chapter 6.      
 
Figure 5.4 Causal framework for risk [60] 
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In a similar way an opportunity is characterized by the following set of events (Figure 5.5): 
• Trigger event - a positive event that may or may not occur. If it occurs it may cause an 
opportunity event. Project manager has no impact on this node. There may be numerous 
trigger events for one opportunity event. 
• Danger event – is the analogy of control event. A negative event that may stop trigger 
event or reduce the size of its impact on the opportunity event. There may be numerous 
danger events for one opportunity event. 
• Opportunity event – a positive event that in turn may cause a positive consequence. This 
is the key node observed in the model. 
• Peril event – is the analogy of mitigant event. A negative event that may reduce the 
impact of opportunity event on further consequence event. There may be numerous peril 
events. 
• Consequence event – a positive event which is the result of an opportunity event 
occurring. There may be numerous consequence events caused by one opportunity event.    
 
Figure 5.5 Causal framework for opportunities 
To implement our causal risk framework and demonstrate the synergy between risks and 
opportunities, we present the ‘Developing system for client’ example in Figure 5.6. On the left 
hand side is a causal chain characterising risk events; on the right hand side is a causal chain 
characterising opportunity events. We can clearly see how what some people regard as a risk, 
others might regard as a cause, a consequence, a control or a mitigant. Others still might even 
regard it as an opportunity. 





Figure 5.6 Developing system for client 
A causal framework shows not just that there is a synergy between risks and opportunities, but 
also that risks and opportunities can, and should be handled together. Therefore a single risk 
management process can effectively handle both opportunities and risks. Opportunities are given 
equal status with risks and seeking to manage them proactively can only benefit the project and 
the organisation.  
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5.8 Improved Causal Framework for Risk 
 
Considering that our causal framework for risk and our causal framework for 
opportunities mirror each other; the natural way to handle this is to go for a uniform approach and 
have one qualitative model for risks and opportunities (Figure 5.7); where the values for the 
nodes could go from negative to positive. Which means instead of having, for example, a 
‘Trigger’ node that can be only negative in the risk model or only positive in the opportunity 
model, this node can have a range from negative to positive, which means things can be better or 
worse than normal. 
 
Figure 5.7 Causal framework for risks and opportunities 
If we apply this new approach to our ‘Developing system for client’ model it will look as per 
Figure 5.8. Node names are now modified to suit this different approach and the nodes can take 
values from better to worse. 




Figure 5.8 Developing system for client (new approach)  
When risks are represented directly, a given risk can, at best, only take the value of zero. 
This is a problem, because the model would not be able to fully support the risk definition, and 
real life situations. For example, if ‘Feedback during development’ is known to be an active risk 
area and we think it could have a negative impact on ‘Quality of delivered system’, we might 
decide to investigate whether an improvement in ‘Prototype delivery’ could help to counteract 
this negative impact. This is not possible if ‘Feedback during development’ is represented 
directly. 
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Therefore, in the model shown in Figure 5.8 risks are no longer represented explicitly. 
Nodes that represented risks are now represented by scale attributes that underlie those risks, i.e. a 
node represents the quality of a risk. For example, before we had a node representing the ‘Lack of 
feedback during development’ risk, now we have a node representing the quality of ‘Feedback 
during development’. For simplicity reasons in this example we use 3-point scale with low, 
medium and high states. Users can form a judgement from probabilities associated with a 
collection of outcomes. 
Risks are represented as the quality of risk and not directly (Figure 5.9), because the 
model should be able to support the risk definition and the real life situations, and it seems it is 
easier for people to have one model where things can be better or worse; than to have two 
separate models, one where things can be only positive and one where things can be only 
negative.  
 
Figure 5.9 Developing system for client – nominal state 
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The root nodes in the model, i.e. they have no parent nodes are: ‘Personal contacts’, ‘Prototype 
delivery’, ‘Staff performance’, ‘Cultivate personal contacts’, ‘Diversify clients’ and ‘Strategic 
planning’. Details of some nodes in the model are as follows: 
• Feedback during development. This node represents the quality of the contribution that 
the feedback has on ‘Quality of the delivered system’ and ultimately ‘Company state’. 
The node is dependent on ‘Personal contacts’ as well as ‘Prototype delivery’. The state 
values of this node are: low, medium and high. Considering this is a ranked node, the 
distribution we have used is TNormal. The WMIN function is used as the mean of the 
TNormal. This means: 
o When ‘Personal contacts’ and ‘Prototype delivered’ are both ‘high’ the 
distribution of ‘Feedback during development’ is heavily skewed toward ‘high’ 
(Figure 5.10). 
 
Figure 5.10 Feedback during development – high 
o When ‘Personal contacts’ and ‘Prototype delivery’ are both ‘low’ the distribution 
of ‘Feedback during development’ is heavily skewed toward ‘low’. 
o When ‘Personal contacts’ is ‘low’ and ‘Prototype delivery’ is ‘high’ the 
distribution of ‘Feedback during development’ is centred toward ‘low’. 
o When ‘Personal contacts’ is ‘high’ and ‘Prototype delivery’ is ‘low’ the 
distribution of ‘Feedback during development’ is centred toward ‘low’. 
The nodes ‘Quality of delivered system’, ‘Follow on work with the client’ and ‘Company state’ 
are defined similarly using the wmin function. The node ‘Profits’ uses the wmean function. 
 
 





In this chapter, we have identified some problems with the term risk as well as problems 
with how risk is quantified. Traditional definitions illustrate the term risk as negative. In any 
given decision situation both risks and opportunities are usually involved, and both should be 
managed. Relatively recent risk definitions incorporate opportunities into their risk definition. 
To manage risk we propose a causal framework for risk. Risks and opportunities can 
sometimes be treated separately, but it is important to understand that they are not independent. 
Hence we use this framework to develop qualitative models where risks are no longer represented 
explicitly, but nodes that represent risk are now represented by scale attributes that underlie those 
risks. With this type of model, it is possible to fully support the risk definition and real life 
situations. 




6. The Causal Risk Register Model 
 
In chapter 2 we analysed standard project risk management tools; why they were often 
inadequate and provided no natural measure for risk analysis. We then went on to describe 
Bayesian nets in chapter 3 and explained why they provided a better platform for project risk 
analysis. Chapter 4 demonstrated the current BN project risk models and their limitations. New 
risk taxonomy was then presented in chapter 5. This chapter introduces the ‘Causal Risk Register 
Model’, a new model for large projects at the overall project level. 
The main novel contribution of this chapter, and consequently of the whole thesis, is to 
implement and validate new risk framework using the Bayesian net model. This new model 
adopts the basic philosophy from the existing models whilst overcoming certain limitations. The 
model implicitly considers the trade-offs that may be made in the risk model, specifically time, 
cost and quality. We discussed project success and failure in section 2.5. At the end, the model 
gives a risk score in the form of the probability of the project failing. 
6.1 Overview of the Causal Risk Register Model 
The main goal of the Causal Risk Register Model (CRRM) is to offer an improvement on 
the standard risk measurement (Risk = Probability x Impact) and therefore enable improved 
project risk analysis. It captures the basic philosophy of the standard project risk analysis tool i.e. 
the risk register, but structurally it is very different.  
As discussed previously, there are many problems with the standard measure of risk 
using the risk register. In chapter 5 we explained the rational way to think about risks in terms of 
causal models with trigger events, control events, risk events, mitigant events and consequence 
events. We have applied the causal framework to general top level risks and developed the risk 
model for an international leading defence company which we will refer to as ‘company X’. 
Figure 6.1 shows the CRRM which is an improvement to the original model developed for 
‘company X’. This model illustrates how these risks affect ‘Project Failure’.  




  Figure 6.1 Causal Risk Register Model 
6.2 Summary of model variables 
We identified the variables to be used in the model by analysing data provided by and 
collected from experts at ‘company X’. There are a number of key level one consequence events 
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influencing the final project outcome: poor quality product, poor process quality, schedule 
overrun, project overspent and required functionality missing. We have extensively discussed the 
influence of these risk events with experts in project risk management. Table 6.1 summarizes all 
the variables of the CRRM including the original names and our names which in majority of 
cases are revised versions of the original names. We made more significant changes in the 
following consequence nodes: 
• We divided ‘operational’ into ‘poor process quality’ and ‘poor product quality’ 
• We defined ‘performance’ as ‘required functionality missing’. These two terms have 
been used together and interchangeably in ‘company’s X’ documentation. Considering 
the company’s nature, we believe ‘required functionality missing’ is more specific and 
provides a better description. 
• We believe that it is standard to have a risk score and therefore we have ‘project failure’ 
as consequence level 2. Originally ‘company X’ had ‘reputation’ here. We believe 
‘reputation’ should not be included at this stage.       




Resources and motivation Poor staff performance 
Organisation and its 
effectiveness 
Organisation and its 
ineffectiveness 
Design solution – culture and 
acceptability 
Poor design solution 
Functional and performance 
requirements 
Requirements creep 
Planning and programme 
commitment 
Lack of programme 
commitment 
Process efficiencies Process inefficiencies 
Interfacing and integration 
into the platform 
Rushed interfacing and 
integration into the platform 
Procurement and sub-
contractor management 
Key sub-systems fail 
Obsolescence Obsolescence 
Business environment (order 
book, PR and legal) 
Inadequate business 
environment 
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Availability of facilities Inadequate facilities 
Budget constraints Initial underfunding 
Consequence event level 1 
 
Operational Poor product quality 
Operational Poor process quality 
Schedule Schedule overrun 
Cost Project overspent 
Performance Required functionality missing 
Consequence event level 2 Reputation Project Failure  
Table 6.1 Summary of all Causal Risk Register Model variables 
6.3 Improved Causal Risk Register Model 
The structure of the CRRM follows the new risk framework discussed in chapter 5. At 
the moment the CRRM has risk events and consequence events, and these are clearly defined in 
the company’s documentation. In addition, consequence events are divided into two levels. From 
the documentation, we can draw a conclusion on trigger events and control events, and add these 
to the CRRM. Considering the model is based on ‘company X’, the structure it has consists of 
trigger events, risk events, control events and consequence events, i.e. mitigant events are not 
included. Hence, we could make a parallel to the causal taxonomy of the Risk Control Self 
Assessment Model discussed in chapter 4 (Table 6.2). 
Risk Control Self Assessment Model Causal Risk Register Model 
Issues with control Trigger event 
Action plan Control event 
Risk occurs Risk event 
Losses Consequence event 
Table 6.2 Risk control self assessment model and causal risk register model taxonomy 
Based on ‘company’s X’ documentation we believe that the trigger events and control 
events shown in Table 6.3 would be best suited to the type of top level risk events we have in the 
CRRM (Figure 6.2).    
Trigger event Associated control event 
Poor training scheme Recruit adequately qualified staff 
Poor motivation 
Flexible working hours and holidays 
Good appraisal system and pay 
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Dislocation from corporate Change organisation structure 
Business objectives not clear  
Inability to freeze design early Specify maximum length for 
negotiation/changes 
Poor management Implement progress reports 
Technical novelty Recruit adequately qualified staff 
Poor initial requirements Follow-up procedures in place 
Lack of rapport with the client Follow-up procedures in place 
Poor concurrent engineering strategy  
Poor change control  
Poor build strategy  
Important overridden by urgent 
Key control checks must be passed 
Good planning 
Dependence on supplier deliveries  
Especially complex requirements Recruit adequately qualified staff 
Poor image and PR Market diversification 
Share price performance low Focus on opportunity cost 
Inadequate testing and trials  
Rapidly changing technologies Product diversification 
Small budget plan for order book Good negotiating skills 
Poor cash flow analysis Focus on opportunity cost 
Table 6.3 Summary of trigger events and control events 




Figure 6.2 Causal Risk Register Model with Trigger Events and Control Events 
                                                                                                               
110 
 
As established in chapter 5, it is possible for each risk event to have more than one trigger 
event and control event. If we observe the Causal Risk Register Model segment for ‘Poor staff 
performance’ risk event (Figure 6.3), we can see there are two trigger events (‘Poor motivation’ 
and ‘Poor training scheme’) and three control events (‘Recruit adequately qualified staff’, 
‘Flexible working hours and holidays’ and ‘Good appraisal system and pay’). Considering there 
are five parent nodes, we need to be careful not to end up with very complex NPTs.  
To keep ease of use throughout the model and simple NPTs, we have taken the following 
steps: firstly, we introduced two dummy nodes for each of the trigger events, i.e. ‘Poor staff 
performance with respect to training scheme’ and ‘Poor staff performance with respect to poor 
motivation’. Secondly, since there are two control events for ‘Poor motivation’, we introduced 
additional dummy node ‘Control against poor motivation’.  This node represents the combined 
contribution that all the control events put together have on the risk event with respect to a 
particular trigger event.  For simplicity, this node is a Boolean node and we have used a noisyor 
comparative expression to define the NPT. 
‘Poor staff with respect to poor motivation’ node is dependent on ‘Poor motivation’ and 
‘Control against poor motivation’. This node represents the impact that ‘Poor motivation’ has on 
‘Poor staff performance’ when ‘Control against poor motivation’ taken into account. This is a 
Boolean node and the NPT is defined manually.  
‘Poor staff performance’ node represents a risk event. It is dependent on ‘Poor staff with 
respect to poor motivation’ and ‘Poor staff with respect to poor training scheme’. It directly 
influences ‘Poor process quality’ which is a consequence level 1 event. Hence, we could say 
‘Poor staff performance’ is a trigger event for the ‘Poor process quality’ risk event. Hence, we 
can see how the types of events in the causal taxonomy of risk are all completely interchangeable. 
 




Figure 6.3 ‘Poor staff performance’ risk event    
 
6.4 Structure of the Model  
Trigger events and control events are root nodes and they don’t have any parents; 
therefore we assign probability values to these nodes based on the information provided in 
‘company’s X’ documentation. Considering they are defined as Boolean nodes it is easy to enter 
their NPTs. Therefore, it is also easy to customize their NPTs, since companies typically gather 
some data from their past projects.  
For all the nodes that have more than two parents we use a noisyor expression, for 
example ‘Organisation and its ineffectiveness’. We use constants for weighting (Equation 6-1) 
and this will be discussed more in section 6.7 . 
Organisation and its ineffectiveness =  
noisyor(org_ineff_bus_obj,org_ineff_bus_obj_const,org_ineff_disloc_cor, 
org_ineff_disloc_cor_const, org_ineff_poor_mng,org_ineff_poor_mng_const, 0.1)         (6-1) 
 Normally we will enter observations about risk events for the particular project being 
studied. As soon as we enter observations, these impact consequences level 1 and in turn the 
consequence level 2. Consequences are the main part of the model and they represent measurable 
quantities that managers can reason about. The combination of consequence outcomes determines 
if the overall project is going to fail or not.  
A key feature of the Causal Risk Register Model is the trade-off part (Figure 6.4). The 
fact that the model indirectly models trade-off between time, cost and quality via: 
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• Poor product quality 
• Poor process quality 
• Schedule overrun 
• Project overspent 
• Required functionality missing. 
Since ‘Project failure’ has more than two parents we use a noisyor expression. We use constants 
for weighting (Equation 6-2) and this will be discussed more in section 6.7 . 
Project failure =  
noisyor(poor_prod_qual,poor_prod_qual_const,poor_proc_qual,  
poor_proc_qual_const, sched_overrun,sched_overrun_const, proj_overspent, 
proj_overspent_const, req_func_missing, req_func_missing_const, 0.1)                             (6-2) 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Trade-off part 
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6.5 Issues arising from model development 
One of the initial requirements was for the model to be used by practitioners who have no 
mathematical/statistical background. Hence, all the variables in the model are Boolean and NPTs 
for them are defined manually.  
In some cases, where there are more than one trigger event and control event; what we 
had in the model, by following the risk register approach, was a list of trigger events that can 
trigger the risk event and then a list of control events for the combination of all triggers. If we 
analyse a segment of the model in Figure 6.5, we can see that we have ‘Poor training scheme’ and 
‘Poor motivation’ as trigger events for ‘Poor staff performance’ on one side and ‘Pay increase’, 
‘Flexible working hours’ and ‘Longer holidays’ as control events on the other side.   
Figure 6.5 Original ‘Poor staff performance’ risk event 
 
Using this structure we cannot clearly see which control event relates directly to which 
trigger event. What we have is a set of combined control events for the set of combined trigger 
events. What we want to do is to separate the trigger events and control events. We need a 
different model structure in order to achieve this. We need a model structure whereby we will 
take the first trigger event and then list all the control events for a risk event with respect to the 
first trigger event; then take the second trigger event and list all the control events for a risk event 
with respect to the second trigger event.  
In practice, looking at Figure 6.6, we will first take the ‘Poor motivation’ trigger event 
and list all the control events for ‘Poor staff performance’ with respect to the ‘Poor motivation’; 
then we will take the second trigger event ‘Poor training scheme’ and list all the controls for 
‘Poor staff performance’ with respect to the ‘Poor training scheme’. You can see what the same 
model segment looks like using the new model structure in Figure 6.6. 




Figure 6.6 Modelling trigger events and control events 
6.6 Model validation 
6.6.1 Internal Validation 
We will first validate the model internally, based on priors that we had supplied and 
probabilities for the outcomes. Ideally we would have liked to have information on which triggers 
happened during this project, but unfortunately considering the nature of the project, this 
information was too confidential.  
Internal validation is followed with two cases of external validation by two independent 
project managers. In the first case of external validation we look at a small software company.  
Case 1 – No observations entered 
First we validate the model internally and analyse if the model predictions are consistent 
with the initially assumed distributions. We execute the model without any observations. Table 












False 81% 70% 63% 65% 83% 63% 
True 19% 30% 37% 35% 17% 37% 
  Table 6.4 Predictions when no observations are entered  
We can observe that the predicted probabilities are reasonable and consistent with what 
‘company X’ was expecting at the time. For example, the model correctly predicts a higher 
probability of failure for ‘Schedule overrun’ and ‘Project overspent’. This is historically correct 
for ‘company X’; as well as many other companies.  
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Case 2 – Observation ‘false’ is entered for ‘Project failure’ 
We execute the model when observation ‘false’ is entered for ‘Project failure’. This 
results in back propagation and Table 6.5 illustrates the revised probabilities for ‘consequence 











False 87% 77% 69% 71% 88% 
True 13% 23% 31% 29% 12% 
Table 6.5 Predictions when observation ‘false’ is entered for ‘Project failure’ 
The model correctly revises probability distributions and predicts a higher probability of 
‘consequence level 1’ nodes being ‘false’. For example, the probability for ‘Product quality’ 
being ‘false’ is revised and it increases from 81% (Figure 6.4) to 87% (Figure 6.5). 
Case 3 – Observation ‘false’ is entered for ‘Schedule overrun’ 
We execute the model when observation ‘false’ is entered for ‘Schedule overrun’. This 
results in back propagation and Table 6.6 illustrates the revised probabilities for relevant risk 
event nodes. 
 Poor design 
solution 
Lack of programme 
commitment 
Rushed interfacing and 
integration into the platform 
False 92% 93% 91% 
True 8% 7% 9% 
Table 6.6 Predictions when observation ‘false’ is entered for ‘Schedule overrun’ 
The model correctly revises probability distributions and predicts a higher probability of 
relevant risk events being ‘false’. For example, the probability for ‘Poor design solution’ being 
‘false’ is revised and it increases from 77% (Figure 6.7) to 92% (Figure 6.6).  
 Poor design 
solution 
Lack of programme 
commitment 
Rushed interfacing and 
integration into the platform 
False 77% 87% 84% 
True 23% 13% 16% 
Table 6.7 Predictions when no observations are entered 
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Case 4 – Observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events   
We execute the model when observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events. Table 6.8 












False 61% 54% 31% 53% 65% 48% 
True 39% 46% 69% 47% 35% 52% 
  Table 6.8 Predictions when observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events  
For example, the model correctly predicts a higher probability of ‘consequence level 1’ and 
consequence level 2’ events being ‘true’. For example, the probability for ‘Product quality’ being 
‘true’ increases from 19% (Figure 6.4) to 39% (Figure 6.8). 
Case 5 – Observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events and observation ‘false’ is 
entered for all control events 
We execute the model when observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events and 
observation ‘false’ is entered for all control events. Table 6.9 illustrates the predicted probabilities 












False 43% 42% 17% 33% 47% 37% 
True 57% 58% 83% 67% 53% 63% 
Table 6.9 Predictions when observation ‘true’ is entered for all triggers and observation ‘false’ is 
entered for all controls 
For example, the model correctly predicts an even higher probability of ‘consequence level 1’ and 
consequence level 2’ events being ‘true’. For example, the probability for ‘Product quality’ being 
‘true’ increases even further from 39% (Figure 6.8) to 57% (Figure 6.9).  
Case 6 – Observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events and observation ‘true’ is 
entered for all control events 
We execute the model when observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events and 
observation ‘true’ is entered for all control events. Table 6.10 illustrates the predicted 
probabilities for ‘consequence level 1’ and ‘consequence level 2’. 














False 67% 58% 36% 61% 71% 53% 
True 33% 42% 64% 39% 29% 47% 
Table 6.10 Predictions when observation ‘true’ is entered for all trigger events and observation ‘true’ 
is entered for all control events 
For example, the model correctly predicts lower probability of ‘consequence level 1’ and 
consequence level 2’ events being ‘true’. For example, the probability for ‘Product quality’ being 
‘true’ decreases from 57% (Figure 6.9) when control events were ‘false’ to 33% (Figure 6.10).  
Case 7 – Observation ‘true’ is entered for ‘Poor management’ 
We execute the model when observation ‘true’ is entered for ‘Poor management’. This is 
the key risk event that has impact on all ‘consequence level 1’ events. Table 6.11 illustrates the 












False 69% 66% 45% 62% 73% 56% 
True 31% 34% 55% 38% 27% 44% 
Table 6.11 Predictions when observation ‘true’ is entered for ‘Poor management’ 
 For example, the model correctly predicts a higher probability of ‘consequence level 1’ and 
consequence level 2’ events being ‘true’. For example, the probability for ‘Product quality’ being 
‘true’ increases from 19% (Figure 6.4) to 31% (Figure 6.11).  
6.6.2 External Validation 
Case 1 – External validation for ‘company Y’ 
We have asked the project manager for a small software company, which we will refer to 
as ‘company Y’, to enter values for the triggers and controls for two projects. The entries for the 
triggers are shown in Figure 6.7 and the entries for controls are shown in Figure 6.8. These entries 
are completed in a ‘Risk table’ which is the feature of AgenaRisk and allows observations to be 
entered in a similar way as in a spreadsheet.  




Figure 6.7 Project manager’s entries for triggers for ‘company Y’  
 
Figure 6.8 Project manager’s entries for controls for ‘company Y’ 
‘Project 1’ was a reasonably successful project. Therefore, we can see that there are some 
triggers that are ‘true’, but also the relevant controls are mainly ‘true’. ‘Project 2’ was a bit of a 
failure. Hence, there are many triggers that are ‘true’, but also many relevant controls are ‘false’.  
The model correctly predicted the risk events and these probabilities were more or less spot on. 
Figure 6.9 shows some examples of risk events. 





 Figure 6.9 Predicted probabilities for risk events 
We can observe that the model predicts a higher probability of 92% for ‘Poor staff 
performance’ being false for ‘project 1’ which is a successful project. The probability for ‘Poor 
staff performance’ being false drops to 46% for ‘project 2’ which is an unsuccessful project. 
Similarly the model predicts a higher probability of 71% for ‘Poor design solution’ being false for 
‘project 1’ and this drops to 29% for ‘project 2’.  
The model’s predictions for ‘consequences level 1’ and ‘consequences level 2’ are 
showed in Figure 6.10. 
  





    Figure 6.10 Predicted probabilities for consequences 
The predictions for ‘consequence level 1’ are pretty good. There are small inaccuracies and 
reasons for this are as follows: 
• These projects were different in nature, had different sizes and were done in a different 
environment to the original project environment for which the model was built. 
• There were certain risk events that were not at all relevant; for example, ‘Lack of 
programme commitment’, ‘Inadequate business environment’ and ‘Inadequate facilities’. 
The way the model handles this is to (correctly) assert that these particular risk events 
have a low probability of occurring. The problem is that the model does not distinguish 
between them being ‘unlikely’ and being ‘irrelevant’. Therefore, it treats them as 
unlikely, but still relevant. Hence, they impact in a positive way on the subsequent 
predictions. 
The predictions for ‘Project failure’ are very good. The model predicts there is a 63% 
probability that ‘project 1’ will be successful and a 58% probability that ‘project 2’ will be a 
failure. 
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Case 2 – External validation for ‘company Z’ 
We have asked the project manager for a large construction company, which we will refer 
to as ‘company Z’, to enter values for the triggers and controls for two projects. The entries for 
the triggers are shown in Figure 6.11 and the entries for controls are shown in Figure 6.12. 
 
Figure 6.11 Project manager’s entries for triggers for ‘company Z’  
 
Figure 6.12 Project manager’s entries for controls for ‘company Z’ 
‘Project 1’ was a bit of a failure. Hence, there are many triggers that are ‘true’, but also 
many relevant controls are ‘false’. ‘Project 2’ was a reasonably successful project. Therefore, we 
can see that there are some triggers that are ‘true’, but also the relevant controls are mainly ‘true’. 
The model correctly predicted the risk events and these probabilities were more or less spot on. 
Figure 6.13 shows some examples of risk events. 





 Figure 6.13 Predicted probabilities for risk events 
We can observe that the model predicts a higher probability of 88% for ‘Organisation and 
its ineffectiveness’ being false for ‘project 2’ which is a successful project. The probability for 
‘Organisation and its ineffectiveness’ being false drops to 29% for ‘project 1’ which is an 
unsuccessful project. Similarly the model predicts a higher probability of 90% for ‘Poor design 
solution’ being false for ‘project 1’ and this drops to 35% for ‘project 2’.  
The model’s predictions for ‘consequences level 1’ and ‘consequences level 2’ are 
showed in Figure 6.14. 






    Figure 6.14 Predicted probabilities for consequences 
The predictions for ‘consequence level 1’ are pretty good. Small inaccuracies and reasons for 
this are same as in the previous case and they are due to: 
• Projects were different in nature, had different sizes and were done in a different 
environment to the original project for which the model was built. 
• There were certain risk events that were not at all relevant; for example, ‘Lack of 
programme commitment’ and ‘Inadequate business environment’.  
The predictions for ‘Project failure’ are very good. The model predicts there is a 59% probability 
that ‘project 1’ will be failure and a 69% probability that ‘project 2’ will be a success. 
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6.7 CRRM Ease of Use and Tailoring  
The model (Figure 6.3) is easy to use and it is possible for the project manager to go 
directly to the Risk Table and enter observations for all the nodes. The Risk Table is more like a 
questionnaire and it is useful for entering many observations at once. A sample risk table is 
shown in Figure 6.15. In addition, the model can still be easily tailored to different projects.  
 
Figure 6.15 CRRM Risk Table 
The managers with a non-mathematical background can easily tailor the model to 
different projects. Trigger and control events don’t have any parents and they are Boolean nodes. 
Therefore it is easy to change their priors in accordance with different projects (Figure 6.16).   
 
Figure 6.16 Example NPT for root node ‘Poor training scheme’   
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A CRRM is created for a specific company. If we want to have a more general model, we 
could define the probability for all triggers and all controls as P(‘True’) = 0.5 and P(‘False’) = 
0.5. In this case, project managers can enter priors directly into the risk table as soft evidence 
(Figure 6.17) and there is no need to change the NPTs.   
 
Figure 6.17 Soft evidence example 
As mentioned in section 6.4 noisyor expression involves constants. This enables the user 
to change the weighting directly from the risk table (Figure 6.18) without the need to access and 
change NPTs.  
 
Figure 6.18 Constant example   
6.8 CRRM Features  
The causal taxonomy approach satisfies the minimalist requirements described by Chapman and 
Ward in [34] where they recommend that any approach to risk quantification:  
“should be so easy to use that the usual resistance to appropriate quantification based on lack of 
data and lack of comfort with subjective probabilities is overcome”.  
Moreover, the approach ensures that:  
• A project manager can easily change priors for triggers and controls, either by directly 
changing NPTs or by entering soft evidence into the risk table.   
• Every aspect of risk measurement is meaningful in the context – the risk map tells a story 
that makes sense. This is an improvement on “risk = probability x impact” approach 
where not one of the concepts has a clear unambiguous interpretation.  
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• Every aspect of uncertainty is fully quantified since at any stage we can simply read off 
the current probability values associated with any event.  
• It provides a visual and formal mechanism for recording and testing subjective 
probabilities. This is especially important for a risk event about which you do not have 
much or any relevant data. 
• Enables us to perform trade-off analysis. 
• Provides an overall risk ‘score’ in terms of ‘Project failure’. 
• Prioritisation of risk events can be achieved in ways that are much more meaningful and 
rigorous. For example, we could:  
o Simply read off the marginal probability values for each risk event given 
your current state of knowledge. This will rank the risks in order of 
probability of occurrence. (This tells you which are most likely to happen 
given your state of knowledge of controls and triggers);  
o Set the value of each risk event in turn to be true and read off the 
resulting probability values of the appropriate consequence nodes. This 
will provide the probability of the consequence given that each 
individual risk definitively occurs. The risk prioritisation can then be 
based on the consequence probability values.  
o Introduce ‘dashboard’ type features by identifying key consequences, 
setting thresholds below which they should not fall and then building 
traffic light components based around that. 
6.9 Further enhancements to the model 
In organisations where risk is treated seriously, at the start of every project, project 
managers discuss and list risks. Hence, most such projects will have a risk register. As discussed 
in section 2.7.2 when creating a risk register, we first identify risks. Then we give each risk a 
probability and the impact it can have. At the end, we add up all the risks to get the risk score. 
The more the risk register expands, the more the risk score increases and the more the manager 
thinks that the overall probability of the project failing increases. This is the paradox. The fact is 
that at the start of the project, the process of identifying risks cannot possibly increase the risk of 
the project failing.  
This is supported by classical subjectivist view of the probability. Suppose you ask your friend 
Naomi to roll a die without letting you see the result, but before she rolls it you have to answer 
the following: 
                                                                                                               
127 
 
Question 1: What is the probability the number rolled will be a 4? 
Having rolled the die Naomi must write down the number rolled on a piece of paper (without 
showing you) and place it in an envelope. 
Now answer: 
Question 2: What is the probability the number written down is a 4 (i.e. was the number rolled a 
4)? 
From your perspective it is rational to answer 1/6 in both cases. If Naomi informs Hannah that the 
number written down is even, then the rational answer to Question 2 from Hannah's perspective is 
1/3. So different information about the same unkown event can rationally lead to different 
subjective probabilities about that event. But from Naomi's perspective there is no uncertainty at 
all about the event. The answer to question 2 is either 1 (if it is a 4) or 0 (if it is not) and it is this 
situation that leads (wrongly) to the 'no such thing as probability' argument. This argument says 
that there is no uncertainty about the number because it is a ‘fact’ - it is even written down (and is 
known to Naomi). But, if YOUR knowledge about the number after it is thrown (i.e. if you are 
not Naomi or even Hannah) is as incomplete as it was before, then your uncertainty about it 
remains the same. Hence it is irrational to argue that the probability has changed from your 
perspective. 
For example, we could look at the probability of a terrorist attack from two perspectives 
[2]; the perspective of a random school child and the perspective of an MI5 officer.  Imagine they 
were both given authority to make decision about the risk of a terrorist attack. We can say that 
what is known to the decision maker in the first case will be less than what is known to the 
decision maker in the second case (at least we hope this would be the case). However, the 
probability of the terrorist attack is clearly independent of probability assign to it by decision 
makers.  
Therefore, the key in this example is that the probability of the ‘terrorist attack’ is the 
same in both cases. This probability does not change. What changes is that the random school 
child will probably know less ‘known terrorist groups’ than the MI5 officer who will hopefully 
know more. The fact that the MI5 officer will simply list many more ‘known terrorist groups’ 
does not increase the probability of a ‘terrorist attack’.  Hence, the prior for ‘terrorist attack’ 
should not change, because what changes is only our knowledge about the risks and not the risks 
themselves. Following the risk register approach, the random school child and the MI5 officer 
would end up with two different risk scores. The MI5 officer would end up with a higher risk 
score, because he would simply list many more terrorist groups; and the random school child 
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would end up with a lower risk score, because he/she would list less terrorist groups. This is the 
paradox. 
However, there has been little discussion about this paradox. Therefore, we need a new 
approach to improve risk classification. The key point is that in the beginning when we do a risk 
assessment, the probability of a project failing does not change. However, the probability margins 
between the known knowns and the known unknown are probably different. This is the key 
technical point that most project managers miss out on. We will discuss risk classification more in 
the next section. 
6.9.1 The Risk Classification Framework 
 
The United States military was the first one to use the term ‘unknown unknowns’. The 
earliest use comes from a paper entitled ‘Clausewitz and Modern War Gaming: losing can be 
better than winning’ [68]. Almost a decade later, the software engineering community has 
adopted the term and used it as basis to propose one of the ways to classify risks. A 1993 paper 
by Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engineering Institute proposed grouping risks into three basic 
categories. Risks can be known, unknown or unknowable. “Known risks are those that one or 
more project personnel are aware of – if not explicitly as risks, at least as concerns. The unknown 
risks are those that would surface (i.e. become known), if the project personnel were given the 
right opportunity, cues, and information. The unknowable risks are those that, even in principle, 
“none could foresee.” [169] In 1997 Chapman and Ward’s [32] text book on project management 
adopted this approach of classifying risk. In 2002 Donald Rumsfeld [165], the American secretary 
of defence at the time, was ridiculed by media for his famous ‘known unknowns’ remark, then 
defended as clear. Media coverage did not reveal he was simply quoting accepted project 
management theory.  
Most commonly used standards for project risk management in organisations e.g. Project 
Management Institute, Project Management Body of Knowledge, Chapter 11 [151], UK 
Association for Project Management Project Risk Analysis and Management (PRAM) Guide [7],  
AS/NZS 4360 Standard [9]; do not at all mention known, unknown and unknowable risk. The 
World Economic Forum 2006 [179] Global risk report’s suggestion is to classify risks into three 
categories: known, unknown and unknowable. Clearly there are ambiguities here; the cases of 
tsunamis, hurricanes, the severity of an epidemic, terrorism attacks are a few to mention. 
Let us take, for example, the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11th 
2001. Here we can identify the risk event as “Terrorists hijack and crash large civilian aircraft 
into major buildings”. The question now is whether this risk event was known, unknown or 
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unknowable. We can certainly say that it was definitely not an unknowable risk event, because 
there were many examples before whereby terrorists have hijacked planes. The real question is 
whether this risk event was known or unknown. We are not able to answer this question using the 
classification framework proposed in 1993 and still in use. The reason for this is that the risk 
event in question was known to the US intelligence, but it was unknown to the key decision 
makers at the time. Using this example we can clearly see what is wrong with the risk 
classification framework currently in use. It fails to account for information and knowledge 
available to particular decision makers.      
Part of the initial purpose of our new risk classification framework was to define known, 
unknown and unknowable in more detail and to provide simple descriptions and terminology to 
fit these ambiguities. The key is that these ambiguities do not fit in the World Economic Forum 
2006 Global risk report framework, because the risk event from the above example is not just 
unknown. Generally speaking people knew about it, but the problem was that at the time decision 
makers did not know. Hence, in our new risk event classification framework, we will introduce 
this new idea of the decision maker and the information and knowledge available to them (Table 
6.12).  
There are known knowns; these are things we know we know. A known known is when 
we know the risk and we have seen it happen sufficiently many times before. Hence, we are able 
to make an empirical probabilistic judgement of the risk occurring and its consequence. We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. 
A known unknown is when we know the risk event, but we have rarely observed it or we have 
never had the opportunity to observe it. Hence, we can only make a subjective probabilistic 
judgement about it and we are not able to make an empirical probabilistic judgement. Hence, the 
probability of the risk occurring and its consequence is based only on our subjective probabilistic 
judgement.  




Table 6.12 Risk classification framework 
The key concept we introduce in our framework is the decision maker knowledge of the 
risk event. It is possible for both risk groups, known knowns and known unknowns, to be known 
to the decision maker or not to be known to the decision maker. If a known known is not known 
to the decision maker than it is unknown known from the decision maker’s point of view. If a 
known unknown is not known to the decision maker then it is an unknown unknown. 
The unknowable risks are those ones we don’t know we don’t know. Which means there 
are facts that are unknown by anyone and others that will never be known. These are not worth 
addressing in this thesis since it is impossible to quantify them and hence we omitted them from 
our new risk classification framework.  
6.9.2 The Risk Classification Framework Example 
We can use the example of a submarine to demonstrate our new risk classification 
framework (Table 1). In 2010 ‘Attack by submarine’ is a known known risk event to any 
competent naval officer since it has been used sufficiently many times during the wars until today 
for the decision maker to be able to make an empirical probabilistic judgement about it. The same 
risk event would be an unknown known to any incompetent naval officer who because of his 
incompetence would not be able to identify ‘Attack of submarine’ as a risk event and 
consequently would not be able to make an empirical probabilistic judgement about it. 
In 1776, during the American Revolution, ‘Attack by submarine’ was a known unknown 
risk event for the American army. The reason for this is that the concept of a submarine existed. 
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The fact that it had not been used in warfare before meant that the decision makers at the time 
were not able to make an empirical probabilistic judgement. However, they were still able to 
make a subjective probabilistic judgement about it. Since the decision makers were able to make 
a subjective judgement about the risk event, we can put the above risk event into the known 
unknown category.  
The first published description for the submarine was in 1578. William Bourne, a former 
Royal Navy gunner, designed a completely enclosed boat that could be submerged and rowed 
beneath the surface. His creation was a wooden framework bound in waterproofed leather. It was 
to be submerged by using hand vices to contract the sides and decrease the volume. In 1776, the 
submarine was used in warfare for the first time. Because of this we can say that before 1776 
‘Attack by submarine’ was an unknown unknown risk event. 
The key to improving the risk register is using our new risk classification framework and 
looking at how dividing line between the known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns 
and unknown unknowns changes. As the project progresses what changes is our knowledge about 
risks and not the risk events themselves. What is a known unknown can become a known known. 
In some situations, the list of things that are known knowns and known unknowns can be altered. 
There are some things that could be known knowns, but sometimes the costs of knowing them 
may exceed the potential benefits. Risk management in general tries to shift risks that are 
considered known unknowns into the category of known knowns and tries to mitigate the costs 
associated with things that remain known unknowns. Known unknowns can appear at any time 
during the execution of the project. We need to create a strategy to deal with such possibilities.  
The real dilemma is what to do with risks that seem unknowable. In a crisis, information 
inevitably will be highly imperfect. The very nature of a crisis means that the ratio of the 
unknown and unknowable will be especially large relative to the known, and this, in turn, can 
influence how decision makers judge risks. It is important to mention that the only way for the 
overall probability of failure to change is if an unknowable risk becomes at least an unknown 
unknown. 
The challenge is how to complete priors for this type of model. Maybe it would be 
possible to elicit them from experienced managers. We would have to ask them to say something 
about what they don’t know. An unknowable risk cannot be modelled. The only way to 
incorporate unknowable risks is to add additional nodes when unknowable risks become at least 
unknown unknowns. Hence, in terms of quantitative project risk management, it would be 
possible to concentrate on known knowns and known unknowns. 
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Ideally what we would like to achieve in a model is to somehow automatically change 
between known knowns and known unknowns without changing the overall probability. This 
complex causal relationship is important, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6.10 Summary 
The new Causal Risk Register Model discussed in this chapter applies risk framework 
developed in chapter 5. The model is developed based on top level risks provided by an 
international leading defence company. The internal and external validation performed on the 
CRRM showed its great potential in providing useful information for project risk assessment. The 
model provides reasonable explanations in a number of different scenarios. We identified some 
issues and possible future improvements notably the risk classification framework. The next 
chapter discusses the extension to the model in order to explicitly address project trade-offs.    
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7. Generic Trade-off Model 
In chapter 4 we provided examples of previous BN models and how they indirectly 
addressed trade-offs. The Causal Risk Register Model developed in chapter 6 also addresses 
trade-offs indirectly. Therefore, this chapter focuses on extending the Causal Risk Register Model 
with a sub-model able to explicitly model trade-offs. The Generic Trade-off Model considers the 
trade-offs that may be made during a project, specifically time, cost and quality. For example, if 
asked to estimate the probability of a project overrunning by various lengths of time, a manager 
may respond by contending that such a risk can be reduced to virtually zero if he is given a larger 
budget. This implies that, in such a case, there is a trade-off between the time and the cost.   
Novel contributions of this chapter include a list of assumed rules that satisfy project 
trade-offs and reflect relationships between key project variables and the BN model that satisfies 
all the assumed rules identified. The Generic Trade-off Model is one of the main contributions to 
the whole thesis. The earlier version of this work has been published [64]. 
7.1 The Project Trade-offs 
As mentioned in section 2.5, successful project risk management attempts to control 
resources within the constraints of time, cost and quality. In the traditional cost, time and quality 
model; quality is a euphemism for the features of the end project which is delivered. This clearly 
has two attributes: functionality (amount of useful features delivered to end users) [107] and 
product quality (how good is the product delivered) [104]. Clearly it is possible to deliver less or 
more functionality; and lower or higher product quality. This breakdown of quality is really 
important, since it brings the causal aspect into the model. In addition, we introduce a new 
dimension – process quality (how good is the process during delivery). This is important because 
from a risk management perspective this is something the project manager can control/improve.  
For the purpose of assumed rules simplification, we have grouped cost and time into 
resources. If cost and time are observed independently, then anything that applies to resources 
applies to cost and time. The model itself preserves cost and time separately; considers process 
quality and both attributes for quality.     
  Trade-offs are always determined by the constraints of the project. The types of 
constraints commonly imposed are illustrated in Table 7.1 [97]. Situations with one or two 
elements fixed at a given time are the typical trade-offs encountered in project management. 
Situations where three elements are fixed or variable portray some research and development 
projects. The quality of research and development projects, for example, is usually well defined, 
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and it is cost and time that may be allowed to go beyond budget and schedule. The decision on 
which element to sacrifice is based on the available alternatives.   
Time Cost Quality 
One element fixed at the time 
Fixed Variable Variable 
Variable Fixed Variable 
Variable Variable Fixed 
Two elements fixed at the time 
Fixed Fixed Variable 
Variable Fixed Fixed 
Fixed Variable Fixed 
Three elements fixed or variable 
Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Variable Variable Variable 
Table 7.1 Trade-off constraints categories [97] 
Most capital equipment projects will eventually reach a stage where time is of the 
essence, i.e. time is fixed and cost and quality are variable. The sooner the piece of equipment 
gets into production, the sooner the return on investment can be realised. In addition markets are 
entered early and it is possible to grow those markets quickly. In pharmaceutical product 
development, the Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug Development estimates an average of $30 
000 in direct costs is added for each day’s delay [70]. Often performance constraints exist which 
determine the profit potential of the project. If the project potential is determined to be great, after 
all the constraints have been considered, cost will be the slippage factor hence time and 
performance will be fixed whereas cost will be variable. 
Non-process-type equipment, such as air pollution control equipment, usually result in 
the situation where time is variable and cost and quality are fixed. Quality is fixed by the 
Environmental Protection Agency. The deadline for compliance can be delayed through litigation, 
but if the lawsuits fail, most firms then try to comply with the least expensive equipment that will 
meet the minimum requirements.    
Professional consulting firms operate primarily with fixed time and cost constraints and 
variable quality constraints. In the situation where all three elements are fixed there is no room for 
error as none of the elements can be changed yet the project is managed with a view to success; if 
all elements are variable, there are no constraints and thus no trade-offs.   
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7.2 Assumed rules for Generic Trade-off Model 
Before discussing the assumed rules we make a number of simplifying assumptions: 
1. Cost and time are combined into resources in order to keep the assumed rules simple.  
Resources represent total effort allocated for a project.  
2. Quality is separated into: 
a) process quality – overall measure of process quality aggregating various 
     organizational factors, 
b) functionality – size or quantity of a product, 
c) product quality – how good the delivered product is. 








1 if R↑ then F↑ or Q↑ 
2 if P↑ then F↑ or Q↑ 
3 if F↑ then P↑ or R↑ 
4 if Q↑ then P↑ or R↑ 
5 if F↑ and R= then P↑ or Q↓ 
6 if F↑ and P= then R↑ or Q↓ 
7 if Q↑ and R= then P↑ or F↓ 
8 if Q↑ and P= then R↑ or F↓ 
* ‘R’ – resources, ‘P’ – process quality,  
   ‘F’ – functionality, ‘Q’ – project quality 
   ‘↑’ – increase, ‘↓’ – decrease, ‘=’ – no change 
Table 7.2 Summary of assumed rules in project management 
Assumed rule 1. If the only information that we have about the project is that the resources have 
increased (i.e. more time and budget allocated to the project), then it is reasonable for us to expect 
that either the functionality delivered and/or the product quality will increase.  
Assumed rule 2. If the only information that we have about the project is that the process quality 
has increased, then it is reasonable for us to expect that either the functionality delivered or the 
product quality will increase.  
Assumed rule 3. If the only information that we have about the project is that the functionality 
delivered has increased, then it is reasonable for us to expect that this increase was an effect of the 
increase in either the process quality and/or the resources being allocated to the project.     
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Assumed rule 4. If the only information that we have about the project is that the project quality 
has increased, then it is reasonable for us to expect that this increase was an effect of the increase 
in either the process quality and/or the resources being allocated to the project. 
Assumed rule 5. If the functionality delivered increases and if the resources being allocated for 
the project remain unchanged, then it is reasonable for us to expect either:  
1) If the process quality increases the project quality remains unchanged. 
2) If the process quality remains unchanged the project quality will decrease. 
Assumed rule 6. If the functionality delivered increases and if the process quality remains 
unchanged, then it is reasonable for us to expect either:  
1) If the resources being allocated for the project increase the project quality will remain 
unchanged.  
2) If the resources being allocated for the project remain unchanged the project quality will 
decrease. 
Assumed rule 7. If the quality of the project increases and if the resources allocated for the 
project remain unchanged, then it is reasonable for us to expect that either:  
1) If the process quality increases the functionality will remain unchanged.  
2) If the process quality remains unchanged the functionality will decrease.  
Assumed rule 8. If the quality of the project increases and if the process quality remains 
unchanged, then it is reasonable for us to expect that either: 
1) Functionality delivered will decrease if the resources being allocated for the project 
remain unchanged. 
2) If functionality delivered remains unchanged then the resources being allocated for the 
project will increase. 
While these assumed rules are uncontroversial, it turns out that it is remarkably difficult to 
construct a causal BN model in which they are all satisfied. A major challenge therefore was to 
consider how and why previous attempts failed to preserve all the assumed rules and how we 
built a model that satisfied them.  
7.3 Issues arising from model development 
7.3.1 Modelling trade-off based on SIMP model 
Initially we looked at the SIMP model discussed in chapter 4. We concentrated on 
percentage increase or decrease in cost, schedule and performance based on the risk score. The 
reason being, as previously mentioned in chapter 4, the project manager can determine percentage 
increase or decrease when analysing the trade-off between budget and time. Therefore in order to 
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build our model, we tried to improve the original SIMP model. To be able to use the SIMP model 
more generally in the core of it we distinguished four nodes: Risk Score, Actual Resources, 
Quality Produced and Functionality Delivered; as shown in Figure 7.1.    
 
Figure 7.1 Initial core of the SIMP model 
 
For example, when risk increases quality and functionality decrease. At the moment the 
model in Figure 7.1 does not predict this correctly since there is no link between functionality and 
quality. This link is crucial for the assumed rules to be satisfied. Hence, we have introduced it in 
our model (Figure 7.2). 
   
Figure 7.2 Improved core of the SIMP model 
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Details of the nodes in the model are as follows: 
• Risk score. This node summarizes all risks into one score. The node type is discrete real. 
It has a numeric value in the range from -5 to 5. This range allows risks to be positive and 
not only negative things in the model. 
• Actual Resources. This node represents available resources. The node type is a 
continuous interval. It has a numeric value in the range minus infinity to plus infinity.  
• Quality Produced. This is the extent to which the quality delivered in the final project 
satisfies the project specification. This node has three parents Risk Score, Actual 
Resources and Functionality Delivered. The node essentially takes account of the impact 
of the three parents onto the final Quality Produced. The node type is continuous interval. 
It is calculated using the normal distribution and its value is numeric in the range minus 
infinity to plus infinity. 
• Functionality Delivered. This is the extent to which the functionality delivered in the 
final project satisfies the project specification. This node has two parents: Risk Score and 
Actual Resources. The node essentially takes account of the impact of the two parents 
onto the final Functionality Delivered. The node type is continuous interval. It is 
calculated using the normal distribution and its value is numeric in the range minus 
infinity to plus infinity. 
The problem with this model is when for example we know there are a lot of risks and 
Risk Score value increases; both Quality Produced and Functionality Delivered decrease. It is 
only when we fix either variable at nominal i.e. zero, the decrease in the other variable is worse. 
This leads us to another problem, for example, if we put that Functionality Delivered is zero, then 
the model assumes that this affects Quality Produced, as well as Actual Resources. Hence, both 
Actual Resources and Quality Produced decrease. This means we have to fix Actual Resources as 
well for the model to work. From this we see that the model only works if Actual Resources and 
either Quality Produced or Functionality Delivered are fixed.  
We tried to solve our problem by introducing the delta function. The delta represents 
percentage change in the model. For example consider the situation in Figure 7.3. 




Figure 7.3 Delta function segment 
The delta represents proportional change in Resulting functionality given Risk score. The delta 
function was a good idea when applied to one node or maybe even two nodes. The problem 
emerged when we tried to apply it to all four nodes in our model. The model became complicated 
and we concluded that the delta function was not the simple solution we were looking for. 
7.3.2 Revised SIMP trade-off model 
In the revised model we made the following changes: 
• Instead of ‘Risk score’ we introduced ‘Process quality’. 
• ‘Process quality’ and ‘Resources’ are combined into ‘Effective resources’.  
• ‘Quality’ and ‘Functionality’ have only one parent and that is ‘Effective resources’. 
• We introduced a constraint node which we called ‘balanced f and q’. In essence, the 
normal constraint is that this node is set to ‘balanced between attributes’ and this means 
that we expect there to be a balance between functionality and quality. Please note that 
the observation entered for the node balanced f and q is both attributes. This is done 
because as said earlier we expect to have a balance between functionality and quality. 
This observation shouldn’t be changed when you run the model. 




Figure 7.4 Revised generic trade-off model 
Details of the nodes in the revised model are as follows: 
• Process quality. This node represents the quality of all processes. The node type is 
ranked. It has a 7 point scale: lowest, very low, low, medium, high, very high and 
highest. 
• Resources. This node represents available resources. The node type is ranked and it 
has a 7 point scale.  
• Effective resources. This node is simply a weighted average of process quality and 
resources. The node type is ranked and it has a 7 point scale. 
• Quality. This node represents the quality produced. It is proportional to effective 
resources. The node type is ranked and it has a 7 point scale. 
• Functionality. This node represents the functionality delivered. It is proportional to 
effective resources. The node type is ranked and it has a 7 point scale. 
• Balanced f and q.This node is simply the average of quality and functionality. The 
node type is ranked. Possible observations you can enter are: neither attributes, 
balanced between attributes, both attributes. In order to satisfy our requirements, this 
node is set to balanced between attributes.  
The revised SIMP trade-off model works when the node balanced f and q is set to 
balanced between attributes and it is possible to put constraints on one or two attributes and have 
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the model predict the third one. For example, if you know you have high resources you can have 
the model predict what quality and functionality you can expect. You can also put constraints on 
two nodes, for example, if you know you have medium resources and you want high quality, you 
can get the model to predict what will happen with functionality.  
7.3.3 Internal Validation 
This section explores different scenarios of the revised SIMP trade-off model. The main objective 
is to establish whether the model satisfies all the assumed rules and therefore is suitable for trade-
off analysis. By entering various evidence (observations) to the model, it is possible to analyse 
project trade-offs from different aspects and in comparison to the ‘Nominal’ scenario. Our 
‘Nominal’ scenario is when we run the model where ‘balanced f and q’ is set to ‘balanced 
between attributes’ and no other evidence is entered into the model.  
Assumed rule 1. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has the 
‘highest’ resources to deliver a project. The model predicts that for such a project the 
functionality will increase (Figure 7.5 a) or the quality will increase (Figure 7.5 b ). 
  
a) Functionality b) Quality 
Figure 7.5 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule1  
Assumed rule 2. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has the 
‘highest’ process quality to deliver a project. The model predicts that for such a project the 
functionality will increase (Figure 7.6 a) or the quality will increase (Figure 7.6 b). 




a) Functionality b) Quality 
Figure 7.6 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 2 
Assumed rule 3. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager wishes to find 
an answer on: How to deliver the ‘highest’ functionality in a project? The model predicts that for 
such a project there has to be an increase in the process quality (Figure 7.7 a) or an increase in the 
resources (Figure 7.7 b). 
  
a) Process quality b) Resources 
Figure 7.7 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 3 
Assumed rule 4. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager wishes to find 
an answer on: How to deliver the ‘highest’ quality in a project? The model predicts that for such a 
project there has to be an increase in the process quality (Figure 7.8 a) or an increase in the 
resources (Figure 7.8 b). 




a) Process quality  b) Resources 
Figure 7.8 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 4 
Assumed rule 5. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ functionality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in resources. The model 
predicts that for such a project there has to be an increase in the process quality (Figure 7.9 a) to 
keep the quality unchanged (Figure 7.9 b) or the quality will decrease if process quality remains 
unchanged. 
  
a) Process quality b) Quality 
Figure 7.9 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 5 
Assumed rule 6. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ functionality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in process quality. The 
model predicts that for such a project there has to be an increase in the resources (Figure 7.10 a) 
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to keep the quality unchanged (Figure 7.10 b) or the quality will decrease if resources remain 
unchanged. 
  
a) Resources b) Quality 
Figure 7.10 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 6 
Assumed rule 7. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ quality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in resources. The model 
predicts that for such a project there has to be an increase in the process quality (Figure 7.11 a) to 
keep the functionality unchanged (Figure 7.11 b) or the functionality will decrease if process 
quality remains unchanged. 
  
a) Process quality b) Functionality 
Figure 7.11 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 7 
Assumed rule 8. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ quality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in process quality. The model 
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predicts that for such a project there has to be an increase in the resources (Figure 7.12 a) to keep 




a) Resources b) Functionality 
Figure 7.12 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 8 
Based on internal validation we can conclude that revised generic trade-off model overall 
performs well. In some cases, for example Assumed rule 1 movements are not as high as 
expected, but the model does indicate movement in the right direction. Main drawbacks of the 
model are: 
• Need to fix the ‘balance f and q’ node.  
• The cost and time are combined into resources, therefore the model does not preserve 
them separately. 
In the next section we present final generic trade-off model that solves the problem in a much 
more practical way. 
7.4 Overview of the Generic Trade-off model  
The BN used to model project trade-offs is shown in Figure 7.13. The main goal for the 
Generic Trade-off Model was to develop a conceptual model which contains only the lowest 
possible set of variables and satisfies the assumed rules discussed in the previous section in order 
to improve project risk assessment in comparison to the previous models discussed in chapter 4. 
Table 7.3 summarizes the model variables for the BN.  




Figure 7.13 Generic Trade-off Model 
 




This node represents cost of a project. It leads 
to resources. 
Schedule This node represents schedule of a project. It 
leads to resources. 
Process Quality This node represents level of process quality. 
It leads both to quality and functionality. 
Resources This node represents total resources available 
for a project. 
Quality This node represents total product quality. 
















This is a dummy node that represents 
percentage of resources spent on quality. It 




This is a dummy node that represents 
percentage of resources spent on 
functionality. It leads to functionality.  
Prod_prior_ratio This is a dummy node that calculates ratio of 
functionality and product quality. 
Functionality_B This is an input node that is linked to 
‘Required functionality missing’ output node. 
Product This is an input node that is linked to ‘Poor 
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quality_B Continuous interval 
 
 
product quality’ output node. 
Schedule_B This is an input node that is linked to 
‘Schedule overrun’ output node. 
Cost_B This is an input node that is linked to ‘Project 
overspent’ output node. 
Process quality_B This is an input node that is linked to ‘Poor 
process quality’ output node. 
Table 7.3 Variables in Generic Trade-off Model 
The BN shown in Figure 7.13 is best thought of as consisting of three fragments. 
Fragment 1 contains the trade-off nodes (Figure 7.14). ‘Available cost’ and ‘available schedule’ 
determine ‘Resources’, which represent the total effort allocated for a project. Increase or 
decrease in ‘available cost’ and ‘available schedule’ influence ‘Resources’ in equal measure. 
‘Resources’ are calculated using the formula in Equation (7-1) 
Resources = TNormal (wmean (1.0, cost, 1.0, schedule), 5.0E-3)             (7-1) 
The TNormal expression has a mean that is the weighted mean of ‘available cost’ and ‘available 
schedule’, which both carry equal weighting in this expression, with a variance of 5.0E-3. 
‘Resources’ in turn influence both ‘Quality’ and ‘Functionality’. Hence, for example an increase 
in ‘available cost’ would lead to an increase in ‘Resources’ which in turn would lead to an 
increase in ‘Quality’ and ‘Functionality’. 
 
Figure 7.14 Fragment 1- Trade-off nodes 
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Quality is separated into: 
a) ‘Process quality’ which represents the overall measure of process quality aggregating 
various organizational factors. The value of the ‘Process quality’ is just the ‘Poor 
process quality’ value from the Causal Risk Register Model. ‘Process quality’ 
influences both ‘Quality and ‘Functionality’. High ‘Process quality’ means high 
‘Quality’ and ‘Functionality’. 
b) ‘Quality’ represents how good the delivered product is. ‘Quality’ is influenced by 
‘Process quality’, ‘Resources’ and ‘percent on quality’. We will discuss ‘percent on 
quality’ more in Fragment 2. ‘Quality’ is calculated using the formula in Equation (7-
2). 
Quality =  
TNormal (wmean (1.0, percent_quality/100, 1.5, pq, 1.5, res), 0.05)        (7-2) 
c) ‘Functionality’ represents the size or quantity of a product. ‘Functionality’ as well as 
quality is influenced by ‘Process quality’, ‘Resources’ and naturally ‘percent on 
func’. We will discuss ‘percent func’ in Fragment 2. ‘Functionality’ is calculated 
using the formula in Equation (7-3). 
Functionality =  
TNormal (wmean (1.0, percent_func/100, 1.5, pq, 1.5, res), 0.05)        (7-3) 
 
Figure 7.15 Fragment 2 – Percentage nodes 
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Fragment 2 contains the “percentage” nodes that are lightly shaded in Figure 7.15. There 
are two “percentage” nodes and they are dummy nodes in the BN model. It is impossible to build 
the model satisfying all the assumed rules without introducing the “percentage” nodes. It is 
reasonable to assume if resources need to be divided between quality and functionality then there 
should be an equitable distribution of resources. The model shown in Fragment 1 works based on 
this principle. The problem arises when we would like to specify that we want to spend more 
resources on, for example, quality. Therefore, we want to have high quality.  
To achieve this it is necessary to introduce “percentage” nodes:  
1. ‘Percent on quality’ represents percentage of resources out of 100% spent on quality. Quality 
can be viewed as time spent on testing.   
2. ‘Percent on func’ represents percentage of resources out of 100% spent on functionality. 
Functionality can be viewed as time spent on development. 
For any project time spent on development and time spent on testing can be checked from time 
sheets. Using “percentage” nodes that are hidden from the user is really crucial in making the 
model work. They allow us to allocate a certain percentage of total resources we would like to 
spend on quality and functionality. For example, if we would like to achieve very high quality, 
we may wish to spend 70% of resources on quality.  In that case, we have only 30% left for 
functionality assuming we are not going over resources. Hence, we would have to be satisfied 
with low to medium functionality. Hence, percentage spent on functionality is calculated using 
the formula in Equation (7-4). 
Percentage spent on functionality = Max (0, 100 – percent_quality)    (7-4) 
We are using the maximum arithmetic function and simply saying that the value for functionality 
is 100% minus the percentage we spent on quality. 




Figure 7.16 Fragment 3 – Linked nodes 
Fragment 3 contains the “link” nodes that are darkly shaded in Figure 7.16. These nodes 
are dummy nodes in the BN model. ‘Process Quality_B’, ‘Cost_B’ and ‘Schedule_B’ use 
constants. They pass values directly from the Causal Risk Register Model from ‘Poor process 
quality’ to ‘Process quality’; ‘Project overspent’ to ‘available cost’ and ‘Schedule overrun’ to 
‘available schedule’. We established earlier discussing Fragment 2 that ‘percent on func’ is 
dependent on ‘percent on quality’. Therefore, ‘Product quality_B’ and ‘Functionality_B’ are 
joined together into ‘prod_prior_ratio’ that passes value to ‘percent on quality’ (this sentence 
doesn’t quite make sense). ‘Prod_prior_ratio’ is calculated using a TNormal expression where 
‘product quality’ is divided by the sum of ‘product quality’ and ‘functionality’ with variance 0.1.       
7.5 The Object Oriented framework 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Generic Trade-off Model is an 
extension to the Causal Risk Register Model. The two models are linked together using an object 
oriented framework. The AgenaRisk tool provides numerous facilities for building Object 
Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBNs). As defined in section 3.4.4, a Bayesian object is a 
fragment of a BN that encapsulates the internal nodes and is linked to other objects through 
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interfaces. AgenaRisk provides the easy linking of predefined BNs, forward only inference 
algorithm and the mixing of discrete and continuous approximation nodes. 
Figure 7.13 shows five input nodes (shown by the dashed ellipse: ‘Process quality_B’, 
‘Cost_B’, ‘Schedule_B’, ‘Product quality_B’ and ‘Functionality_B’. These nodes take their value 
from other objects. ‘Poor process quality’, ‘Project overspent’, ‘Schedule overrun’, ‘Poor product 
quality’ and ‘Required functionality missing’ variables from the Causal Risk Register Model are 
output nodes that send their values to input nodes. Figure 7.17 shows the resulting OOBN. 
  
Figure 7.17 The Generic Trade-off Model using object oriented framework  
7.6 Model Validation 
7.6.1 Internal Validation 
This section explores different scenarios of the revised generic trade-off model. The main 
objective is to establish whether the model satisfies all the assumed rules and therefore is suitable 
for trade-off analysis. By entering various observations to the model it is possible to analyse 
project trade-offs from different aspects and in comparison to ‘Nominal’ scenario. Our ‘Nominal’ 
scenario is when we run the model with no evidence entered into the model.  
Assumed rule 1. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has the 
‘highest’ resources to deliver a project. The model predicts significant increase in functionality 
(Figure 7.18 a) and quality (Figure 7.18 b).  




a) Functionality b) Quality 
Figure 7.18 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 1 
As mentioned previously cost and time are grouped together into resources in order to simplify 
the assumed rules. The model preserves cost and time separately. Therefore we observe that if a 
project manager has ‘highest’ available cost, the model predicts increase in functionality (Figure 
7.19 a) and quality (Figure 7.19 b).  
  
a) Functionality b) Quality 
 Figure 7.19 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 1 when ‘Available cost’ is highest 
As seen in the previous example for available cost, we can in a similar way observe that if a 
project manager has ‘highest’ available schedule, the model predicts increase in functionality 
(Figure 7.20 a) and quality (Figure 7.20 b). 




a) Functionality b) Quality 
Figure 7.20 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule1 when ‘Available schedule’ is highest 
Assumed rule 2. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has the 
‘highest’ process quality to deliver a project. The model predicts significant increase in 
functionality (Figure 7.21 a) and quality (Figure 7.21 b). 
  
a) Functionality b) Quality 
Figure 7.21 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 2 
Assumed rule 3. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager wishes to find 
an answer on: How to deliver the ‘highest’ functionality in a project? The model predicts that for 
such a project there has to be an increase in process quality (Figure 7.22 a) and resources (Figure 
7.22 b). 




a) Process quality b) Resources 
Figure 7.22 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 3 
Assumed rule 4. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager wishes to find 
an answer on: How to deliver the ‘highest’ quality in a project? The model predicts that for such a 
project there has to be an increase in process quality (Figure 7.23 a) and resources (Figure 7.23 
b). 
  
a) Process quality b) Resources 
Figure 7.23 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 4 
Assumed rule 5. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ functionality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in resources. The model 
predicts that for such a project there has to be a significant increase in process quality (Figure 
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7.24 a) to keep quality unchanged (Figure 7.24 b) or quality will decrease if process quality 
remains unchanged. 
  
a) Process quality b) Quality 
Figure 7.24 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 5 
Assumed rule 6. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ functionality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in process quality. The 
model predicts that for such a project there has to be a significant increase in resources (Figure 
7.25 a) to keep quality unchanged (Figure 7.25 b) or quality will decrease if resources remain 
unchanged. 
  
a) Resources b) Quality 
Figure 7.25 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 6 
Assumed rule 7. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ quality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in resources. The model 
                                                                                                               
156 
 
predicts that for such a project, there has to be a significant increase in process quality (Figure 
7.26 a) to keep functionality unchanged (Figure 7.26 b) or functionality will decrease if process 
quality remains unchanged. 
  
a) Process quality b) Functionality 
Figure 7.26 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 7 
Assumed rule 8. This assumed rule is indicative of a case where a project manager has to deliver 
the ‘highest’ quality in a project, but he cannot afford an increase in process quality. The model 
predicts that for such a project, there has to be a significant increase in resources (Figure 7.27 a) 
to keep functionality unchanged (Figure 7.27 b) or functionality will decrease if resources remain 
unchanged. 
  
a) Resources b) Functionality 
Figure 7.27 Predicted probabilities for Assumed rule 8 
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7.6.2 External Validation 
 
External validation should be used in combination with internal validation. Projects were 
chosen based on success and failure factors identified and discussed in sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
Advantages of external evaluation and using the real life projects are: 
1. It is possible to convey key information about project. 
2. Fully depicts client’s experience throughout project which represents powerful means to 
portray project to outsiders.  
Disadvantage of this approach is difficulty to generalize from a single successful project observed 
and a single failed project observed. 
Case 1 – External validation for ‘company Y’ 
 We observe the model for the scenarios entered for ‘company Y’ and used for external 
validation of the CRRM. All parameter passing from CRRM to GTOM is correct (Figure 7.28). 
‘Project 2’ was failure and probabilities for ‘consequence level 1’ to be ‘true’ were higher and 
this is reflected in GTOM. For example, probability for ‘Process quality’ is lower than average.    
  
a) Process quality b) Available cost 
  
c) Available schedule d) Quality 





Figure 7.28 Parameter passing for ‘company Y’ 
Case 2 – External validation for ‘company Z’ 
We observe the model for the scenarios entered for ‘company Z’ and used for external validation 
of the CRRM. All parameter passing from CRRM to GTOM is correct (Figure 7.29). ‘Project 2’ 
was a success and probabilities for ‘consequence level 1’ to be ‘false’ were higher and this is 
reflected in GTOM. For example, probability for ‘Process quality’ is higher than average. 
  
a) Process quality b) Available cost 
  
c) Available schedule d) Quality 





Figure 7.29 Parameter passing for ‘company Y’ 
7.7 Further enhancements to the model  
If we want deliberately to focus on ‘functionality’ or ‘quality’, then the weighting in the 
model should be changed. The model could be extended in a way that instead of changing 
weighting by directly accessing NPTs, we somehow change weighting automatically.  
An extension to the Generic Trade-off Model could be finding a way of including 
reputation in the trade-off model potentially extending quality prediction. We have demonstrated 
how to solve the problem of cost/schedule/quality trade-offs. The next step could be to address 
cost/schedule/quality/reputation trade-offs.  
7.8 Summary 
The Generic Trade-off Model discussed in this chapter is an extension to the CRRM 
presented in chapter 6. This model focuses explicitly on project trade-offs between time, cost and 
quality. The model satisfies the assumed rules identified for trade-off analysis. The validation 
performed on the model showed that the model can be a useful extension to the CRRM, but it can 
also be a standalone model. This model is especially powerful because it is truly generic and it 
can be used for a number of various projects.  The model has great potential in providing useful 
information for trade-offs for any project. The model provides reasonable explanations in a 
number of different scenarios. 




8. Conclusions   
The main hypothesis stated in chapter 1 was that we can provide an approach and template model 
that satisfies all of the following requirements needed by decision makers for effective project 
risk management:   
1. Able to model and measure trade-offs between time, cost and quality; in such a way as to 
be able to answer questions such as those provided in chapter 1. Supported by 7.2 and 
7.4. A list of assumed rules that satisfy project trade-offs between time, cost and quality 
has been developed. The assumed rules reflect relationships between key project 
variables and the Generic Trade-off Model satisfies all the assumed rules identified.     
2. Able to produce an overall risk score for the project which: a) takes into account the 
overall success criteria and b) is available at any stage of the project life cycle and not 
just at the end of the project. Supported by 6.1 and 6.3. The Causal Risk Register Model 
illustrates how top level risks affect time, cost, quality and consequently project failure at 
any stage of a project. 
3. Is dynamic, i.e. able to take into account new information in order to revise its predictions 
and assessments for the overall risk score. Supported by 7.5. The Generic Trade-off 
Model is an extension to the Causal Risk Register Model. The two models are linked 
together using object oriented framework. 
4. Is able to capture notions of cause and effect such as the possibility of avoiding risks by 
using controls and mitigants. Ideally also be able to capture opportunities as well as risks 
since these will have an impact on the overall success of the project. Supported by 5.6, 
5.7 and 6.3. 
5. Able to quantify unavoidable uncertainty in all of this. Supported by 3.3, 3.4, 5.6, 6.3 and 
7.4. It was discussed that BNs offer a general and flexible approach for modelling risk 
and uncertainty. The models developed in this thesis applied BNs to incorporate 
uncertainty in project risk analysis.  
6. The approach can be used by practitioners who have no mathematical/statistical 
background. Supported by 6.7. It is possible to use Risk Table in the Causal Risk Register 
Model to enter observations and also soft evidence in order to change probabilities for 
different projects without the need to directly change NPTs.  
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I claim novelty for the models developed in points 1 and 2. They are a significant 
improvement on the previous BN models that are already in use in the commercial environment. 
Although, there is still room for further improvements, I discussed the need to extend the causal 
risk register to deal with the issue of unknown knowns in 6.8 and the scope for improving the 
trade-off model in 7.7, I believe that the contributions provided by the new models will lead to a 
better understanding of project trade-offs between time, cost and quality; better project risk 
analysis and consequently better project delivery.  
The best (and possibly only realistic) way to ensure proper practical use and exploitation 
of this model is to make it web enabled, with different users having access to the parts of the 
model relevant to them. Different users would enter evidence into the model on one or more 
nodes during project duration. This would enable the model to be used for bottom-up as well as 
top-down reasoning. The users could find out the reasoning behind the model outputs as 
interactions between variables are clearly displayed. This would provide clarity to users and 
increase the transparency of project risk management decision making. In addition it may be 
appropriate to link a database to the system and store different scenarios in order to enhance 
future forecasts and analysis for different projects. This would show that it is possible to deploy 
large and complex probabilistic models in practice. 





1. @Risk, http://www.palisade.com 
2. Adams J., Risk (Routledge, 2005) 
3. Agena, AgenaRisk: Advanced risk analysis for important decisions. 
http://www.agenarisk.com (2007) 
4. Agena, Software Project Risk Models Manual, Version 01.00, 2004 
5. Ames D.P., Neilson B. T., Stevens D. K. and Lall U., Using Bayesian networks to model 
watershed management decisions: an East Canyon creek case study, World Wide Web, 
http://www.hydromap.com/papers/ames_ecc.pdf, 2003, Visited July, 2005 
6. Andradottir, S. and Bier V. M., Applying Bayesian ideas in simulation, Elsevier, 2000  
7. Association for Project Management, Project risk analysis and management (PRAM) 
Guide, 2nd ed., APM Publishing, High Wycombe, 2004 
8. Atkinson R., Project management: cost, time and quality, two best guesses and 
phenomenon, its time to accept other success criteria, International Journal of Project 
Management, 17 (6), 337-342, 1999  
9. Australian/New Zealand Standard AS/NZS 4360:2004, Risk Management, Homebush 
NSW 2140: Standards Australia and Wellington 6001: Standards New Zealand, 2004 
10. Babu A. J. G. and Suresh N., Project management with time, cost, and quality 
considerations, Euro. J. of Op. Res., 320-327, 1996 
11. Baker B. N., Murphy D. C. and Fisher D., Factors affecting project success, Project 
management handbook 2nd Ed., Cleland D. I. and King W. R. Ed., John Wiley, New 
York, 1998    
12. Ballantine J., Bonner M., Levy M., Martin A., Munro I. and Powell P. L., The 3-D model 
of information systems successes: the search for the dependent variable continues, 
Information Resources Management Journal, 9(4), 5-14, 1996      
13. Banxia, http://www.banxia.com/dexplore/index.html 
                                                                                                               
163 
 
14. Barlow R. E. and Lambert H. E., Introduction to fault tree analysis, In Richard E. Barlow, 
Jerry B. Fussell and Nozer Singpurwalla, Reliability and Fault Tree Analysis, Society for 
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1975 
15. Belassi W. and Tukel O.I., A new framework for determining critical success/failure 
factors in projects, International Journal of Project Management, 14(3), 141-151, 1996  
16. Belton V. and Stewart T., Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: An Integrated Approach, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 2002  
17. Bernoulli D., Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk, Econometrica, 22 
(1), 23-36, 1738/1954 
18. Bobbio A., Portinale L., Minichino M. and Ciancamerla E., Improving the analysis of 
dependable systems by mapping fault trees into Bayesian networks, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 71 (3), 249-260, 2001  
19. Boehm, B. W., Software risk management principles and practices, IEEE Software, 8(1), 
32-41, 1991 
20. Bonini C. P., Hausman W. H. and Bierman H., Quantitative Analysis for Management, 
9th Ed., McGraw-Hill Companies, New York, 319, 1997  
21. Borsuk M. E., Stowl C. A. and Reckhow K. H., A Bayesian network of eutrophication 
models for synthesis, prediction ,and uncertainty analysis, division of environmental 
science and policy, Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences, Duke 
University, Durham, USA, 2003 
22. Breese J.S. and Heckerman D., Decision theoretical troubleshooting, IEEE Trans-actions 
on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A (Systems and Human), 26 (6):838-842, 1999 
23. Brehmer, B., The Psychology of Risk: Risk and Decisions, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 
1987  
24. British Standards Institute, BS6079-3:2000: Project Management – Part : Guide to the 
Management of Business-related Project Risk, London: BSI, 2000  
25. Calantone R.J., Di Benedetto C.A., Performance and time to market: accelerating cycle 
time with overlapping stages, IEEE Transactions on Engeneering Management, 27 (2), 
232-244,  2000 
26. Cambridge Dictionaries Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
                                                                                                               
164 
 
27. Canadian Standards Association, CAN/CSA-Q850-97: Risk Management: Guideline for 
Decision makers, Mississauga, Ont: Canadian Standards Association, 2002 
28. Carr, Marvin, Konda, Suresh, Monarch, Ira, Urlich, Carol, Walker, Clay, Taxonomy 
based risk identification (CMU/SEI-93-TR-6, ADA266992), Software Engineering 
Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, 1993  
29. Carter R., Hancock T., Morin J. M. and Robins N., Introducing RISKMAN 
Methodology, NNC Blackwell Ltd, UK, 1995 
30. Chankong V. and Haimes Y. Y., Multiobjective Decision Making: Theory and 
Methodology, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, 1983    
31. Chapman C. and Ward S., Managing Project Risk and Uncertainty, Chichester, England, 
John Wiley & Sons, 2002 
32. Chapman C. B. and Ward S. C., Project risk management: Processes, Techniques and 
Insights, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, 1997 
33. Chapman C., Project risk analysis and management – PRAM the generic process, 
International Journal of Project Management, 15 (5), 273-281, 1997 
34. Chapman C.B. and Ward S. C., Estimation and evaluation of uncertainty: a minimalist 
first pass approach, International Journal of Project Management, 18, 369-383, 2000 
35. COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission), 
Enterprise Risk Management: Integrated Framework, www.coso.org/publications.htm, 
2004 
36. Crawford L., Pollack J. and England D., Uncovering the trends in project management: 
journal emphases over the last 10 years, Int. J. Proj. Mgmt., pp. 175-184,  2006 
37. Crossland R., McMahon C. A. and Williams J. H., Survey of current practices in 
managing design risk, Design Information Group, University of Bristol, 1998 
38. Crystall Ball, http://www.decisioneering.com 
39. Davies A., Brady T. and Hobday M., Charting a path toward integrated solutions, MIT 
Sloan Mgmt. Rev., 39-48, 2006 
40. Dawson R. J. And Dawson C. W., Practical proposals for managing uncertainty and risk 
in project planning, International Journal of Project Management, 16(5), 299-310, 1998 
                                                                                                               
165 
 
41. De Witt A., Measurement of project management success, International Journal of 
Project Management, 6(3), 164-170, 1988 
42. De Witt A., Measuring project success, Project management Institute 
Seminar/Symposium Montreal Canada, 13-21, Sep 1987 
43. Deltek Risk+, http://www.deltek.com 
44. Diez F. J., Parameter Adjustment in Bayes Networks: The Generalized Noisy OR-Gate, 
Proceedings 9th Conference Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 99-105, 1993  
45. DIR, Risk List, http://www.dir.state.tx.us/eod/qa/risk/risklist.htm 
46. Douglas, M., Risk acceptability according to social sciences, Russell Sage Foundation, 
1985 
47. Douglas, M., Understanding the enterprise culture: Themes in the work of Mary Douglas, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1990 
48. Druzdzel M. K. and van der Gaag L. C., Building Probabilistic Networks: Where Do the 
Numbers Come From?, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 12 (4), 
481-486, 2000  
49. Duffy P. J. and Thomas R. D., Project performance auditing, International Journal of 
Project Management, 7 (2), 101-104, 1989   
50. Durbach I. N. and Stewart T., Using expected values to simplify decision making under 
uncertainty, OMEGA: International Journal of Management Science, 37, 312-330, 2009 
51. Eden C., Ackermann F. and Cropper S., The Analysis of Cause Maps, Journal of 
Management Studies, 29, 309-324, 1992  
52. Eden C., On the Nature of Cognitive Maps, Journal of Management Studies, 29 (3), 261-
165, 1992 
53. Fairley R., Risk Management for Software Projects, IEEE Software, 57–67, 1994 
54. Fenton N. E. and Neil M., Making Decisions: Using Bayesian Nets and MCDA, 
Knowledge-Based Systems, 14, 2001, 307-325 
55. Fenton N. E. and Neil M., Software metrics, failures and new directions, J. of Systems 
and Software, 47, 1999, 149-157 
                                                                                                               
166 
 
56. Fenton N. E., Neil M. and Caballero J. G., Using Ranked nodes to model qualitative 
judgements in Bayesian Networks, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data 
Engineering, 2007  
57. Fenton N. E., Neil M. and Marquez D., Using Bayesian Networks to Predict Software 
Defects and Reliability, 5th International Mathematical Methods in Reliability Conference 
MMR 07), Glasgow, 2007 
58. Fenton N. E., Neil M., Hearty P., Marsh W., Marquez D., Krause P. and Mishra R., 
Predictiong Software defects in Varying Development Lifecycles Using Bayesian Nets, 
Information and Software Technology, vol. 49, no. 1, 32-43, 2007 
59. Fenton N. Neil M., Measuring your risks, Agena White Paper, 2005, www.agenarisk.com 
60.  Fenton N. Neil M., Visualising your Risks, Agena White Paper, 2005, 
www.agenarisk.com 
61. Fenton N., Bayesian Net References: A Comprehensive Listing, From 
http://www.agenarisk.com/resources/BN_refs.doc. 
62. Fenton N., Krause P. and Neil M., Probabilistic Modelling for Software Quality Control, 
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 12 (2), 173-188, 2002 
63. Fenton N., Marsh W., Neil M., Cates P., Forey S., Tailor M., Making Resource Decisions 
for Software Projects, Proc. 26th Int. Conf. on Software Engineering (May 23–28 2004), 
IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC,  397–406, 2004 
64. Fineman M., Radlinski L. and Fenton N. E., Modelling Project Trade-off Using Bayesian 
Networks, IEEE Int. Conf. Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering. 
Wuhan, China,  IEEE Computer Society, 2009 
65. Fineman, M. and Fenton N. E., Quantifying Risks Using Bayesian Networks, IASTED 
Int. Conf. Advances in Management Science and Risk Assessment (MSI 2009), Beijing, 
China, IASTED 662-219, 2009 
66. Fishburn P. C., Foundations of risk measurement, I. Risk as probable loss, Management 
Science, 30 (4), 396-406, 1984 
67. Freeman M. and Beale P., Measuring project success, Project Management Journal, 
23(1), 8-17, 1992 
                                                                                                               
167 
 
68. Furlong R., ‘Clausewitz and Modern War Gaming: losing can be better than winning’, 
Air University Review, 1984 
69. Gaddis P. O., The Project Manager, Harvard Business Review, May-June 89-97, 1959 
70. Getz K.A. and de Bruin A.,  Speed demons of drug development, Pharm. Exect., 78-84, 
July 2000 
71. Godfrey P. S., Sir Halcrow W. and Partners Ltd., Control Of Risk – A Guide to the 
Systematic Management of Risk from Construction, CIRIA, 1996 
72. Graves S. B., Why costs increase when projects accelerate, Research Technology 
Management, 32 (2), 16–18, 1989 
73. Haasl D. F., Advanced concepts in fault tree analysis, In System Safety Symposium, 
University of Washington, 1965  
74. Hackerman D. and Wellman M. P., Bayesian Networks, Communications of the ACM, 
38 (3), 1995, 27-30 
75. Hackerman D., Bayesian networks for data mining, Data Mining and Knowledge 
Discovery, 1 (1), 1997, 79-119 
76. Hackerman D., Horvitz E. and Nathwani B., Towards normative expert systems: Part I. 
The Pathfinder project, Methods of Information in Medicine, 31 (2), 90-105, 1992  
77. Hansson O. and Mayer A., Heuristic search as evidential reasoning, Proceedings of the 
5th Workshop on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 1989. 
78. Harter D.E., Krishnan M.S., Slaughter S.A., Effects of process maturity on quality, cycle 
time, and effort in software product development, Management Science, 46 (4), 451–466, 
2000 
79. Hayes R., An introduction to project planning and costing risk management, Risk 
Analysis and Management Conference,  Chartered Institute of Management Accountants 
and the Operational Research Society, 1987 
80. Heidenberger K., Dynamic project selection and funding under risk: a decision tree based 
MILP approach, European Journal of Operational Research, 95 (2), 284-298, 1995  
81. Hillson D., Extending the risk process to manage opportunities, International Journal of 
Project Management, 2002 
                                                                                                               
168 
 
82. Hulett D., Schedule Risk Analysis Simplified, PM Network, Project Management 
Institute, 23-30, 1996 
83. Ingleby M. and West M., Causal influence coefficients: A localised maximum entrpy 
approach to Bayesian inference, Doksum K. and Lindqvist B. H. eds., Mathematical and 
Statistical Methods in Reliability, Quality, Reliability and Engineering Statistics, World 
Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, Ch. 4, 45-56, 2003 
84. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, IEEE Standard 1540-2001: Standard for 
Software Life Cycle Process – Risk Management, New York: IEEE, 2001  
85. Institute of Risk Management/National Forum for Risk Management in the Public 
Sector/Association of Insurance and Risk Managers, A Risk Management Standard, 
London: IRM/ALARM/AIRMIC, 2002 
86. International Electrotechnical Commission, CEI/IEC 62198:2001 International Standard: 
Project Risk Management: Application Guidelines, Geneva: IEC, 2001  
87. Ireland L. R. and Shirely V. D., Measuring risk in the project environment, Proceedings 
of the 18th Annual Seminar/Symposium of the Project Management Institute, Montreal, 
Cnada, pp 150-156, 1986 
88. Japanese Standards Association, JIS Q2001:2001(E): Guidelines for Development and 
Implementation of Risk Management System, Tokyo:JSA, 2001  
89. Jensen F. V., An Introduction to Bayesian Networks, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1996 
90. Jones C., Assessment and Control of Software Risks, Prentice Hall, 1994 
91. Kandaswamy S., The Basic of Monte Carlo Simulation: A Tutorial, Proceedings of the 
31st Annual Project Management Institute 2001 Seminars and Symposium, Nashville, 
Tennessee, USA, 2001 
92. Karlsson C. and Ahlstrom P., Technological level and product development cycle time, 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 16 (4), 352–362, 1999 
93. Karni E., Foundations of Bayesian theory, Elsevier, 2005 
94. Kasperson A. and Stallen P., Communicating risks to the public: Technology, risk and 
society, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991  
95. Kelly G. A., The Psychology of Personal Constructs, New York: Norton & Company 
Inc., 1995 
                                                                                                               
169 
 
96. Kelly J. E., Critical-Path Planning and Scheduling: Mathematical Basis, Operations 
Research, 9:290-320, 1961 
97. Kerzner H., Project management, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 1992,  875-879. 
98. Kerzner H., Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling and 
Controlling, John Wiley, 2001 
99. Khang D. B. and Myint Y. M., Time, cost and quality trade-off in project management: a 
case study, International Journal of Project Management, 249-256, 1999 
100. Khodakarami V., Applying Bayesian Networks to Model Uncertainty in Project 
Scheduling, PhD Thesis, Queen Mary University Of London, 2009 
101. Klein J. H., Modelling Risk Trade-off, The Journal of the Operational Research 
Society, 44 (5), 445-460, 1993 
102. Kleindorfer P. R., Kunreuther H. C. and Schoemaker P. J. H., Decision Sciences, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Chapter 4, 1993  
103. Kliem R. L. and Ludin I. S., Reducing Project Risk, Gower, 1997 
104. Knoepfel H., Cost and quality control in the project cycle, International Journal 
of Project Management, 7(4), 229-235, 1990 
105. Kohrs R. H. and Welngarten G. C., Measuring successful technical performance 
– A cost/schedule/technical control system, Proceedings of the 18th Annual 
Seminar/Symposium of the Project Management Institute, Montreal, Canada, 158-164, 
1986 
106. Koller, D. and Pfeffer, A., Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks, In Proceeding of 
the Thirteenth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, San 
Francisco, Morgan Kaufmann, 1997 
107. Kometa S., Olomolaiye P. O. and Harris F. C., An Evaluation of Clients’ needs 
and Responsibilities in the Construction Process, Engineering, Construction and 
Architectural Management, 2 (1), 45-56, 1995 
108. Kozlov D. and Koller D., Nonuniform Dynamic Discretization in Hybrid 
Networks, Proceedings 13th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 
Stanford, 1997   
                                                                                                               
170 
 
109. Kumar R. L., Managing risks in IT projects: an options perspective, Information 
& Management, 40, 63-74, 2002 
110. Langseth H. and Lindqvist B. H., A maintenance model for componenets 
exposed to several failure mechanisms and imperfect repair, Mathematical and Statistical 
Methods in Reliability, Lindqvist B. H. and Doksum K. A. ed., World Scientific, River 
Edge, NJ, 415-430, 2003 
111. Langseth H., Bayesian networks with applications in reliability analysis, PhD 
thesis Department of Mathematical Sciences, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, 2002 
112. Larson E. W. and Gobeli D. H., Significance of project management structure on 
development success, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 36(2), 119-125, 
1989 
113. Laslo Z., Activity time-cost tradeoffs under time and cost chance constraints, 
Computers and Industrial Engineering, 44 (3), 365–384, 2003 
114. Lauritzen S. L., Graphical Models, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996 
115. Lopes L. L., Some thoughts on the psychological concept of risk, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 9, 137-144, 1983 
116. Lucas P., van der Gaag and Abu-Hanna A., Bayesian networks in biomedicine 
and health-care, Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 2004 
117. Luu V. T., Kim S., Tuan N. V. and Ogunlana S. O., Quantifying schedule risk in 
construction projects using Bayesian Networks, International Journal of Project 
Management, 27 (1), 2007, 39-50 
118. Majumdar D., An axiomatic characterization of Bayes’ Rule, Elsevier, 2003 
119. Malcolm D. G., Roseboom J. H., Clark C. E. and Fazer W., Application of a 
Technique for Research and Development Program Evaluation, Operations Research, 7 
(5): 646-669, 1959  
120. Marcot B.G., Holthausen R. S., Raphael M. G., Rowland M. and Wisdom M., 
Using bayesian belief networks to evaluate fish and wildlife population viability under 
land management alternatives from an environmental impact statement, Forest Ecology 
and Management, 153:29-42, 2001 
                                                                                                               
171 
 
121. Marquez D., Neil M. and Fenton N., Solving Dynamic Fault Trees using a New 
Hybrid Bayesian Network Inference Algorithm, 16th Mediterranean Conference on 
Control and Automation, Ajaccio, France, 2008 
122. Marsh W. and Bearfield G., Merging Event Trees Using Bayesian Networks, in 
Proceedings of ESREL 2007, Stavanger, Norway, Springer-Verlag, 2007  
123. Maylor H., Project management, Prentice Hall, Harlow, England, 2003 
124. Maytorena E., Winch G. M., Kiely T., Clarke S. and Dalton M., Identifying 
Project Risks: A Cognitive Approach, In: Slevin D. P., Cleland, D. I. and Pinto J. K. 
(Eds.), Innovations: Project Management Research, Pennsylvania, USA: Project 
Management Institute Inc., 465-80, 2004  
125. McCabe, B., AbouRizk, S.M. and Goebel, R., Belief Networks for Construction 
Performance Diagnostics, Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering, Vol. 12, No. 2, 93- 
100, 1998 
126. McCabe, B., Belief Networks in Construction Simulation, Proceedings of the 
30th conference on Winter simulation. Washington, D.C., United States, IEEE Computer 
Society Press, 1998. 
127. McConnell S., Code Complete, Microsoft Press, 1993 
128. McConnell S., Rapid Development, Microsoft Press, 1996 
129. McCoy F. A., Measuring Success: Establishing and Maintaining A Baseline, 
Project management Institute Seminar/Symposium Montreal Canada, 47-52, Sep 1987  
130. Miller, R. W., How to Plan and Control with Pert, Harvard Business Review, 93–
104, 1962 
131. Mockus A., Weiss D.M. and Zhang P., Understanding and Predicting Effort in 
Software Projects, Proc. 25th Int. Conf. on Software Engineering (Portland, OR, May 3–
10 2003), IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, 274–284, 2003 
132. Moder, J., Network Techniques in Project Management. Project Management 
Handbook, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1988 
133. Morris P. W. G. and Hough G. H., The anatomy of major projects, John Wiley, 
1987 
                                                                                                               
172 
 
134. Nasir, D. et al., Evaluating Risk in Construction-Schedule Model (Eric-S): 
Construction Schedule Risk Model, Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 
129(5): 518, 2003 
135. Neapolitan R. E., Learning Bayesian Networks, Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004 
136. Neil M., Andersen L. B. and Hager D., Modelling Operational Risk in Financial 
Institutions using Hybrid Bayesian Networks, The Journal of Operational Risk, 2009  
137. Neil M., Fenton N. E., and Tailor M., Using Bayesian Networks to Model 
Expected and Unexpected Operational Losses, Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 
vol. 25, no. 4, 963-972, 2005 
138. Neil M., Fenton N. E., Forey S., and Harris R., Using Bayesian Belief Networks 
to Predict the Reliability of Military Vehicles, IEE Computing and Control Engineering, 
12(1), 11-20, 2002 
139. Neil M., Marquez D. and Fenton N., Using Bayesian networks to model the 
operational risk to information technology infrastructure in financial institutions, Journal 
of Financial Transformation, 2008  
140. Neil M., Marquez D., Fenton N., Tailor M. and Hearty P., Modelling Dependable 
Systems using Hybrid Bayesian Networks, First International Conference on Availability, 
Reliability and Security (ARES 2006), Vienna, Austria, 2006 
141. Neil M., Tailor M. and Marquez D., Inference in Bayesian networks using 
dynamic discretisation, Statistics and Computing, 17:3, 2007 
142. Nikovski D., Constructing Bayesian Networks for Medical Diagnosis from 
Incomplete and Partially Correct Statistics, IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data 
Engineering, 12 (4), 509-516, 2000  
143. Norges Standardiseringsforbound, Norsk Standard NS5814:1991: Krav til 
risikoanalyser. Lysaker: NSF, 1991 
144. Oisen R. P., Can project management be defined?, Project Management 
Quarterly, 2(1), pp 12-14, 1971 
145. Oxford dictionary, http://www.askoxford.com/?view=uk 
                                                                                                               
173 
 
146. Patterson F. D. and Neailey K., A Risk Register Database System to aid the 
management of project risk, International Journal of Project Management, 19, 139-145, 
2002 
147. Pearl J. and Russell S., Bayesian Networks, In Michael A. Arbib, Ed., The 
Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks, 2nd ed., MIT Press, 2003 
148. Pearl J., Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent systems: Networks of Plausible 
Inference, Morgan-Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 1988 
149. Pertmaster Project Risk, http://www.pertmaster.com 
150. Pinto J. K. and Sevin D. P., Critical success factors across the project life cycle’, 
Project Management Journal, 19 3, pp 67-75, 1988   
151. PMI (Project Management Institute), A guide to the project management book of 
knowledge: PMBOK (project management book of knowledge) guide, Upper Darby, 
PA:PMI, 2004 
152. Pollack-Johnson B. and Liberatore M.J., Incorporating Quality Considerations 
Into Project Time/Cost Tradeoff Analysis and Decision Making, IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management, 53 (4), 534–542, 2006 
153. PROAct, http://www.noweco.com 
154. Project Risk Analysis, http://www.katmarsoftware.com 
155. Pulat P.S. and Horn S.J., Time-Resource Tradeoff Problem, IEEE Transactions 
on Engineering Management, 43 (4), 411–417, 1996. 
156. Radlinski L., Fenton N., Neil M., and Marquez D., Modelling Prior Productivity 
and Defect Rates in Causal Model for Software Project Risk Assessment, Polish Journal 
of Environmental Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4A, 256-260, 2007 
157. Radlinski L., Improved Software Project Risk Assessment Using Bayesian Nets, 
PhD Thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 2008 
158. Rainer A. and Hall T., Identifying the causes of poor progress in software 
projects, Proc. 10th Int. Symposium on Software Metrics, 184–195, 2004 
159. Raz T., Shenhar A. J. and Dvir D., Risk Management, Project Success, and 
Technological Uncertainty, R&D Manag., 101-109, 2002 
160. Recht J. L., System safety analysis: The fault Tree, National Safety News, 1996  
                                                                                                               
174 
 
161. Risk+ from S/C Solutions Inc., www.cs-solutions.com 
162. Risky Project Professional 2.1, http://www.intaver.com 
163. Rodin A., Mosley T. H., Clark A. G., Sing C. F., Boerwinkle E., Mining genetic 
epidemiology data with Bayesian networks application to APOE gene variation and 
plasma lipid levels, Journal of Computational Biology, 12 (1), 2005, 1-11 
164. Rubin I. M. and Seeling W., Experience as a factor in the selection and 
performance of project managers, IEEE Trans Eng Management, 14(3), 131-134, 1967 
165. Ruhe G., Eberlein A. and Pfahl D., Trade-off Analysis for Requirements 
Selection, International Journal on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, 13 
(4), 345–366, 2003 
166. Rumsfeld D. H., Transforming the Military, Foreign Affairs, 81 (3), 20-32, 2002  
167. Saarinen T., Systems development methodology and project success, Information 
and Management, 19, 183-193, 1990 
168. Shane S. and Venkataraman S., The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of 
research, Academy of Management Review, 25 (1), 217-26, 2000  
169. Smith P.G. and Reinertsen D. G., Developing Products in Half the Time: New 
Rules, New Tools, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1998    
170. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon SEI Annual Report, 1993 
171. Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon SEI Annual Report, 2001 
172. Spiegelhalter D., Dawid A., Lauritzen S. and Cowell R., Bayesian analysis in 
expert systems, Statistical Science, 8 (3), 219-283, 1993    
173. Srinivas S., A Generalization of the Noisy-OR Model, Proceedings 9th 
Conference Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 208-215, 1993 
174. Statman M. and Tyebjee T. T., The risk of investment in technological 
innovation, IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 31 (4), 165-171, 1984 
175. Struckenbruck L., Who determines project success, Project Management Institute 
Seminar/Symposium Montreal Canada, 85-93, 1987 
176. Swan J., Using cognitive mapping in management research: Decision about 
technical innovation, British Journal of Management, 8 (183-198), 1997 
                                                                                                               
175 
 
177. Swink M., Talluri S., Pandejpong T., Faster, better, cheaper: A study of NPD 
project efficiency and performance tradeoffs, Journal of Operations Management, 24, 
542–562, 2006. 
178. Taroni F., Biedermann A., Garbolino P. and Aitken C. G., A general approach to 
Bayesian networks for the interpretation of evidence, Forensic Science International, 139, 
2004, 5-16 
179. The Economist, 2006 
http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5354696&no_na_tran=1 
180. Thomsett R., Third Wave Project Management, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice 
Hall, 1992 
181. Turner J. R., Editorial: Project management: a profession based on knowledge or 
faith, International Journal of Project Management, 17(6), 329-30, 1999 
182. US Department of Defense, Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, 
Defense  Acquisition University, Defense Systems Management College, 5th end. Fort 
Belvoir, VA: DSMC, 2002   
183. Van Dorp J.R. and Duffey M. R., Statistical Dependence in Risk Analysis for 
Project Networks Using Monte Carlo Methods, International Journal of Production 
Economics, 58 (1), 17-29, 1999 
184. Ward S. C., Assessing and managing important risks, International Journal of 
Project Management, Volume 17, Issue 6, 331-336, Dec 1999  
185. Wateridge J., How can IS/IT projects be measured for success?, International 
Journal of Project Management, 16(1), 59-63, 1998 
186. Wateridge J., IT projects: a basis for success, International Journal of Project 
Management, 13(3), 169-172, 1995 
187. Wellman M. P., Fundamental Concepts of Qualitative Probabilistic Networks, 
Artificial Intelligence, 44 (3), 257-303, 1990 
188. Wharton F., Risk management: Basic concepts and general principles, in: Ansell 
J. and Wharton F. (eds.), Risk: Analysis, Assessment and Management, Wiley, New 
York, 1-14, 1992 
                                                                                                               
176 
 
189. Wideman R. M., Risk Management Handbook, Project Management Institute, 
Newtown Square, PA, 1992 
190. Williams T. M., Assessing Extension of Time delays on major projects, 
International Journal of Project Management, 21, 19-26, 2001 
191. Williams T. M., Risk-management infrastructures, International Journal of 
Project Management, 11, 5-10, 1993 
192. Williams T. M., Two-dimensionality of project risk, International Journal of 
Project Management, 14 (3), 185-186, 1996 
193. Williams T. M., Using a Risk Register to integrate Risk Management in Project 
Definition, International Journal of Project Management, 12, 17-22, 1994 
194. Williams T., Ackermann F. and Eden C., Structuring a delay and disruption 
claim: An application of cause-mapping and system dynamics, European Journal of 
Operations Research, 148 (1), 192-204, 2003 
195. Winkler R.L., An Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision. Second 
Edition, Probabilistic Publishing, Gainsville, FL, 2003. 
196. Wright J.N., Time and budget: the twin imperatives of a project sponsor, 
International Journal of Project Management, 15(3), 181-186, 1997  
197. Wright S., Correlation and causation, Journal of Agricultural Research, 20:557-
585, 1921 
198. Xenos M., Prediction and assessment of student behaviour in open and distance 
education in computers using Bayesian Networks, Computers and Education, 43 (4), 345-
359, 2003 
199. Yager R. R., Including decision attitude in probabilistic decision making, 
International Journal Approximate Reasoning, 21(1), 1-21, 1999 
200. Yager R. R., On the valuation of alternatives for decision-making under 
uncertainty, International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 17, 687-707, 2002  
201. Yager R.R., Fuzzy modelling for intelligent decision making under uncertainty, 
IEEE Transactions Systems Man Cybernet, Part B 30 (1), 60-70, 2000 
202. Yates F. J. And Stone E. R. The risk construct,  Risk taking behaviour, J. F. 
Yates Ed., John Wiley, New York, 1992  
                                                                                                               
177 
 
203. Zagorecki A. and Druzdzel M., An Empirical Study of Probability Elicitation 
under Noisy-OR Assumption, In Proceedings of the 17th International Florida Artificial 
Intelligence Research Society Conference, Barr V. and Markov Z. (eds), 880-885, 2004 
204. Ziv H. and Richardson D. J., Bayesian-network confirmation of software testing 
uncertainties, ESEC, 1997 
 
                                                                                                               
178 
 
Appendix A, Risk Factors for Large Projects 
Project 
Domain 
Name for an area in which projects might be done, with risk factors in this table generally 
found in this type of project. 
Factor ID A sequentially assigned number for risk factors in this domain. When new factors are 
added, they get the next available sequential number, thus items within a category may not 
be in numerical order. 
Risk 
Category 
Header that names the category in which the following risk factors belong. 
Risk Factors Named areas of potential risk to projects in this domain. 
Low Risk 
Cues 
Characteristics of this factor when it can be considered low risk to a project. 
Medium 
Risk Cues 
Characteristics of this factor when it provides a medium risk to a project. 
High Risk 
Cues 
Characteristics of this factor when it should be considered high risk to a project. 
Rating Level of risk you think is true of this project. 
Low (L) This project exhibits the low risk cue, or appears to have no risk in this area. 
Medium (M) This project exhibits the medium risk cue, or something similar in threat. 
High (H) This project exhibits the high risk cue, or something similar in threat. 
Not Applic 
(NA) This factor is not applicable to this project. 
Need Info 
(NI) We need information from someone else (perhaps an expert) to make a judgment. 
TBD The project is not far enough along to make a rating; we need to review this later. 
Notes Space for notes during rating, for later reference on reasons a rating was chosen. 
                                  
               Rating (check one)    
Factor Risk Factors Low Risk Cues Medium Risk High Risk L M H NA NI TBD Notes 
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ID Cues Cues 
                                    
Mission and Goals 










impacts one or 









                     










impacts one or 

























or services of 
this 
organization 
                     
4 Work Flow little or no 
change to work 
flow 
will change 
some aspect or 
have small 




work flow or 
method of 
organization 
                     
Program Management (if project is part of a program) 















                     





















need the same 
resources at 
the same time 
(or compete 
for the same 
budget) 

















are trying to 
drive it in very 
different 
directions 
                     






person or team 
responsible for 
program, but 
unable to spend 
enough time to 
lead effectively 
program has 
no leader, or 
program 
manager 
concept is not 
in use 



















new to the 
domain 
                     






program is not 
well-defined 
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but unlikely to 











































date is being 
partially driven 
by need to 
meet marketing 
demo, trade 





date is being 
totally driven 









                     





been in use for 
some time 
project is being 
done in a sub-






being done as 
a way to show 
a new 
technology or 
as an excuse 
to bring a new 
                     






14 Short Term 
Solution 
project meets 












of what is 











the short term 
deliverable 





























their own roles 
and 
responsibilities 




their own roles 
and 
responsibilities, 






many in the 
organization 








                     






no policies or 
standards, or 
                     







standards are in 
place, but are 















little or no 
support 





























































of how needs 





have needs in 
mind 





unsure of how 
needs can be 
                     










process is in 







in place for 
user approvals 





                     











training yet or 























                     
Project Characteristics 






































known to fail 
in certain 
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circumstances cases, likely to 
be late, or 
incompatible 
with parts of 
approach 
























                     
























that schedule is 
acceptable and 
can be met 
team finds one 
phase of the 
plan to have a 
schedule that is 
too aggressive 
team agrees 
that two or 
more phases 
of schedule 
are unlikely to 
be met 





























only in the 
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unclear head of the 
customer 
36 Testability product 
requirements 




product hard to 





to test, or no 
test plans 
being made 







unclear how to 
design, or 
aspects of 































of the project 
and other parts 
of system 
some elements 




are not yet 
comprehended 
no clear plan 
or schedule 




                     
Deployment 
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service service service 
approach or 
offerings 
42 Data Migration 
Required 
little or no data 
to migrate 







much data to 
migrate; 
several types 
of data or no 
good 
descriptions of 
what is where 
                     




pilot needs to 
be done with 
several sites 
(who are 
willing) or with 
one who needs 
much help 
only available 
pilot sites are 
uncooperative 
or in crisis 
mode already 














































of the team 
                     















no QA process 
or established 
procedures 
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to find all 
defects with 
testing 












no process in 
place to track 
defects 
                     































                     





















                     
54 Vendor Support complete 
support at 
reasonable 














                     
















or causes extra 
work to 
comply 






























                     
Project Management (PM) 






                     





















PM has no 
experience 
with this type 
of project or is 
new to project 
management 
                     


























                     




team and of 
management 
support by 







                     
Team Members 
61 Team Member 
Availability 












most of time 
fighting fires 
                     
62 Mix of Team 
Skills 








                     















some of the 
information 





team or to 
others who 
need to be 
informed 
















                     












with domain in 
team or able to 
call on experts 
as needed 

























                     
68 Training of 
Team 














                     




willing to do 
what it takes to 
little or no 
commitment 
                     






get the job 
done 
to the project; 


















met, delays in 
deliverables 



















a poor match 
to the problem 
or customer 















                     















                     
74 Maturity of 
Technology 
technology has 
been in use in 













                     









                     

















                     
77 Vendor Support complete 
support at 
reasonable 














                     
                                    
      Total 
Categories 
14                      
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Appendix B, Risk Factors for Large Projects as Attributes 
 
 Adequacy of PM          Good                                                Bad
Mission and Goals 
1 Project Fit to 
Customer 
Organization 
directly supports customer 
organization mission and/or 
goals 
does not support or relate to 
customer organization mission 
or goals 
2 Project Fit to 
Provider 
Organization 
directly supports provider 
organization mission and/or 
goals 
does not support or relate to 
provider organization mission or 
goals 
3 Customer Perception customer expects this 
organization to provide this 
product 
project is mismatch with prior 
products or services of this 
organization 
4 Work Flow little or no change to work 
flow 
significantly changes the work 
flow or method of organization 
5  Goal commitment of 
project team  
High goal commitment of 
project team  
Low goal commitment of project 
team 
Program Management (if Project is part of a program) 
5 Goals Conflict goals of projects within the 
program are supportive of or 
complimentary to each other 
goals of projects are in conflict, 
either directly or indirectly 
6 Resource Conflict projects within the program 
share resources without any 
conflict 
projects within the program 
often need the same resources at 
the same time (or compete for 
the same budget) 
7 Customer Conflict multiple customers of the 
program have common needs 
multiple customers of the 
program are trying to drive it in 
very different directions 
8 Leadership program has active program 
manager who coordinates 
projects 
program has no leader, or 
program manager concept is not 
in use 
9 Program Manager program manager has deep program manager is new to the 
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Experience experience in the domain domain 
8 Project manager 
location 
On-site project manager Off-site project manager 
1
0 
Definition of the 
Program 
program is well-defined, with 
a scope that is manageable by 
this organization 
program is not well-defined or 





Political Influences no particular politically-
driven choices being made 
project has a variety of political 
influences or most decisions are 
made behind closed doors 
1
2 
Convenient Date date for delivery has been set 
by reasonable project 
commitment process 
date is being totally driven by 
need to meet marketing demo, 
trade show, or other mandate; 




Use of Attractive 
Technology 
technology selected has been 
in use for some time 
project is being done as a way to 
show a new technology or as an 
excuse to bring a new 
technology into the organization 
1
4 
Short Term Solution project meets short term need 
without serious compromise 
to long term outlook 
project team has been explicitly 
directed to ignore the long term 
outlook and focus on completing 






little or no change in 
management or structure 
expected 
management or organization 






individuals throughout the 
organization understand their 
own roles and responsibilities 
and those of others 
many in the organization are 
unsure or unaware of who is 
responsible for many of the 
activities of the organization 
1 Policies and development policies and no policies or standards, or they 
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7 Standards standards are defined and 
carefully followed 
are ill-defined and unused 
1
8 
Management Support strongly committed to 
success of project 









Project Objectives verifiable project objectives, 
reasonable requirements 
no established project objectives 




User Involvement users highly involved with 
project team, provide 
significant input 
minimal or no user involvement; 
little user input 
2
2 
User Experience users highly experienced in 
similar projects; have specific 
ideas of how needs can be 
met 
users have no previous 
experience with similar projects; 
unsure of how needs can be met 
2
3 
User Acceptance users accept concepts and 
details of system; process is 
in place for user approvals 
users do not accept any concepts 
or design details of system 
2
4 
User Training Needs user training needs 
considered; training in 
progress or plan in place 




User Justification user justification complete, 
accurate, sound 
no satisfactory justification for 
system 
Project Characteristics  
2
6 
Project Size small, non-complex, or easily 
decomposed 






components available and 
compatible with approach 
components identified, need 





components available and 
directly usable 
components known to fail in 
certain cases, likely to be late, or 
incompatible with parts of 




9 Accuracy of  initial 
cost estimates 
High accuracy of initial cost 
estimates 




Budget Size sufficient budget allocated doubtful budget is sufficient 
3
0 
Budget Constraints funds allocated without 
constraints 
allocation in doubt or subject to 
change without notice 
3
1 











team agrees that schedule is 
acceptable and can be met 
team agrees that two or more 
phases of schedule are unlikely 






little or no change expected 
to approved set (baseline) 







all completely specified and 
clearly written 
some requirements only in the 
head of the customer 
3
6 
Testability product requirements easy to 
test, plans underway 
most of product hard to test, or 
no test plans being made 
3
7 
Design Difficulty well defined interfaces; 
design well understood 
interfaces not well defined or 





content is reasonable for this 
team to implement 
content has components this 




System Dependencies clearly defined dependencies 
of the project and other parts 
of system 
no clear plan or schedule for 
how the whole system will come 
together 
 






Response or other 
Performance Factors 
readily fits boundaries 
needed; analysis has been 
done 






requires little change to 
customer service 
requires major changes to 






little or no data to migrate much data to migrate; several 
types of data or no good 
descriptions of what is where 
4
3 
Pilot Approach pilot site (or team) available 
and interested in participating 
only available pilot sites are 





Alternatives Analysis analysis of alternatives 
complete, all considered, 
assumptions verifiable 
analysis not completed, not all 
alternatives considered, or 
assumptions faulty 
5 Adequacy of 
planning and control 
techniques 
High adequacy of planning 
and control techniques 




Commitment Process changes to commitments in 
scope, content, schedule are 
reviewed and approved by all 
involved 
changes to commitments are 
made without review or 





QA system established, 
followed, effective 






correct and available nonexistent 
4
8 
Use of Defined 
Development Process 
development process in 
place, established, effective, 
followed by team 
no formal process used 
4 Early Identification peer reviews are incorporated team expects to find all defects 
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9 of Defects throughout with testing 
5
0 
Defect Tracking defect tracking defined, 
consistent, effective 




Change Control for 
Work Products 
formal change control 
process in place, followed, 
effective 




Physical Facilities little or no modification 
needed 




Tools Availability in place, documented, 
validated 
unvalidated, proprietary or major 
development needed; no 
documentation 
6  Start-up difficulties          Low start-up difficulties High start-up difficulties 
5
4 
Vendor Support complete support at 
reasonable price and in 
needed time frame 
little or no support, high cost, 
and/or poor response time 
5
5 
Contract Fit contract with customer has 
good terms, communication 
with team is good 
contract has burdensome 
document requirements or 
causes extra work to comply 
5
6 
Disaster Recovery all areas following security 
guidelines; data backed up; 
disaster recovery system in 
place; procedures followed 
no security measures in place; 
backup lacking; disaster 
recovery not considered 
7  Bureaucracy Absence of bureaucracy High bureaucracy 
Project Manager (PM) 
5
7 
PM Approach product and process planning 
and monitoring in place 




PM Experience PM very experienced with 
similar projects 
PM has no experience with this 
type of project or is new to 
project management 
5 PM Authority has line management or has little authority from location 
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9 official authority that enables 
project leadership 
effectiveness 
in the organization structure and 
little personal power to influence 
decision-making and resources 
7 PM Influence High PM influence Low PM influence 
8 PM Technical skills High PM technical skills Low PM technical skills 
9 PM Human skills High PM human skills Low PM human skills 
6
0 
Support of the PM complete support by team 
and of management 
no visible support; manager in 
name only 




1 Project manager 
commitment to 
established budgets  
  










in place, little turnover 
expected; few interrupts for 
fire fighting 
high turnover, not available; 










clearly communicates goals 
and status between the team 
and rest of organization 
rarely communicates clearly 
within team or to others who 





extensive experience in team 
with projects like this 







good background with 
application domain within 
development team 
no expertise in domain in team, 
no availability of experts 












high experience low experience 
6
8 
Training of Team training plan in place, 
training ongoing 




Team Spirit and 
Attitude 
strongly committed to 
success of project; 
cooperative 
little or no commitment to the 
project; not a cohesive team 
7
0 
Team Productivity all milestones met, 
deliverables on time, 
productivity high 
productivity low, milestones not 




Technology Match to 
Project 
technology planned for 
project is good match to 
customers and problem 
selected technology is a poor 





Experience of Project 
Team 
good level of experience with 
technology 






technology experts readily 
available 
will need to acquire help from 





technology has been in use in 
the industry for quite some 
time 
technology is leading edge, if 
not "bleeding edge" in nature 
Maintenance and Support 
7
5 
Design Complexity easily maintained extremely difficult to maintain 
7
6 
Support Personnel in place, experienced, 
sufficient in number 




Vendor Support complete support at 
reasonable price and in 
needed time frame 
little or no support, high cost, 
and/or poor response time 
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